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Spring 1983

David P. Calleo — American Domestic Priorities and the Demands of Alliance

Robert N. Kearney — The Political Party System in Sri Lanka

Bonita A. Wlodkowski — Caveat Emptor in Health Care

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Geoffrey Piller — DOD's Office of International Security Affairs

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From the Editor:

In this issue. . .

DAVID P. CALLEO examines the degree to which America's domestic political priorities interfere with its foreign obligations, particularly its alliances with Western Europe.

ROBERT N. KEARNEY traces the evolution of the political party system of Sri Lanka since independence. He concludes that institutionalization has advanced rapidly, with a growing tendency toward polarization of voter support between two major opposing parties.

BONITA A. WLODKOWSKI's review essay of *The Economics and Politics of Health* and *A New Approach to the Economics of Health Care* discusses the performance of regulatory policies in controlling health care costs. She also critically appraises the theoretical and current political appeal of market-oriented approaches to health care cost containment.

RICHARD P. NATHAN summarizes the principal theoretical lessons from ten years of field evaluations of federal grants-in-aid and of their cutback under the Reagan administration.

GEOFFREY PILLER examines the Defense Department's Office of International Security Affairs, showing how it rose to a very high level of influence in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and fell to relative obscurity under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

STEPHEN M. MILLETT reviews the history of the negotiations of SALT I with emphasis on the forward-based systems (FBS) issue, highlighting contrasting Soviet and American perceptions of security.

DONALD R. BRAND analyzes the regulation of the oil industry under the National Recovery Administration. He argues that the NRA was an example of democratic corporatism in which government bureaucrats promoted the interests and organization of small business at the expense of big business.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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American Domestic Priorities and the Demands of Alliance

DAVID P. CALLEO

Vietnam and Watergate revived the old question of whether America's domestic politics and priorities are compatible with its international role. Progressively worsening economic conditions and rising military costs have kept the topic alive.

The subject remains many-sided and hard to grasp. Analytically, the distinction between foreign and domestic goals is often elusive. On the one hand, many domestic aims depend closely upon a certain kind of international order. On the other, allies who let domestic economic and social conditions deteriorate grow less reliable. Prescribing the appropriate sum and balance of foreign and domestic claims depends upon answering numerous complex questions: What are the nation's appropriate external commitments and acceptable ways of meeting them? What level of domestic prosperity and welfare is needed to sustain a stable social and political system solidly committed to democratic values? At what point does diverting resources from civilian purposes undermine growth and long-range strength, abroad as well as at home? Can the burdens of external commitments be shared through the international economy, and if so, with what consequences for economic and political stability? Analyzing why policy reaches the answers it does requires understanding the perspectives and dynamics of America's mass and elite opinion, the political process with its structures and mobilized groups, the economic trends and expectations, and the role of foreign pressures. Analyses of such matters are highly controversial in themselves, let alone in conjunction with each other.

DAVID P. CALLEO is professor and director of European Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and is currently writing on American policy toward the Atlantic Alliance. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies at The Hague and is being published as an Adelphi Paper.

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The Traditional View

The issue of domestic versus external goals is difficult for students of international relations to approach without distorting preconceptions. Those who study and practice foreign policy are strongly inclined to regard interfering domestic priorities as similar to psychosomatic causes of bad health—unfortunate and unnecessary. Their natural inclinations toward the primacy of foreign policy are strongly reinforced by certain widely prevailing views about recent history. The Second World War is blamed on Europe's "appeasement" of Hitler, a policy traced to the domestic self-indulgence of democracies with provincial leaders.

Alongside this common view of European appeasement is an equally traditional picture of American isolationism and its international consequences. In this traditional historical view, the United States should have taken up the indispensable role of world manager as Britain grew progressively enfeebled. The *Pax Britannica* should have been sustained by being transformed into a *Pax Americana*. Instead, the isolationist inclinations of its masses are said to have kept America aloof. As a result, the disintegrating world balance led to two world wars, neither of which could be resolved until internationalist-minded elites maneuvered the United States out of its domestic self-preoccupation. Thanks to the Cold War after World War II, America's elites, with transatlantic help, were able to keep the country's attention on international responsibilities. In this perspective, the postwar *Pax Americana*, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in particular, was a sort of benevolent and successful conspiracy of transatlantic elites against an erratic American public. Populist isolationism revived, however, with Vietnam. America's policy, and the world's stability, have been seriously undermined ever since.

However valid this isolationist paradigm may seem for the past, it is irrelevant to the Atlantic Alliance's current problems. The American public is not opposed to foreign commitments, least of all to America's European commitments. The current quarrel is not between America's public and its elites but among the transatlantic elites themselves. Those in charge of foreign policy in Europe and America do not agree over the shape of the future world system. Increasingly, they do not agree on how to deal with the Soviet Union, with the Third World, or with their own relationship. On the American side, at least, the springs of this conflict are not to be found in the popular heartland, but in elitist Washington. If American foreign policies are more and more "unilateral," by which it is usually meant that Europe does not approve of them, the blame should not be laid on the American public's domestic preferences.

Public Opinion and the Alliance

Surveys of public opinion over recent years hardly reveal American mass opinion as chronically disposed to place domestic goals above foreign obligations.

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On the contrary, even in the wake of Vietnam and the more sanguine view of Soviet-American relations prevailing in the heyday of Kissingerian détente, public support for NATO remained strong. Measurements of public opinion over the past several years confirm, over and over, the continuing mass support for using American troops against a Soviet attack in Europe. According to one set of data, a post-Vietnam bottom of 48 percent in favor was reached in 1974–75, with 34 percent opposed.[1] Support began rising by 1976, with a temporary postwar high of 74 percent in favor and only 19 percent opposed in July 1980 following the Soviet Union's Afghan invasion and the taking of Americans as hostages in Iran. Polls in 1982 showed support down to a more normal 56 percent in favor and 25 percent opposed. Logically enough, the public also supports keeping troops in Europe. A Gallup poll in February 1982 showed half the American public favoring American forces in Europe at their present level, and 16 percent wanting an increase, while 10 percent favored a reduction and 11 percent wanted the troops out altogether.[2] But even in 1974, with anti-Vietnam feeling still running high, 52 percent favored retaining the same troop levels, with 3 percent wanting an increase, while 25 percent favored reduction and 12 percent elimination.

Rising support for the European commitment after the mid-1970s was paralleled by even sharper increases in support for defense spending. In various polls from the late 1960s to mid-1970s, one-third to one-half of the respondents regularly found U.S. defense spending excessive, whereas those who found it insufficient ranged from 9 to 17 percent. By 1975, an NBC poll recorded 41 percent who still found spending excessive, but 25 percent who believed it insufficient. The trend thereafter changed the ratio dramatically. By 1980, various polls showed only 5 to 14 percent found spending excessive and 46 to 76 percent who found it insufficient.[3] By March 1982, the huge Reagan defense proposals seemed finally to have produced a public reaction. A CBS/*New York Times* poll showed 49 percent favoring defense cuts against 41 percent who did not.[4]

[1] Surveys for Potomac Associates were kindly provided, along with much good advice, by William Watts. See his "The United States and Japan: How We See Each Other," speech delivered on 28 May 1982 in Tokyo at the Nippon Press Center Building, p. 14. Also Lloyd Free and William Watts, "Internationalism Comes of Age . . . Again," *Public Opinion*, April/May 1980, p. 46. For interpretations I take to be along the broad lines developed here, see also Daniel Yankelovich, "Cautious Internationalism: A Changing Mood Toward U.S. Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion*, March/April 1978, p. 12; Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kaagan, "Assertive America," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1980*, 59 (1981): 696–713; Bruce Russett and Donald R. DeLuca, "Don't Tread on Me: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (1981): 381–401; a broad view that has influenced my thinking is in John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: Its Past and Future," *International Security* (1981): 74–102.

[2] International Poll by Gallup-Affiliated Institutions during February 1982, for *Newsweek International* and other European news organizations.

[3] Various CBS/*New York Times*, NBC and AIPO surveys as summarized in Table 1, Russett and DeLuca, "Don't Tread on Me."

[4] CBS/*New York Times* Poll, 18 March 1982.

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The revived public support for external commitments has never been indiscriminate. The strong majority found in 1982 to favor NATO in Europe diminishes slightly for the American commitment to Japan (54 favorable versus 30 percent opposed) and dwindles into a minority of one-third (with 51 percent opposed) for South Korea.[5] Support for interventions in Central America is almost non-existent. The public also seems increasingly wary that the Reagan administration's foreign policy is too belligerent and undiscriminating. A Harris poll of 17 June 1982 shows 52 percent worried about Reagan "getting the country into a war," with 45 percent not worried, 53 percent giving the president "negative marks on his nuclear weapons negotiations with the Soviets," and only 41 percent positive.[6] When nuclear weapons are mentioned, even public support for European defense seems more ambivalent. An NBC poll in October 1981 showed 52 percent opposed to American use of nuclear weapons in reply to a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe. Only 29 percent favored either a limited or an all-out American nuclear response. Seventy-eight percent felt neither side could win a nuclear war.[7]

In summary, nuclear ambiguities notwithstanding, public support for the Alliance has remained strong, with a near majority even at its lowest point in the mid-1970s. But support does vary considerably, even if a firm base remains.

Changes in Public Opinion

What mechanism governs changes in public opinion?[8] On foreign policy issues, public opinion as a whole generally appears less volatile than the opinion of what might be called its "upper stratum," those occupying high occupational, economic, and educational status. Mass opinion tends to follow this upper stratum but with a smaller fluctuation. The upper stratum, for example, turned against the Vietnam War and defense spending earlier and more sharply than the general public. It also seems to have grown fearful of declining American strength earlier than the public at large.

Opinion in the upper stratum is said to be particularly sensitive to the treatment of foreign policy events in the media. The media themselves reflect the foreign policy elites—administration leaders and other politicians, bureaucratic experts, vigorous interest groups, as well as a sizeable band of private pundits and research centers.

At the present time, criticism of the Alliance in foreign policy circles has grown intense and is already amply represented in the media. Upper-stratum and ultimately mass opinion may thus be affected. Mass opinion seems already well aware of the current transatlantic friction. An NBC poll in early 1982

[5] Watts, "The United States and Japan."
[6] Harris Poll, 17 June 1982.
[7] NBC Poll, 10 November 1981 (taken in October 1981).
[8] Russett and DeLuca, "Don't Tread on Me."

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revealed 72 percent who saw West European allies not supporting U.S. sanctions against Poland sufficiently and 80 percent who saw insufficient support for American policies in general.[9] Should such disappointments and irritations ultimately cause popular support for the European commitment to disintegrate, however, the shift would not fit the traditional isolationist paradigm. An autonomous and fickle drift of the mass public to neoisolationism would not overpower the internationalist elites. Instead, the erosion in public support would follow debates initiated among elite policymakers and private experts in which the Alliance lost ground and the consequences gradually filtered into mass opinion.

Cultural Community

Transatlantic recrimination among foreign policy elites has, of course, been frequent since the NATO treaty was signed in 1949. Yet the public has remained faithful. An intense cultural community, close economic interaction, and a myriad of personal connections are thought to form a community of identity and perception that shields military and political ties from the inevitable collisions of national interest. The political benefits of cultural interpenetration may, of course, be exaggerated. Intense interdependence has characterized relations among European states throughout much of their history without preventing innumerable European wars. Postwar Europe and America, however, have had the crucial advantage of being able to define their common values and interests in relation to an obvious common enemy. Détente has now made European–American–Soviet relations more ambiguous. In addition, many people perceive a corresponding attenuation of transatlantic cultural ties.

Factors like cultural sympathy and mutual identity are difficult to define or measure. Relationships that can be counted do not reveal diminishing transatlantic interactions. From 1962 to 1977, for example, the annual number of Europeans studying in America increased nearly fourfold, while nearly twice as many Americans were studying in Europe. From 1960 to 1977, the annual number of European visitors to the United States increased by about ten times, while the number of Americans visiting Europe more than doubled.[10]

The quality of relations may deteriorate, of course, even as the frequency increases. Changes in education can make Europeans and Americans know each other less well even as they see each other more often. American elite education, once heavily oriented toward European history and culture, has entered into a time of relative disarray and proliferation of subject matter, with greater sensitivity to non-European aspects of America's heritage.[11] Education in Europe

[9] NBC Poll, 5 February 1982.

[10] Derived from various years of *UN Statistical Yearbook* and UNESCO, *Statistics of Students Abroad.*

[11] See David P. Calleo, "The Alliance: An Enduring Relationship?" *SAIS Review* 4 (1982).

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has undergone a democratic revolution of its own. Serious knowledge or interest about America seems less common. Many young Europeans, moreover, are intrigued by a Third World where, in the leftist perspectives that dominate much of European education, America has been cast in a heavy and unsympathetic role—a part the Reagan administration seems ready to play. As a result, what was close identity in the last generation threatens to become only ritualized nostalgia in the next. If so, the problem is not the quantity of communication but its substance. Such uneasiness over the quality of cultural bonds suggests both the need for careful thought on how they may be reinforced and less complacency about their capacity to compensate for deep political differences.

Domestic Pressure Groups

To affect policy, public opinion needs to be mobilized. In political systems as open and unstructured as the American, well-organized interest groups can give minority views greater weight than the widespread but inert predispositions of the broader public. Aside from the essentially economic pressure groups discussed below, two groups seem particularly relevant to America's external commitments, the renascent anti-nuclear movement and the long-standing Israeli lobby.

The Anti-Nuclear Movement

The recent rise of a militant mass movement against nuclear weapons seems to belie the stability of popular support for America's external commitments, particularly in Western Europe, where a nuclear threat is widely thought to compensate for an imbalance in conventional forces.

America's mass anti-nuclear movement is sufficiently recent, sudden, and diffuse to resist easy generalizations. Its rise seems most plausibly explained, not as a spontaneous defection from old commitments, but as a popular reaction to the Reagan administration's massive arms build-up and bellicose rhetoric.[12] Not unreasonably, the public fears not only nuclear war but also those in power who appear to anticipate it with complacency.[13] Logically, American fear of nuclear war could easily turn into hostility toward the Atlantic Alliance. Renewed American interest in European conventional defense, for example, is driven by fears not only that regional deterrence in Europe may be inadequate, but also

[12] For a comprehensive recent survey, see Fox Butterworth, "Anatomy of the Nuclear Protest," *New York Times Magazine*, 11 July 1982, p. A13. For public opinion on whether the Reagan administration is too bellicose, see note 6.

[13] See, for example, two articles by Robert Scheer, "Civil Defense Program to be Revised: Reagan Seeks to Counter Possible Attack by Soviets," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 January 1982, Sect. I, p. 1, and "U.S. Could Survive War in Administration's View," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 January 1982, Sect. I, p. 1; also Judith Miller, "Panel Angered by Failure of Aide to Testify on Civil Defense Notions Change but the Skepticism Remains," *New York Times*, 4 April 1982, p. 6E.

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that the United States may thereby be drawn into a nuclear war.[14] As more radical experts occasionally suggest, America's nuclear risks would greatly diminish without its NATO commitment.

Whether the anti-nuclear group's momentum will carry it from condemning nuclear war to advocating withdrawal from nuclear commitments remains to be seen. European agitation over the dangers of American missiles on European soil may, of course, resonate to America. But assuming a link between the anti-nuclear movement and isolationism seems premature. The logical affinities, however, suggest the importance of making public sense out of military strategies and official positions on arms control. An intemperate and insensitive official posture risks provoking an organized wave of public mistrust that may greatly inhibit external commitments in the future. No doubt experts will then blame neoisolationism.

Ethnic Lobbies

Of America's lobbies claiming to represent ethnic groups and pressing particular foreign policy goals, the Israeli lobby is the most ambitious and effective. Not only American Jews but also a large part of the general public feels a special sympathy and obligation toward Israel. For several decades, a coalition of diverse agencies and individuals has effectively mobilized and brought this support to bear on Congress and the administration. Pro-Israeli influence has been felt not only on American policy toward the Middle East but also toward the Soviet Union. Russia's persecution of dissenters, plus Soviet support for Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), have in recent years encouraged a certain coalescence between pro-Israeli and anti-Soviet perspectives. This coalescence has played its part in the deterioration of Soviet–American détente. In particular, the Jackson–Vanik amendment to the trade bill of 1974, intended hoping to constrain the Soviets to permit more emigration, became a serious obstacle to building up Soviet–American trade.

Some of Israel's American supporters have also grown increasingly critical of the Europeans. From an American perspective that combines support for Israel with loathing for the Soviets, European states can easily be criticized for "Finlandization" at home, a pro-Arab bias in the Middle East, and a generally fatuous complacency about revolutionary movements in the Third World. European inclinations to appease this criticism have declined, and European disapproval of current Israeli policy has grown increasingly vehement. With most European states increasingly alienated from Israel, how significant for American-European relations is this coalescence of pro-Israeli, anti-Soviet and anti-European perspectives?

An American foreign policy opposing détente in Europe while condoning

[14] See McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (1982): 753–68.

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Israeli militancy in the Middle East clearly was not formulated with European sensibilities in mind. If popular antipathy against the Soviet Union remains strong in America, however, support for Israel's present militant course seems on the wane, not least in the American Jewish community itself. Even Americans deeply attached to Israel and sympathetic to the dilemmas involved in "appeasing" the Arabs must wonder at the cost to the United States of a policy that progressively alienates not only the Arab states but also the European allies. Such sentiments are widespread among foreign policy elites and surface more and more frequently in the media.[15] If the American public is unlikely to renounce concern for Israel, the escalation of the diplomatic costs should make future support less unconditional and sweeping. Logically, a certain coalescence of American and European views on the Middle East is more imaginable than formerly. Thus at least one source of transatlantic friction shows some possibility of diminishing.

Economic Constraints on Foreign Policy

Every Western state has a multitude of powerful economic interest groups. Deteriorating economic conditions intensify their vigor and competitiveness. Greater competitiveness between domestic economic goals and foreign commitments seems logical, even if the distinction is often elusive.

Examining tensions between domestic interests and foreign obligations involves looking at both macroeconomic and commercial policy. In macroeconomic policy, the size of the defense budget is the most self-evident foreign-policy issue. Defense spending obviously has its domestic beneficiaries. But since the state's resources are not infinite, a bigger defense budget appears to mean a smaller civilian budget. Whether a particular defense budget seems adequate presumably depends upon estimates of the foreign commitments national security requires, the forces needed to meet the commitments adequately, and the reasonable cost of such forces. Someone who believes that the United States should be the "world's policeman," with a secure first-strike capability against the Soviet Union and the capacity to fight two or three major conventional wars simultaneously, requires a different sum and balance of domestic and foreign spending from someone with more limited external requirements.

Comparing American with Soviet or NATO with Warsaw Pact military spending is one obvious index of military adequacy. The difficulties of such comparisons are well known. Straightforward comparisons do not, however, show an overall imbalance unfavorable to NATO. In 1980, before Reagan's major build-up, the U.S. defense budget was $142.6 billion. Published CIA calculations have the Soviet Union spending the equivalent of around $185 billion. The rest of NATO, however, spent well over $98.2 billion, as opposed to rough-

[15] Polls in early July 1982 assessing public reactions to Israel's Lebanon invasion varied widely. For a sensitive analysis of growing anti-Israeli sentiment, see Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Anti-Semitism and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 47 (1982): 172–83.

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ly $16.7 billion for the rest of the Warsaw Pact. The West also has slightly more men under arms in peacetime (4.93 million versus 4.78 million).[16] Such comparisons, obviously crude, nevertheless help put in perspective the widespread notion of the Warsaw Pact's superior military resources. That NATO should be able to outspend and outnumber the Warsaw Pact should not be surprising. The West is far superior in population, industrial infrastructure, and technology.

Despite the West's inherent superiority in resources and explicit superiority in spending and manpower, many analysts find its effective combat strength markedly inferior, particularly for conventional war. Logically enough, some experts trace this putative inferiority to a misallocation of resources. Its critics, for example, often find American defense planning without an adequate military doctrine to link commitments, tactics, weapons, and forces. In this view, official planners—bemused by technology—know more about weapons than about fighting. Reagan's build-up is seen merely as an extravagant shopping list of new weapons, in many cases without serious military justification. The United States military lacks not money and personnel but the brains and imagination needed for adequate doctrine and organization. Even if critics are more convincing when pointing to defects than to alternatives, America's low ratio of combat forces makes the critique plausible.[17]

The inability to formulate coherent and efficient military doctrines does not, in itself, indicate a scarcity of material resources. (Quite the contrary.) Nor do budgetary politics in recent years suggest a squeezing of defense spending. From 1960 to 1980, American military outlays increased 7 percent at constant prices. The rate, to be sure, was uneven. A compound annual growth rate from 1960 to 1970 of 2.7 percent was followed by a 1.9 percent compounded annual decline from 1970 to 1979. The American decline in the 1970s, however, was more than matched by compound annual increases of 1.8, 3.3, 2.8 and 3.5 percent for Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, respectively.[18] In any event, the Carter ad-

[16] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1981-1982,* pp. 3-39, 112-13, 121-25.

[17] For a survey of congressional and other critics of military budgeting, see Richard Halloran, "Criticism Rises on Reagan's Plan for 5-Year Growth of the Military," *New York Times*, 22 March 1982, p. 1; James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981) mounts a comprehensive attack on the defense budget. Concern about NATO's effectiveness among congressional leaders generally worried about defense can be found in Senator Sam Nunn, "NATO: Can the Alliance Be Saved?" Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 13 May 1982 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982). For a recent newspaper survey of NATO's deficiencies, see Neil Ulman, "An Out-gunned NATO has Much to Discuss at its Summit in June," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 May 1982, p. 1. Specialist literature on military issues is extensive. Representative American critiques of present doctrines and force structures are Steven I. Canby, "Territorial Defense in Central Europe," *Armed Forces and Society* 7 (1980): 51-67; or William S. Lind, "Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army," *Military Review* 17 (1977): 54-65. For sharp critique of the critics, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front," *International Security* 6 (1981-82): 104-22. A survey assessing and synthesizing contrasting positions is Colonel T. N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, retired, "The Nondebate Over How Army Should Fight," *Army*, June 1982, pp. 35-45.

[18] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1981-1982*, p. 110.

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ministration had already reversed the American decline. In addition, the Reagan plans announced in 1981 called for defense expenditures to rise from $161 billion in fiscal year 1981 to $343 billion in fiscal year 1986—a gradual increase of $181 billion.[19]

Despite the straitened economic circumstances and prolonged congressional budgetary struggle of 1982, the new defense program emerged virtually unscathed. In the end, Congress abandoned not the military buildup, but any prospect of moving toward budgetary equilibrium. Despite all the rhetoric about fiscal responsibility, the administration proposed and the Congress accepted an overall budget that would predictably lead to a deficit of well over $100 billion.[20]

The 1982 budget battle was simply a more theatrical version of an annual American performance.[21] Congress once more proved unable to reconcile domestic and foreign claims within the resources it was willing to make available. True, in the face of a tax cut and substantial military increases, the annual rise in civilian expenditures was slowed; it nevertheless continued to grow, and a record deficit became unavoidable. Resolving the budgetary dilemma through a large deficit has, by now, become the normal state of affairs. Except for 1969, the U.S. federal budget has had a deficit every year since 1960.

Deficits are not cost-free. Depending on whether monetary policy is generous or tight, perpetual and substantial fiscal deficits generally mean either inflation or else a shortage of capital for private investment. The United States has now experienced both forms of cost. Until recently, Congress's traditional aversion to high interest rates meant financing deficits with easy money; hence, there has been a steady rise of inflation along with a weak and often depreciating dollar. Given the dollar's international role, much of the inflation was exported, adding significantly to the inflationary problems of most advanced capitalist countries. The cost of America's deficit was thus shared throughout the Alliance.

Tighter American monetary policy since 1979 has meant more financing from real savings borrowed in the capital markets. Unfortunately, this shift to tight money has coincided with a severe cyclical recession and Reagan's greatly increased fiscal deficits. Unprecedented interest rates and a dramatically appreciated dollar have made it difficult for either the American or other economies to recover. Unemployment and bankruptcy have reached levels unknown in the postwar era. Few predict a sustained recovery under present cir-

[19] *New York Times*, 5 March 1981, p. A1. An updated request can be found in Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1983*, January 1982.

[20] For a detailed account of the Senate debate, see Pat Towell, "Defense Authorization Bill Passed by Senate after Trims Made to Meet Budget Goals," *Congressional Quarterly, Special Report*, 15 May 1982, pp. 1155–59. For the flavor of the House debate, see Margot Hornblower, "House Backs Reagan on Military Spending," *International Herald Tribune*, 31 July–1 August 1982, p. 1. For various estimates of the deficit, see "U.S. Aides Downplay Report on Economy," ibid.

[21] For an extended version of this argument, see David P. Calleo, *The Imperious Economy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), ch. 9.

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cumstances. In short, the deficits once paid through inflation are now being paid through deflation.

The political distress of prolonged recession could easily force either a new round of excessive monetary creation, and hence renewed inflation, or else a new drive toward fiscal equilibrium, and hence a serious battle for fiscal priority. Either course poses serious difficulties for the Reagan administration.

Renewing inflation is ultimately the traditional and perhaps easiest tactic. Some analysts found the Federal Reserve already launched on such a policy in the last months of 1982. If so, the country might well face sharply renewed inflation, or, in other words, another round of the increasingly violent cyclical oscillations that have characterized the economy since the 1960s. For the Reagan administration to try more seriously to move toward fiscal equilibrium, on the other hand, means either raising taxes or cutting spending. Trying to increase taxes sufficiently would threaten the administration's basic "supply-side" economic strategy and might well prove self-defeating in a recession. Conversely, cutting expenditures would mean a heightened confrontation between civilian and military spending. With the recession boosting welfare costs and draining the administration's political support, success in cutting civilian budgets grows increasingly improbable. Since American defense expenditures are already much higher than Western Europe's, and U.S. welfare expenditures are relatively meager, a budgetary squeeze risks a backlash not only against the expanded military budget, but against the NATO commitment itself.[22] Such a reaction, logical and widely feared, might sorely test the public's long-standing devotion to the alliance. At the moment, however, it is the foreign-policy elites themselves who are most critical of the "free-riding" allies.

Whatever else may be said, the Reagan administration's economic policies cannot be construed as domestic priorities overriding foreign commitments. Wisely or not, the administration, supported by the public, has refused to cut back its ambitious plans for the increased defense spending it believes vital for national security and world obligations. In effect, economic policy has been sacrificed to defense policy. If some of the consequences have been as unpopular abroad as they have been unfortunate at home, they must be blamed on an excess of internationalist zeal rather than a rebirth of isolationism.

Protectionism and the Alliance

Whereas the international significance of America's domestic fiscal and monetary policy has only gradually been recognized, commercial policy has

[22] In 1980, defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP for Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S. were 5.1, 3.9, 3.2, and 5.5 percent, respectively. American social security expenditures are, in proportion to GNP, about two-thirds those of Britain and roughly half those of France and Germany. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1981–82*, p. 112. Social security figures are from the Comparative Studies Staff, Office of International Policy, Social Security Administration, and are spelled out in Calleo, *The Imperious Economy*, p. 96.

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always seemed crucial to Alliance relations. Liberal trade has long been thought essential to foreign political and military ties. Liberal trade, of course, is not a foreign obligation necessarily honored at the expense of domestic priorities. Many domestic interests depend on foreign markets for their prosperity. Among these are the farmers—with many of the industries tied to agriculture—and the multinationals in general, including the big banks.

The notable economic disruptions of the 1970s were widely expected to threaten liberal trade with a rebirth of protectionism. Rich Western economies would seek to insulate themselves, it was thought, against an increasingly erratic and unfavorable international environment. Even internationally-minded economic firms would limit their horizons to more predictable home or regional markets. But despite inflation, oil shocks, competition from newly industrializing countries, and increasingly severe business cycles, trade remained remarkably open in the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, with unprecedented recession and unemployment in both Europe and America, and several basic industries in deep structural difficulty, commercial barriers have been proliferating. As the recent conflict over steel imports illustrates, the American government has great trouble controlling protectionist forces.

The change is less abrupt than it seems. The liberalism of commercial exchange in the 1970s was to a considerable extent illusory. Generous monetary policy, unbalanced fiscal policy, and the dismantling of capital controls meant a periodically declining dollar, which the government refused to defend.[23] Demands for trade barriers were thus appeased by a regularly depreciating dollar. This combination of policies gratified both the nationalist and the internationalist wings of the American economy. Unprecedented freedom to export capital was a boon to internationally-oriented business, banks in particular, while a steadily depreciating dollar helped keep home-based manufacturers competitive, despite their inflating costs. Such a policy was as "mercantilist" as formal protectionism. But it did make direct trade barriers unnecessary and, one way or another, concealed American inflation and diffused the costs to its partners. When the accumulating costs of inflation finally forced a tightening of American monetary policy, and the dollar thereby began to appreciate sharply, American products lost their continually renewed competitive advantage. In a depressed economic climate, pressure for direct protection was bound to increase. In this perspective, the new American protectionism of the eighties is not a shift toward mercantilism but merely a change in its form. American manufacturers and workers now expect tariffs to export the domestic costs of deflation as formerly they expected a declining currency to export the domestic costs of inflation.

A return to genuine liberalism seems improbable so long as American monetary policy is condemned to oscillate from exaggerated inflation to exaggerated constraint. A more stable monetary policy would require reestablishing

[23] Calleo, *The Imperious Economy*, chs. 4 and 8.

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control over fiscal policy, an unlikely achievement without some reconciliation between the American government's resources and the domestic and foreign goals it has pursued. Until this elementary equilibrium is achieved, the West can look forward to mounting economic disorder. Like some deep inner sickness, America's fiscal imbalance may be expected to generate a shifting and accumulating variety of noxious symptoms.

The significance of the military budget in the overall American budget and the weight of the NATO commitment in that military budget together link the Alliance directly to America's fiscal problem. Any serious attempt to achieve American budgetary equilibrium may well involve a showdown in NATO over respective defense costs.[24] For obvious reasons, such a confrontation would constitute a major political challenge. Understandably, European governments would prefer to avoid it. From a broader perspective, however, significant adjustments in the responsibilities and costs of European defense may seem not only beneficial but essential. For the United States to achieve fiscal equilibrium—and hence monetary stability—cannot be counted a selfish domestic goal pursued at the expense of foreign obligations. America's fiscal disorder has contributed heavily to the world's inflation, unemployment, financial overextension, and general economic disorder of the past several years. Those "burdens" have been shared in a way that military costs have not. Economic conditions that steadily sap the West's productive vitality and undermine its social peace are no less real a threat than a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Americans may certainly be criticized for failing to tax themselves adequately. Such criticism, however, does not sit well from rich allies whose own territory is directly menaced but whose defense spending is disproportionately less.

Democracy and Foreign Policy

What broad conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between America's domestic priorities and its Alliance obligations? In direct military and political obligations, the traditional isolationist paradigm does not seem to apply. Isolationism is not deeply-rooted in the masses, nor does internationalism depend upon the elites. The general public has supported America's European commitment and the military budgets demanded to sustain America's external role, a willingness no doubt made easier by America's relatively underdeveloped civilian demands and compulsive fiscal deficits. Present American dissatisfaction with Europe stems, if anywhere, from the foreign-policy elite itself. The issue, moreover, is not the priority of domestic over foreign goals but of a different international strategy.

In economic relations, a different picture emerges. Rising American protectionism clearly suggests a conflict for priority between domestic and foreign claims—between preventing further unemployment in home-based industry and

[24] David P. Calleo, "Inflation and American Power," *Foreign Affairs* 59 (1981): 781–812.

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sustaining an open international economy. This growing protectionist pressure is not a populist mutation, but results logically from present economic policies carried out under present circumstances. The chain of causes that ends with turning away from internationalism in trade passes through a macroeconomic policy of perpetual fiscal imbalance. For over 20 years, the American political system has failed to reconcile the sum of the resources it is willing to raise with the civilian and military budgetary claims it insists upon meeting. The accumulating consequences have seriously undermined Western economic prosperity and progressively soured transatlantic political relations. The resulting pressure to end American fiscal instability also feeds a quarrel within the Alliance over military budgets. A long-standing structural imbalance between respective national resources and military responsibilities has itself played a considerable role in that American fiscal imbalance that lies at the heart of the economic deterioration. From this perspective, the Alliance might be better off today if the American public had long ago insisted more firmly on its domestic priorities and been less fond of its foreign obligations.

The analysis may perhaps be put in more general terms. Over the past two decades, neither the United States nor the states of Western Europe have come to terms with their changed situation. American wealth and power, the initial foundation of the postwar system, has inevitably diminished in relation to both America's adversaries and its allies. America's relative decline represents not a failure of long-standing policy, but its logical consequence. Under the circumstances, preserving the highly integrated and relatively stable postwar order, of which the Atlantic Alliance has been the keystone, requires a more plural sharing of cost and control. This means a substantial adaptation of roles and general perspectives within the Alliance itself.

To ask whether American public opinion would comprehend and support such an evolution seems premature. American leaders have never presented the public with a realistic view of the country's changing world position, nor, it must be confessed, have its foreign-policy and political elites been fertile sources of appropriate new policies. Instead, official America has been bemused first by unrealistic notions of détente and now by an unrealistic nostalgia for hegemony. The result has been a progressive renunciation of serious efforts at accommodation with the Soviet Union, followed by a progressive alienation from Western Europe. As more sensitive pollsters suggest, it is not the public that is demanding unilateral world hegemony. Unfortunately, failures in American leadership are not without their analogue in Western Europe. If American policy may be accused of wanting détente or hegemony "on the cheap," present European policy might be dubbed "self-determination on the cheap."

Under the circumstances, the current deep troubles of American foreign policy should not be blamed on the domestic constraints of democracy, nor upon an upsurge of traditional populist neoisolationism. If the American public is unschooled in world politics, its leaders have never presented a suitable cur-

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riculum. So far, at least, it is not American democracy but American elites that have failed. As a result, we continue to lack a realistic policy to preserve our great postwar international accomplishments, including the Atlantic Alliance itself.

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The Political Party System in Sri Lanka

ROBERT N. KEARNEY

The creation of coherent and durable political institutions is among the most vital and difficult of the challenges confronting the "developing" nations of the Third World. For the nation seeking political order through democratic processes and broad popular participation, the evolution of an institutionalized political party system is of crucial importance.[1] In Sri Lanka, the growth and institutionalization of a stable political party system over the brief span of less than four decades must rank among the most significant and impressive of the political achievements of that nation in the post-independence era.

The foundation for a party system was laid in Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) by the introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1931. In the following years, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) was founded in 1935 and the Communist Party (CP) in 1943. It was, however, the approach of independence from British

[1] Among the many works reflecting this perspective are Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1966); Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed, *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behavior in India* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968); Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), particularly the editors' contributions; Ronald H. McDonald, *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America* (Chicago, Ill.: Markham Publishing Co., 1971); and Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

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colonial rule and the adoption of a British-style parliamentary system of government that prompted the formation of most of the political parties that have played major roles in the nation's politics since independence in 1948. Between 1944 and 1951, the Tamil Congress (TC), the United National Party (UNP), the Federal Party (FP), the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP),[2] and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) were all formed. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was created in 1972 by a merger of the FP and the TC.[3] This article traces the major contours of the contemporary party system, relying primarily on electoral data, and provides a tentative assessment of the implications for the party system of a shift from a plurality electoral system to one based on proportional representation.[4]

The Major Parties in Sri Lanka

An election in 1947, held in anticipation of independence early the following year, brought the UNP to power at the head of the first government of independent Sri Lanka. The UNP was returned to power in 1952, but in 1956 it suffered defeat at the hands of an SLFP-led coalition. Subsequently, through five consecutive election contests, the UNP and the SLFP regularly alternated in office, sometimes joined by smaller allies. The results of the five parliamentary elections after 1956 appear in Table 1. While each of the two serious contenders for power maintained a relatively stable proportion of the popular votes in these elections, the distribution of parliamentary seats between them fluctuated wide-

[2] This party was called the Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samaja Party from its founding in 1950 until 1959.

[3] The organization was initially called the Tamil United Front, or TUF. The word "Liberation" was added to its name when it adopted the objective of obtaining a separate Tamil state a few years later.

[4] Earlier examinations of the party system evolving after independence have appeared in Robert N. Kearney, *The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973); A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947–1973* (London: Macmillan, 1974); Calvin A. Woodward, *The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon* (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1969); and W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960). The present work is intended to carry the analysis to the 1980s and to utilize more fully the abundant and reliable electoral data available, particularly those from the 1960 and subsequent elections, in order to specify the structure of the contemporary system and the directions of its development. The focus is on the system, rather than the organization, electoral strategies, campaign techniques, or leaderships of individual parties. On these latter concerns, useful works in addition to those previously cited include James Jupp, *Sri Lanka—Third World Democracy* (London: Frank Cass, 1978); Urmila Phadnis, *Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka* (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1976); Vijaya Samaraweera, "Sri Lankan Marxists in Electoral Politics, 1947–1977," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 18 (1980): 308–24; I. D. S. Weerawardana, *Ceylon General Election, 1956* (Colombo: M. D. Gunasena, 1960); and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *Electoral Politics in an Emergent State: The Ceylon General Election of May 1970* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

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TABLE 1
Parliamentary Election Results by Political Party, 1960–1977

	March 1960		July 1960		1965		1970		1977	
Party	Percent votes won	Number seats won	Percent votes won	Number seats won	Percent votes won	Number seats won	Percent votes won	Number seats won	Percent votes won	Number seats won
UNP	29.6	50	37.6	30	39.3	66[a]	37.9	17	50.9	140
SLFP	21.1	46	33.6	75	30.2	41	36.9	91[a]	29.7	8
LSSP	10.5	10	7.4	12	7.5	10[a]	8.7	19	3.6	–
CP	4.6	3	3.0	4	2.7	4	3.4	6	2.0	–
FP	5.8	15	7.2	16	5.4	14	4.9	13		
TC	1.2	1	1.5	1	2.4	3	2.3	3		
TULF									6.4	18
Other parties	18.3	19	5.3	7	6.7	7	1.3	–	1.7	1
Independents	8.8	7	4.4	6	5.8	6	4.6	2	5.6	1
TOTAL[b]	100.0	151	100.0	151	100.0	151	100.0	151	100.0	168

[a] One candidate was returned unopposed.

[b] Discrepancies in percentage totals are due to rounding.

Sources: *Report on the Parliamentary General Elections, 19 March and 20 July 1960*, Sessional Paper II–1962 (Colombo: Government Press, 1962); *Report on the Sixth Parliamentary General Election of Ceylon, 22 March 1965*, Sessional Paper XX–1966 (Colombo: Government Press, 1966); *Report on the Seventh Parliamentary General Election in Ceylon, 27 May 1970*, Sessional Paper VII–1971 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1971); and *Report on the General Election to the Second National State Assembly of Sri Lanka (Eighth Parliamentary General Election), 21 July 1977*, Sessional Paper IV–1978 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978).

ly. The UNP won 33, 20, 44, 11, and 83 percent, respectively, of the seats in parliament, while the score for the SLFP was 30, 50, 27, 60, and 5 percent.[5]

The alternations in office between the UNP and the SLFP imply a high degree of institutionalization in that each of the parties has demonstrated the resilience necessary to survive defeat and remain in existence as an opposition and a viable alternative for the next election. Another suggestion of institutionalization is the demonstrated capacity of these parties to continue to function with a considerable degree of continuity in policy, style, and popular support despite transitions from their original founder-leaders to new leaderships.

Consolidation of the Party System

Accompanying the pattern of alternation in office has been a trend toward consolidation of the party system and a tendency for the two major contenders to monopolize political power. The trend toward monopolization, as well as the

[5] Electoral data presented in the text, unless otherwise indicated, were derived from the sources cited in Tables 1–6.

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TABLE 2
Combined UNP and SLFP Proportion of Votes and Seats Won, 1952–1977

	1952	1956	March 1960	July 1960	1965	1970	1977
Percent of votes won	59.6	68.0	50.7	71.2	69.5	74.8	80.6
Percent of seats won	66.3	62.1	63.6	69.7	70.9	71.6	88.1

Sources: I.D.S. Weerawardana, "The General Elections in Ceylon, 1952," *Ceylon Historical Journal* 2 (1952): 137–38; I.D.S. Weerawardana, *Ceylon General Election, 1956* (Colombo: M.D. Gunasena & Co., 1960), p. 219; and the sources listed in Table 1 of this article.

regularities of the election results despite wide swings in the fortunes of the individual parties at the polls, can be seen in Table 2, in which the proportions of votes and seats won by the UNP and the SLFP have been combined for the elections following the 1951 founding of the SLFP. The drift upward in the two parties' combined percentage of votes won, seriously interrupted only in the chaotic election of March 1960—when a record number of parties and candidates entered the contest—indicates that growing numbers of voters are casting their ballots for one of the parties that will, in fact, govern the nation. The slight dip

TABLE 3
Percentages of Valid Votes Won by the UNP and the SLFP, by Province, 1960–1977[a]

	March 1960		July 1960		1965		1970		1977	
Province	*UNP*	*SLFP*	*UNP*	*SLFP*	*UNP*	*SLFP*	*UNP*	*SLFP*	*UNP*	*SLFP*
Western Province	34	21	41	32	43	32	39	36	54	31
Central Province	38	37	45	49	49	43	44	53	53	34
Southern Province	33	15	41	36	34	28	39	33	56	29
Northern Province[b]	–	–	3	–	–	–	3	–[c]	8	1
Eastern Province	6	6	14	11	25	16	35	23	41	23
North-Western Province	33	38	40	46	54	40	43	49	57	36
North-Central Province	28	54	35	59	28	50	41	58	55	40
Uva	30	30	42	41	41	50	40	56	59	38
Sabaragamuwa	35	24	43	37	44	32	40	38	54	30

[a] Data from which the percentages were derived were adjusted for multi-member constituencies.

[b] The UNP contested no Northern Province seats in March 1960 and 1965, one in July 1960 and 1970, and seven in 1977. The SLFP contested no seats in the province in March and July 1960 and 1965, two in 1970, and three in 1977. Through 1970, the Northern Province contained 13 seats; in 1977, it contained 14.

[c] Less than 0.5 percent.

Source: Compiled from Department of Elections, *Results of Parliamentary General Elections in Ceylon, 1947–1970* (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1971); and *Report on the General Election to the Second National State Assembly of Sri Lanka (Eighth Parliamentary General Election), 21 July 1977*, Sessional Paper IV–1978 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978).

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in the two parties' share of the votes in 1965 can be accounted for by the votes received by candidates of the UNP's ally, the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party (SLFSP), whose members had earlier split from the SLFP and were soon to join the UNP. The even steeper and more regular upward progression of the proportion of legislative seats won by the two parties more starkly reveals the trend toward polarization. Excluding the Northern Province (somewhat arbitrarily, as UNP candidates narrowly missed capturing the Mannar constituency in 1970 and 1977), the UNP and the SLFP together have won more than three-quarters of all seats in each of the last four elections. In the election of 1977, the proportion rose to 96 percent (148 of 154).

Table 3 indicates the proportions of votes won by the UNP and the SLFP by province in the last five elections. Both parties have consistently shown significant strength in all provinces except the Northern and Eastern in each of these elections. Some regional patterns of partisan support can, nonetheless, be detected. In the Western and Southern Provinces and Sabaragamuwa, clustered in the southwestern corner of the island, the UNP outpolled the SLFP in all five elections. These provinces contain the principal bastions of support for the LSSP and the CP, whose alliance with the SLFP reduced the number of seats contested by the latter in three of the elections. However, when the SLFP was free of the Marxist alliance in March 1960 and again in 1977, the UNP claimed its greatest margins over the SLFP in the three provinces. The SLFP regularly led the UNP by substantial margins in the North-Central Province until the 1977 UNP landslide. The steady growth in the proportion of Eastern Province votes won by the UNP and the SLFP indicates that the voters of the province are being inducted into the national pattern of partisan competition.

Gains and Losses of the UNP and the SLFP

Also evident from Table 3 is the consistency of alternate gains and losses by the two major parties in all regions, excluding the North and East. Nearly all provinces joined in the swing toward the UNP in 1965 and 1977 and toward the SLFP in July 1960 and 1970. An evident exception appearing in the UNP's 1965 proportion of votes won in the Southern and North-Central Provinces may be explained by reference to the votes received by the UNP's small ally, the SLFSP. The latter party won 18 percent of the votes of the North-Central Province and 13 percent of those of the Southern Province, the two areas in which the party was most successful. With the addition of the SLFSP votes to those of the UNP, which the SLFSP was soon to join, these two provinces also conformed to the pattern of UNP gain and SLFP loss, followed in the next election by a reversal of fortunes. The absence of major regional divergence from the national trend in any of these elections is striking.

The UNP has made a consistently strong showing in the island's small number of urban constituencies in recent elections, although the party's support in these constituencies has fluctuated with the national trend. Of the 14 seats selected by

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urban constituencies in the elections from 1960 through 1970 and the 15 seats up in 1977,[6] the UNP won 10, 5, 8, 7, and 12, respectively. Even in 1970, when nationally the UNP captured only 17 of 151 seats, the party won half the urban seats. In that election, the SLFP amassed 91 seats nationally but succeeded in capturing only 1 of the urban seats.

Polarization between two major contenders remains incomplete, however, due to the continued existence of several smaller parties that win votes and legislative seats. Particularly important in this regard is a regional subsystem within the national party system, found in the areas of the North and East inhabited by members of the Ceylon Tamil minority,[7] with political organizations, leaders, and lines of competition differing from the national patterns. For two decades after 1952, the Federal Party (FP) and the Tamil Congress (TC) clashed with each other in the election contests of the North, with no serious competition from a national, non-regional party after an early and unsuccessful UNP effort in 1947. Only once—in 1956—was a seat in the North won by a party other than one of the Tamil regional parties. Except for some FP efforts in east-coast Muslim constituencies, neither the FP nor the TC contested seats outside the Ceylon Tamil region. After the merger of the FP and the TC into the TULF, the latter party in 1977 was faced with competition in the North only from a horde of independents and some token candidates of the parties based in the Sinhala areas. In the Jaffna district, 11 TULF candidates, sweeping all the seats, obtained 72 percent of all votes cast, despite the presence on the ballot of 47 other candidates. In the late 1970s, the Tamil Congress reappeared as a separate political organization and contested local elections in competition with the TULF, but most of the political figures associated with the earlier TC remained with the TULF, and the reconstituted TC was able to attract little electoral support.

Election Results by Categories of Parties, 1960–1977

The structure of the party system that emerged from the 1950s included two large contenders for power (the UNP and the SLFP), two competitors in the

[6] The urban constituencies from the elections of 1960 through that of 1970 were: Colombo North, Colombo Central (three members), Borella, Colombo South (two members), Dehiwala-Mt. Lavinia, Kotte, Galle, Kandy, Senkodagala, Jaffna, and Nallur. For the 1977 election, Colombo South was divided into Colombo East and Colombo West, Dehiwala-Mt. Lavinia was split into Dehiwala and Ratmalana (producing one additional urban seat), and Kandy was renamed Mahanuwara.

[7] Members of the Ceylon Tamil ethnic community, constituting 11 percent of the nation's population of 12.7 million in the 1971 census, are concentrated on the Jaffna Peninsula at the northern tip of the island and are found in lesser numbers in the northern mainland districts and on the east coast. A second Tamil community, called Indian Tamils, many of whom are non-citizens, constituted 9 percent of the 1971 population. Both Tamil communities are predominantly Hindu. A Muslim community called Ceylon Moors formed 7 percent of the population. The Sinhala people, who are largely Buddhist, constitute the majority of the nation's peoples, 72 percent in 1971. The

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North (the FP and the TC) until the early 1970s, and two Marxist parties (the LSSP and the CP) that together consistently won more than a dozen seats in parliament and captured slightly more than one-tenth of the popular vote until 1977. The character of this party system may be illuminated by examining the election results in terms of candidate success by categories of parties. Table 4 presents such information for the last four elections. Included are the combined results for candidates of the UNP and the SLFP, which were the serious contenders for power nationally, as well as the results for the Tamil parties, the contenders in the party subsystem of the Tamil areas. Figures are also shown for candidates of the LSSP and the CP, although these two parties were allied in the four elections (together with the SLFP in all except the latest), and their efforts were complementary rather than competitive, as with the other pairs. Also included in Table 4 are the results for minor party and independent candidates.

Both the UNP and the SLFP have in each election put forward candidates in most of the constituencies outside the North. Their combined proportion of candidates elected has wavered slightly below the 50 percent mark, since they have clashed in most of their contests, and a victory for one has usually been a defeat for the other. Following British practice, in order to discourage frivolous candidates a monetary deposit is required of each candidate, which is forfeited if the candidate fails to receive at least one-eighth of the votes cast in the constituency. Loss of deposit, hence, serves as a measure of very weak support for candidates. The UNP and the SLFP have displayed very high candidate efficiency in that the proportion of their candidates losing their deposits has been very small and the average number of votes received by their candidates has been high. A similar picture is presented by the Tamil regional parties, although the TC contested fewer constituencies than did the FP, so that a gain for one was not always a loss for the other. In 1977, with no serious organized opposition in most of the areas they contested, the performance of the TULF candidates was strikingly efficient. The only TULF candidate to lose his deposit contested the Puttalam constituency on the west coast, in which Ceylon Tamils constituted only 20 percent of the population.[8]

In the three elections prior to 1977, the LSSP and the CP were restricted in the number of candidates they presented by their electoral alliance with the SLFP. Most of the relatively small number of Marxist candidates were concentrated in the areas of their parties' maximum strength, and their fortunes fluctuated with those of the SLFP candidates, generally in competition with the UNP. In 1970, every LSSP and CP candidate contesting outside the Northern Province was elected. The proportion of LSSP and CP candidates losing their deposits has

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Sinhala community is numerically predominant in all regions of the island except in the North and East. Population figures are from Department of Census and Statistics, *Census of Population, 1971*, Vol. II, Part I (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1975), p. 25.

[8] The ethnic composition of the constituency is from *Report of the Delimitation Commission, 1976,* Sessional Paper I—1976 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1976), p. 162.

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TABLE 4

Candidate Performance by Categories of Parties in the Last Four Elections

Category of party	Number of candidates	Percent of candidates elected	Percent of candidates losing deposits	Average votes per candidate
July 1960				
UNP and SLFP	226	46.5	0.9	9,586
FP and TC	31	54.8	12.9	8,566
LSSP and CP	28	57.1	3.6	11,258
Other parties[a]	69	10.1	76.8	2,351
Independents	39	15.4	61.5	3,441
1965				
UNP and SLFP	217	49.3	1.4	12,960
FP and TC	35	48.6	5.7	9,047
LSSP and CP	34	41.2	14.7	12,113
Other parties[b]	103	6.8	82.5	2,387
Independents	106	5.7	72.6	2,452
1970				
UNP and SLFP	238	45.4	2.1	15,683
FP and TC	31	51.6	6.5	11,655
LSSP and CP	32	78.1	18.8	18,826
Other parties[c]	53	0.0	92.5	1,252
Independents	87	2.3	83.9	2,635
1977				
UNP and SLFP	301	49.2	6.6	16,726
Tamil parties[d]	26	73.1	3.8	18,623
LSSP and CP	107	0.0	82.2	3,263
Other parties[e]	27	0.0	96.3	838
Independents	295	0.3	91.5	1,197

[a] Includes the MEP, Lanka Prajathantravadi Pakshaya, Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna, Bosath Bandaranaike Peramuna, All-Ceylon Islamic Front, Sinhala Jathika Sangamaya, and Udarata Peramuna.

[b] Includes the MEP, Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna, and Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party using the election symbol of the Lanka Prajathantravadi Pakshaya.

[c] Includes the MEP and Sinhala Mahajana Pakshaya.

[d] Includes the TULF, Ceylon Workers Congress (Political Wing), and one candidate using the symbol of the defunct FP.

[e] Includes the MEP only.

Sources: Compiled from *Report on the Parliamentary General Elections, 19 March and 20 July, 1960*, Sessional Paper II-1962 (Colombo: Government Press, 1960); *Report on the Sixth Parliamentary General Election of Ceylon, 22 March, 1965*, Sessional Paper XX-1966 (Colombo: Government Press, 1966); *Report on the Seventh Parliamentary General Election in Ceylon, 27 May 1970*, Sessional Paper VII-1971 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1971); and *Report on the General Election to the Second National State Assembly of Sri Lanka (Eighth Parliamentary General Election) 21 July 1977*, Sessional Paper IV-1978 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978).

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been boosted by those parties' practice of offering a few sacrificial candidates in the North who had little or no expectation of winning election.

Their debacle of 1977 deprived the Marxists of any legislative representation for the first time since 1936 and represented a much more stunning setback than their effort in March 1960, when the two parties nominated 154 candidates, of whom 13 were elected and 95, or 62 percent, lost their deposits. Electoral strategies may in certain circumstances, however, be dictated by considerations other than efficiency of performance of a party's candidates. The nomination by the Marxist parties of large numbers of candidates in March 1960 and 1977 seemed intended to deprive SLFP candidates of votes; it could also be viewed as a necessary reprisal for the invasion of their areas of strength by SLFP candidates. Although the Marxists have never been able to generate massive electoral support, they have played a role in the national contest for power. The SLFP has never won power without alliance with the LSSP and the CP. Whether the 1977 election constituted a temporary reversal for the Marxists or a more lasting consolidation within the party system, permanently squeezing them out of effective electoral competition, can be determined only after the next national election.

Minor Parties and Independents

The bleak performance record of the other contestants—minor party and independent candidates—attests to the institutionalization and consolidation occurring within the party system. These candidates have gained very few victories, have forfeited their deposits in very large proportions, and have averaged numbers of votes far below the averages of the major parties' candidates.

A closer look at the independent candidates is provided in Table 5. Although independents have continued to appear, with a record 295 flooding the ballot in 1977, they have scored few recent victories, and the overwhelming majority have lost their deposits. Further, the number of independents elected to parliament has declined steadily since 1947. Only one independent in 1977 and only two in 1970 were successful, while nine of every ten independent candidates in those elections lost their deposits.

Uncertainties in the political environment and electoral situation may encourage the appearance of particularly large numbers of independent candidates. The elections of 1947, March 1960, and 1977 attracted the largest numbers of independent candidates. Each of these elections was the first to follow a new delimitation of constituencies, thereby producing the uncertainties of untested electoral district boundaries. The 1947 election occurred as the nation prepared for independence under a new constitution. The March 1960 election was the first after the landmark election of 1956, when the party in power was defeated for the first time, and followed the assassination of the prime minister and confusion regarding succession to leadership of the SLFP. The

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TABLE 5

Independent Candidates in Parliamentary Elections, 1947–1977[a]

Election	Number contesting	Number elected	Number losing deposit[b]
1947	181	21	
1952	85	11	
1956	64	8	
March 1960	168	7	125
July 1960[c]	39	6	24
1965	96	6	69
1970	87	2	73
1977	295	1	270

[a] Excludes minor party candidates treated as independents in the official returns.

[b] Not ascertained for elections prior to 1960.

[c] Adjusted for ten TC and FP candidates listed in the official returns as independents.

Sources: Ceylon Daily News, *Parliament of Ceylon, 1947* (Colombo: Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, no date); I.D.S. Weerawardana, "The General Elections in Ceylon, 1952," *Ceylon Historical Journal* 2 (1952): 111–78; I.D.S. Weerawardana, *Ceylon General Election, 1956* (Colombo: M.D. Gunasena & Co., 1960); *Report on the Parliamentary General Elections, 19 March and 20 July 1960*, Sessional Paper II–1962 (Colombo: Government Press, 1962); *Report on the Sixth Parliamentary General Election of Ceylon, 22 March 1965*, Sessional Paper XX–1966 (Colombo: Government Press, 1966); *Report on the Seventh Parliamentary General Election in Ceylon, 27 May 1970*, Sessional Paper VII–1971 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1971); and *Report on the General Election to the Second National State Assembly of Sri Lanka (Eighth Parliamentary General Election), 21 July 1977*, Sessional Paper IV–1978 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978).

1977 election ended the longest period between national elections since independence and followed the breakup of the SLFP–LSSP–CP alliance that came to power in 1970. In 1977, a particularly large number of independent contestants appeared in the North. Forty-five independent candidates sought the 14 seats in the Northern Province; they were possibly lured into the contest by the absence of serious organized opposition to the TULF, which was facing its first test before the voters since it was formed and was asking for a mandate to seek a separate Tamil state. Thus, an average of slightly more than three independents sought each seat at stake in the North, double the average elsewhere on the island. In 1970, the Northern Province had produced about the same number of independents per seat as the rest of the island.

Electoral Performance of Minor Parties, 1947–1977

The consolidation and rationalization of the party system over the years since independence can also be traced in the faltering performance of minor parties, most of which came into existence for a single election and quickly vanished. The electoral performance of the minor parties is depicted in Table 6. In the early years of independence, when the major lines of partisan competition were

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TABLE 6
Performance of Minor Parties in Parliamentary Elections, 1947–1977

Election	Number of minor parties[a]	Number of candidates	Number of seats won	Percentage of popular votes won	Number of candidates losing deposits
1947	5	31	12	12.2	12
1952	3	17	2	2.9	14
1956	1	4	0	0.6	b
March 1960	14	315	19	18.3	251
July 1960	7	69	7	5.3	53
1965	7	113	7	6.7	93
1970	2	53	0	1.3	49
1977	2	29	1	1.4	26

[a] All contesting parties other than the UNP, SLFP, LSSP, CP, FP, TC, and (in 1977) TULF.
[b] Not ascertained.

Sources: Derived from Ceylon Daily News, *Parliament of Ceylon, 1947* (Colombo: Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, no date), and the comparable *Ceylon Daily News* volumes for 1956, 1960, 1965, 1970, and 1977; W. Ivor Jennings, "The Ceylon General Election of 1947," *University of Ceylon Review* 6 (1948): 133–95; I.D.S. Weerawardana, "The General Elections in Ceylon, 1952," *Ceylon Historical Journal* 2 (1952): 111–78; *Report on the Parliamentary General Elections, 19 March and 20 July 1960*, Sessional Paper II–1962 (Colombo: Government Press, 1962); *Report on the Sixth Parliamentary General Election of Ceylon, 22 March 1965*, Sessional Paper XX–1966 (Colombo: Government Press, 1966); *Report on the Seventh Parliamentary General Election in Ceylon, 27 May 1970*, Sessional Paper VII–1971 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1971); *Report on the General Election to the Second National State Assembly of Sri Lanka (Eighth Parliamentary General Election) 21 July 1977*, Sessional Paper IV–1978 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978); and Department of Elections, *Results of Parliamentary General Elections in Ceylon, 1947–1970* (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1971).

only beginning to emerge, and again in the extremely fluid and confused situation of March 1960, many new and untested parties appeared. Subsequently, the small new parties have generally been produced by schisms in existing parties. Included among the minor parties is the MEP, which has functioned for three decades and in March 1960 attracted more than ten percent of the votes cast. Thereafter, however, the fortunes of the party declined sharply. In subsequent elections, the MEP nominated a fairly large number of candidates, most of whom lost their deposits and none of whom was victorious after 1965.

It is possible to identify several types of minor parties, although the categories often overlap. These types might be called the parties of high expectations; the personality parties, including disguised independents; special interest parties; and schismatic parties. The appearance of a party of high expectations reflects a hope of launching a serious new political movement, repeating S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's feat in launching the SLFP, or that of S. J. V. Chelvanayakam in establishing the FP. The new party of high expectations usually has nominated a large number of candidates in the apparent belief that the political situation is

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favorable for the new party to become a major force quickly. The Lanka Prajathantravadi Pakshaya, formed in 1960, and the Sinhala Mahajana Pakshaya, created in 1970, appear to have been examples of this type. Although the MEP had been in existence since 1950, the major effort that party made in 1960 appears to have been based on similar calculations.

Personality, Special Interest, and Schismatic Parties

The personality party is essentially the creature of one politician who has a personal following in his or her locality, forms a party, and may persuade one or two others to join the party as its candidates. In the elections of 1960 and earlier, examples of this type of party abounded. Among them were the Republican Party, the Bosath Bandaranaike Peramuna, the Samajavadi Mahajana Peramuna, the Sri Lanka Jathika Peramuna, and the Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna (nicknamed the "husband-and-wife party," as the only two candidates of the party ever to be elected were married to each other). Since the demise of the latter, no parties of this type have appeared in election contests.

The special interest parties resemble the personality parties in that they are essentially one-person parties, generally nominating only one or two candidates. The hopes of the party organizer presumably are based, however, on appeal to a narrow regional or communal interest, rather than solely on the personal appeal of the leader. Such parties appeared in both elections of 1960 and included the Udarata Peramuna, the Tamil-Speaking Front, the Buddhist Republican Party, and the Islamic United Front. Subsequently, the only clear example has been the Eela Thamil Ottumai Munnani, formed in 1965.

The schismatic party has appeared after a split in one of the established parties, and the schismatic party's candidates enter election contests less in the expectation of victory than in the hope of taking votes away from their former party's candidates. After a 1963 split in the CP produced a small pro-Peking rival to the pro-Moscow established CP, pro-Peking leader N. Sanmugathasan contested the three-member Colombo Central constituency that had been returning pro-Moscow leader Pieter Keuneman to parliament since 1947. Similarly, following a 1964 LSSP split, four candidates of the newly created Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary) contested LSSP candidates in the 1965 election. Of a somewhat different nature was the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party, which also contested the 1965 election. The party was formed shortly before the election, principally by a group of members of parliament who had broken away from the SLFP. The new SLFSP fought the election allied to the UNP, and it was subsequently absorbed into the UNP. Hence, the SLFSP served as a temporary expedient for a single election, after its members split away from one major contestant but before they were prepared to join the other.

That none of the new parties formed after 1951 has succeeded in retaining even minor electoral significance suggests that the structuring and institu-

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tionalization of the party system had advanced rapidly in the early years of independence. The development of the party system into relatively clearly structured patterns of competition has made possible more realistic appraisals of the political situation prior to an election, which in turn has presumably been responsible for the declining incidence of ephemeral parties in recent elections.

The political party system that has emerged in Sri Lanka has thus been characterized by repeated transfers of power between the leaderships of the two major partisan rivals as a result of popular elections; a consolidation of the party system, evident in the decline of minor parties and independents and in a tendency toward monopolization between the two major rivals; and the continued presence of a subsystem in the North and East, in which Tamil regional organizations and leaders are dominant.

Proportional Representation and the Party System

A new constitution adopted in 1978 worked a major transformation of the nation's electoral system and institutions of government. Under the new constitution, executive power is concentrated in the hands of a president to be elected by direct popular vote, although a prime minister and cabinet of ministers have been retained. The parliament is to be elected from large multi-member electoral districts by the closed list system of proportional representation, with voters limited to a choice among lists submitted by parties or groups of independents. Lists receiving less than a stipulated proportion of the votes—at present, one-eighth, but this figure is being reconsidered—will receive no seats. In each electoral district, the list winning the most votes will receive a bonus seat. The remaining seats will be distributed among the qualifying lists (those obtaining at least one-eighth of the votes cast in the district) in proportion to their share of the votes. Individual candidates will be selected in the order their names appear on the list, which is determined by the party leadership.[9] To return 196 members to the next parliament, a delimitation commission in 1981 established 22 electoral districts, coterminous with existing administrative districts except in the North, where three sparsely populated administrative districts were combined for electoral purposes.[10] The first parliamentary election under the new electoral system is slated for 1983, and the first direct election of a president for early the following year.

Local and District Elections, 1979 and 1981

Two sets of elections employing the new system of proportional representation for local and district councils in 1979 and 1981 provided slight guidance for

[9] *The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka* (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978).

[10] *Report of the Delimitation Commission under the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist*

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predicting the electoral system's performance in a parliamentary general election. The 1979 local elections, in which the UNP won heavily, involved only the nine municipal councils and 34 urban councils, encompassing only 13 percent of the nation's potential voters.[11] The elections did, however, serve to underscore the centrality of political parties in the nation's political life. The UNP received 53 percent of the votes cast in the local elections, while the UNP and the SLFP together accounted for 76 percent. The UNP, the SLFP, and the TULF collected 94 percent of the council seats (476 of 507). Twenty-four lists submitted by groups of independents appeared in 18 of the 43 contests, but the independents attracted less than six percent of the votes and secured only two percent of the council seats.[12]

The 1981 elections for newly created district councils were boycotted by the SLFP, the LSSP, and the CP, leaving the UNP the winner by default or with only token opposition across most of the island.[13] Seven of the 24 district councils were captured by the UNP without contest. Effective competition appeared only in the North and East, where the TULF, the UNP, and a resuscitated TC battled for council seats. In Jaffna—where there were recent tensions between the police and the public and terrorist acts attributed to an underground movement seeking a separate Tamil state—the polling was marred by pre-election violence and reported irregularities in election procedures.[14] The TULF won control of six of the seven district councils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.[15] Elsewhere, the elections were marked by low voter turnouts and large proportions of spoiled ballots. Nationwide, 55 percent of the eligible voters in the contested districts cast ballots, and 6 percent of the ballots were rejected as spoiled. The rate of voter turnout had been 71 percent in the 1979 local elections and 87 percent in the 1977 parliamentary election. In the last two parliamentary elections, about one-half of one percent of the ballots cast were rejected, and the highest proportion of spoiled ballots in any parliamentary election was two percent in 1947.

The aggregated 1981 results, furthermore, mask considerable regional varia-

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Republic of Sri Lanka, Sessional Paper I—1981 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1981).

[11] Eligible voters for the 1979 municipal and urban councils elections numbered 993,700. In that year, 7,573,214 persons' names were on the registers of electors. The former figure is from "Elections to Municipal Councils and Urban Councils—May 19, 1979," mimeographed report prepared by the Department of Elections. The latter figure is from the 1981 *Report of the Delimitation Commission*, Appendix III, p. 59.

[12] "Elections to Municipal Councils and Urban Councils"; *Ceylon Daily News*, 21 May 1979, pp. 1, 3, 5.

[13] The results were reported in "Development Councils Elections, 1981—June 04, 1981," mimeographed report prepared by the Department of Elections. One SLFP list, in Matale district, had qualified for inclusion on the ballot before the boycott decision was made.

[14] *Ceylon Daily News*, 10, 11, 12, and 16 June 1981; *Ceylon Daily Mirror*, 27 June 1981; *Sun*, 6 June 1981.

[15] *Ceylon Daily Mirror*, 17 June 1981.

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tion. In the North and East, turnout rates and proportions of spoiled ballots approximated those of the past. In the Northern Province, 69 percent of the electorate voted, and one percent of the ballots were rejected. In contrast, voter turnout slumped to 47 percent in the Western Province, with 11 percent of the Western Province votes counted as spoiled. Voting behavior in the Southwest strongly suggested widespread displeasure with the contests, although the effect of the boycott cannot be disentangled from that of general voter disinterest in the competition for control of the new councils.

A sidelight to the local and district councils elections was the appearance of a resurrected Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the organization that launched an armed uprising in 1971, which entered electoral competition as a legitimate political party for the first time in 1981. In its initial electoral venture, the JVP ran candidates, officially classified as an independent group, in the 1979 Colombo municipal council election. The JVP list received under 8 percent of the votes cast and won no seats.[16] In the district councils elections two years later, the JVP entered lists in 8 of the 17 contests, collected 327,000 votes (20 percent of the valid votes cast in the districts it contested), and won 13 seats scattered through six district councils. The JVP was the only opposition to the UNP in half of the contests it entered.[17] Whether the JVP can succeed in filling the political vacuum caused by the decline of the long-established Left parties, and thus establish itself as an enduring addition to the party system, can be determined only after future national elections.

The Effects of the Introduction of Proportional Representation

Where party systems were well established, the introduction of proportional representation has not drastically altered the main contours of the system.[18] The pattern of regular alternations in office between the UNP and the SLFP—a striking feature of the politics of Sri Lanka for a quarter of a century—may, however, be jeopardized by proportional representation, which can be expected to dampen the legislative consequences of small shifts in the parties' fortunes at the polls. Plurality electoral systems, such as the one Sri Lanka employed until recently, tend to magnify shifts from one election to the next in proportions of votes won, producing for a party with an enhanced share of the votes a greater increase in its share of legislative seats and for the party with a reduced propor-

[16] *Ceylon Daily News*, 21 May 1979. The JVP explanation for its decision to participate in the election contest appears in Lionel Bopage, "Local Govt. Elections: The JVP View," *Tribune* (Colombo), 19 May 1979, pp. 19-20.

[17] "Development Councils Elections."

[18] See Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert, *Voting in Democracies* (London: Faber and Faber, 1955), pp. 198-99. Giovanni Sartori has made the point that proportional representation does not *do* much of anything; it may fail to do some things (such as discourage small parties) that are done by a plurality system. See his "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development*, pp. 173-74.

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TABLE 7

Proportions of Votes and Seats Won by Parties in the 1979 Local Councils Elections and the 1977 Parliamentary Election

	1979 Municipal and Urban Councils Elections			*1977 Parliamentary Election*		
Party	*Votes won (in percent)*	*Seats won*	*Deviation (seats from votes)*	*Votes won (in percent)*	*Seats won*	*Deviation (seats from votes)*
UNP	52.6	61.7	+9.1	50.9	83.3	+32.4
SLFP	23.3	20.7	−2.6	29.7	4.8	−24.9
TULF	8.3	11.4	+3.1	6.4	10.7	+4.3
LSSP	5.6	1.2	−4.4	3.6	—	−3.6
CP	2.1	1.4	−0.7	2.0	—	−2.0
Other parties	2.2	1.6	−0.6	1.8	0.6	−1.2
Independents	5.9	2.0	−3.9	5.6	0.6	−5.0

Sources: *Report on the General Election to the Second National State Assembly of Sri Lanka (Eighth Parliamentary General Election), 21 July 1977*, Sessional Paper IV—1978 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978); and "Elections to Municipal Councils and Urban Councils—19 May 1979," mimeographed report prepared by the Department of Elections.

tion of votes, a steeper decline in its share of seats. Systems of proportional representation do not.[19] Under the former plurality system, for example, a UNP loss of less than two percent in its share of votes from the 1965 election to that of 1970 translated into a drop from 44 to 11 percent of the legislative seats. The SLFP, over the span of the same elections, saw its share of votes rise from 30 to 37 percent, while its share of seats leaped from 27 to 60 percent.

Sri Lanka's new electoral system does not appear to be rigorously proportional, as may be inferred from Table 7, which shows proportions of votes and seats won in the 1979 local councils elections using the new system compared with the proportions won in the 1977 parliamentary election under the old plurality system. In both cases, the party with the largest proportion of votes received an enhanced proportion of the seats, although the 1979 elections did not produce the huge divergences between shares of seats and of votes found in the 1977 election. The TULF, the dominant party in the region where it contested, also benefited from the tendency of both types of electoral system to reward the party with the largest proportion of votes (within the area contested) with a larger share of seats. Small parties and independents were disadvantaged by both systems.

The bonus seat awarded to the party with the largest vote in each district and the provision of a fairly high cut-off point for the proportion of votes that a list

[19] Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 101–103. For a recent analysis of the relative effects of proportional and plurality systems, see Richard S. Katz, *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

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must win to be allotted any seats presumably will favor the largest parties in the area—the UNP and the SLFP in most parts of the nation. Between the two major rivals, proportional representation is likely to favor the UNP, if past voting patterns are a reliable guide, because over the past two decades the UNP's proportion of the popular votes has been more stable and slightly larger than the proportion won by the SLFP. While proportional representation systems ordinarily do not penalize small parties to the extent that plurality systems do,[20] the one-eighth share of the votes of the district required to obtain any seats seems likely to constitute a formidable obstacle for small new parties. More difficult to gauge is the effect of the direct election of the president, producing a new prize for which to compete and requiring two sets of national elections, possibly differing substantially in issues and outcomes. The winner-take-all character of the presidential contest could heighten the UNP–SLFP bipolarity, or at least encourage agreements prior to the election between each major contender and one or more smaller parties.

The general features of Sri Lanka's party system that have emerged out of the experience of the past 35 years seem firmly established. Although the new governmental and electoral arrangements undoubtedly will have long-term ramifications for the system, sweeping alterations in its basic character or in the number and relative strength of the parties composing it appear improbable in the immediate future.

[20] See, for example, Rae, *Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, pp. 88–98.

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Caveat Emptor in Health Care

BONITA A. WLODKOWSKI

The problem of health care finance seems almost intractable, with costs continuously escalating even as services remain unevenly provided, and with political fads rather than consensus steering policy directions. The cost figures compel attention, and if familiar by now, they are no less daunting. Health care expenditure comprised 6 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in 1965, rose to 9.4 percent in 1980, and if trends persist, are projected to reach 13 percent by 1990.[1] A complex combination of factors has contributed to the relentless escalation of health care costs: perverse incentive structures, the nature of health care, technological development, the extension of social insurance, and demographic changes.

There are two fundamentally different approaches to containing health care costs. One emphasizes regulatory control of hospitals, physicians, and other providers of care. The second, aimed primarily at consumers, relies on market incentives in order to promote competition. Government efforts have thus far adhered to the first approach through planning and regulation and are generally considered not to have succeeded in containing costs. This pessimistic assessment—coupled with recent changes in the American political agenda that emphasize fiscal retrenchment, free enterprise, and individual responsibility—have given economists and policymakers cause to rethink the nature of cost containment strategies. As a result, the competitive or market strategy, although largely untried, has gained ascendancy since the late 1970s. This new emphasis and its underlying assumptions differ from health policy discourse and directions of the 1960s and early 1970s.

[1] Congressional Budget Office, *Containing Costs through Market forces* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1982).

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First, it represents a shift in the perception of government's role and of its goals. The health policy debate, once focused on National Health Insurance and on governmental efforts to assure access to quality care for all citizens at reasonable cost, now revolves around ways to achieve cost containment. Moreover, the competitive strategy, with its implications for a diminished public role, has emerged as an alternative of increasing political appeal.

Second, policy recommendations made in the 1960s and 1970s were based on the assumption that providers influence health care consumption far more than consumers because of the technical nature of health care. The competitive model assumes that consumers, responding to market incentives, will be able to demand more efficient care. Although there is scant empirical evidence that the market will render more efficient decisions in health delivery, the market model derives its strength from evidence of regulatory disappointment. Finally, and indicative of prevailing political winds, it is a strategy whose proponents are confined to the United States. There is no movement in other Western countries to have health care traded in the market.

There are two recently published books on the new approach to health care cost containment.[2] The first, written by Rita Ricardo-Campbell, presents an overview of the health care sector. Published under the auspices of the Heritage Foundation, the volume presents a discernibly neoconservative viewpoint. The second is a collection of provocative papers, edited by Mancur Olson, that were originally presented at a conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. The latter is a valuable book, presenting in some detail the arguments of leading architects and proponents of the competitive approach, with some dissenting perspective, though not enough to balance the argument. It bears mention that these papers were originally presented in September 1980, a few months before President Reagan was elected. Intentionally or not, they provide academic support for the administration's current plans to introduce competition in health care.

Government Failure or Market Failure?

At the outset, it should be stated that there is danger in categorizing varied approaches to cost containment as being either market-competitive approaches or government-regulatory schemes. Each categorization connotes ideological predispositions that mask differences among the strategies, and the choice of one strategy does not preclude use of another. There are, nonetheless, fundamental differences between a pro-competitive and a pro-regulatory position, and the current advocacy of the competitive strategy derives from criticism of government's regulatory efforts.

[2] Rita Ricardo-Campbell, *The Economics and Politics of Health* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and Mancur Olson, ed., *A New Approach to the Economics of Health Care* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981).

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As mentioned earlier, regulatory efforts were devised on the premise that providers of care dominate decisions about consumption and that it is the provision of care that should be controlled. Physician decisions regarding diagnosis, drug prescription, and the availability of hospital beds account for service utilization and, thus, cost of care. The inherently complex nature of medical care and the uncertainty surrounding its needs distort normal market patterns and instead create a sector where supply of providers creates its own demand.[3] In the late 1960s and 1970s, governmental efforts thus proceeded on three fronts: controls on hospital capital expansion; regulation of hospital prices; and, more recently, controls on utilization, accompanied by a quality assurance program. Bruce Steinwald and Frank A. Sloan, writing in Olson, present an excellent review of the empirical evidence on the operation of these programs. Utilization review and quality assurance have been the least successful programs. Utilization review originally emerged as a self-policing effort for hospitals and directly involved physicians who could judge medical necessity and quality of care. Starting with requirements under Medicare and Medicaid and then evolving into the Professional Standards and Review Organization Program (PSRO) in 1972, government sought to contain costs by reducing unnecessary utilization and, at the same time, assuring quality care. The intrinsic incompatibility of these goals, physician dominance in the review process, and the difficulty of assessing excess utilization and poor quality incapacitated the program. Utilization declined very slightly for Medicare patients but varied by geographical region for unknown reasons. More damning, the PSRO program cost more than it saved.

A second regulatory program—regulation of hospital capital expansion—has been undertaken through state certificate of need (CON) legislation. This requires state agencies to review and approve changes in hospital bed capacity and major equipment purchase. The first important analysis of the effects of CON, undertaken by D. C. Salkever and T. W. Bice, found that between 1968 and 1972, hospitals shifted investments from beds to other forms of capital with no net effect on cost. Salkever and Bice were criticized for analyzing programs before they had reached maturity, but their findings have subsequently been confirmed. CON may reduce beds, but it does not reduce costs and may also produce adverse anticipatory reactions.[4]

Finally, there is rate and revenue control, exemplified by the system of prospective reimbursement of hospital costs. A major cause of hospital cost escala-

[3] Kenneth Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," *American Economics Review* 53 (1963); and A. Relman, "The Allocation of Medical Resources By Physicians," *Journal of Medical Education* 99 (1980).

[4] D. C. Salkever and T. W. Bice, "The Impact of Certificate-of-Need's Control on Hospital Investment," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 54 (1976): 185–213; Bruce Steinwald and Frank A. Sloan, "Regulatory Approaches to Hospital Cost Containment: A Synthesis of the Empirical Evidence," in Mancur Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 273–308.

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tion has been the retrospective reimbursement system whereby hospitals have been paid by private and public insurers whatever costs or charges they have incurred. There is obviously no incentive for hospitals to contain costs since "the more you spend, the more you get."[5] The most promising remedy is prospective reimbursement where rates are established in advance, rendering hospitals at risk for their cost overruns. As of July 1979, there were eight states with prospective reimbursement programs, and these states were found to have considerably lower total expenses. In one study, reported in Olson's volume, Sloan found that new rate setting programs had no effect, but that if all "payors were subject to mature state rate setting, equilibrium cost reductions would range from 7 to 20 percent."[6] Joskow, also published in Olson, concludes that based on data, rate reimbursement constraints have significant effects on hospital costs and have reduced substantially the rate of growth of hospital expenditures.[7] As Steinwald and Sloan write: "Particularly important in terms of implementing a long term strategy for controlling inflation in hospital costs and expenditures is the finding that when prospective reimbursement is instituted as a state-mandated program with authority to set hospital reimbursement rates and when such programs have operated for sufficient time to become institutionalized, savings in hospital costs and expenditures may materialize."[8]

Prospective reimbursement remains a policy option.[9] Given its regulatory promise, why is there so much momentum to deregulate the health care system? First, Steinwald and Sloan themselves cast doubt that prospective reimbursement strategies, which predominate in the Northeast, will be politically feasible elsewhere. Second, they fear that prolonged regulation will cause market distortions in the long run. Olson concurs that rate setting is ultimately inefficient because the system may eventually be dominated by providers much the way CON and utilization review have been. Still, "government agencies that are held responsible for both the costs and the quality of medical care may well choose allocations that are closer to the perfectly competitive ideal than the existing 'market' would, and this may help explain some cost reductions in hospital costs due to state rate setting bodies."[10] The preference for the market, however, is based not only on empirical data but also on the conviction that no theoretical explanation of market failure has justified governmental intervention in health care.

[5] Mancur Olson, "Introduction," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, p. 19.

[6] Steinwald and Sloan, "Regulatory Approaches," p. 299.

[7] Paul L. Joskow, "Alternative Regulatory Mechanism for Controlling Hospital Costs," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 219–57.

[8] Steinwald and Sloan, "Regulatory Approaches," p. 300.

[9] Linda Demkovich, "Relying on the Market—the Reagan Approach to Containing Medical Costs," *National Journal*, 30 January 1982, pp. 194–97.

[10] Olson, "Introduction" in Olson, *A New Approach*, p. 22.

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Richard Zeckhauser and Christopher Zook, writing in Olson, discuss the imperfections that theoretically justify governmental intervention and find that economic justifications—externalities, inadequate information, collusive behavior, distributional equity—have probably played a relatively minor role in health care. The view they dispute holds that health is a merit good with positive externalities, and these, coupled with market failures (such as inadequate information) provide the theoretical and real explanation for intervention by government.[11] Zeckhauser and Zook, on the other hand, state that pecuniary externalities reflect the workings of the market system and therefore are not reflective of market failure; in an inflationary economy such externalities prompt public intervention.[12] The economic conditions favorable to regulation do not obtain in medical care. Zeckhauser and Zook find no evidence of national monopoly but rather, see an industry that is diverse, heterogeneous, and characterized by long-run significant elasticities; one that will respond to financial incentives and consist of many performers; and finally, one that involves difficult trade-offs among conflicting values. Although their points are well made, it is also true that factors rendering regulation difficult also debilitate the market model. First, certain functions are excluded from a truly functioning market in health care. Support for medical schools, medical research, and groups unable to afford health care, as well as the professionalization of medical personnel, are but the most obvious.[13] Moreover, some of the requirements of a competitive market are not met. There is no homogeneous product, no free entry and exit of producers; incomplete information and the motives guiding providers are nonprofit in nature.[14] The physician, acting as agent for the consumer, is guided by professional ethics that emphasize thorough management of cases. The nonprofit nature of much of the sector motivates hospitals to maximize capital investment and quality, rather than profit. These create pressures for spending and indicate different incentives than those prevailing for firms in perfectly competitive markets. Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of medical care jeopardizing the appropriateness of the market model is the absence of consumer sovereignty. Medical care is not a fixed good whose use is predictable or easily perceived to be successful or not. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the "product," the "demand" for which is derived from medical need perceived by the patient, but managed by the physician.

[11] T. R. Marmor, Richard Boyer, and Julie Greenberg, "Medical Care and Pro Competitive Reform," *Vanderbilt Law Review* 34 (1981): 1003–28.

[12] Richard Zeckhauser and Christopher Zook, "Failures to Control Health Costs: Departures from First Principles," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 87–116.

[13] Bernard Reilly and James S. Legge, "The Embattled Hospital: Cost Control Measures Versus Imperatives For Expansion, *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 7 (1982): 254–70.

[14] Donald R. Cohodes, "Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Musings on the Regulation/Competition Dialogue," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 7 (1982): 54–79.

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The Competitive Strategy

Briefly stated, the current crisis in health care is the tension between consumer expectation and cost escalation.[15] The competitive stategists believe that resolution requires altering consumer demand for services. While recognizing that cost reimbursement and providers acting as consumers' agents have led to inefficiencies—namely, overutilization, duplication, rapid technological change, and organizational slack—adherents of the market approach specify three major sources of cost escalation.[16] First, and most serious, is the system of third party payment where seemingly no one pays the bills. As Olson explains, this "subtle subsidy" encourages consumption by enabling physicians to prescribe care freely and by removing the incentives for consumers to question or restrain providers.

Second, many observers argue that the fee-for-service system encourages spending and that prepaid group practice plans, such as health maintenance organizations (HMO), are most cost-conscious and will foster organizational competition. Though not universally embraced,[17] HMOs are largely endorsed by market proponents, a somewhat ironic development for what had once been assailed as socialized medicine. HMOs, it is hoped, will restructure the incentives of traditional participants in medical care, although this notion does contradict historical evidence.[18]

Finally, the tax subsidy is faulted for encouraging over-insurance. Most private health insurance is obtained through employment, and employer contributions are excluded from taxable income. Employer-paid health insurance is a substitute for other compensation, and its exclusion from taxation amounts to a considerable subsidy toward the purchase of insurance. In 1981 alone, employer contributions were approximately $59 billion. At average marginal tax rates of roughly 43 percent, the subsidy amounted to $25 billion in federal revenues.[19] Despite the revenues lost by the federal government, Olson notes the current move to eliminate this subsidy may be misguided. He argues compellingly that the influence of the tax subsidy on cost escalation has been exaggerated. On balance, the influence of the subsidy on the total amount of insurance purchased is offset by the under-spending of those not covered at all and by the

[15] Robert Crawford, "Individual Responsibility and Health Politics in the 1970s," in Susan Reverby and David Rosner, eds., *Health Care in America* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press 1979), pp. 247–68.

[16] Paul L. Joskow, "Alternative Regulatory Mechanics," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 219–57; and Olson, "Introduction" in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 1–26.

[17] Skepticism is expressed by Olson, "Introduction," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 1–26, and by Ricardo-Campbell, *Economics and Politics of Health*.

[18] J. B. Christianson, *Do HMOs Stimulate Beneficial Competition?* (Excelsior, Minn.: Interstudy, 1978); and Donald W. Moran, "HMOs, Competition and the Politics of Minimum Benefit," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 59 (1981): 190–207.

[19] Paul B. Ginzburg, "Altering Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Plans," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 59 (1981): 224–55.

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disincentive effects of public and charitable expenditure for care for those who cannot afford it.

The competitive focus on these sources of cost escalation is incorporated in proposals for removal of the tax subsidy, for consumer cost-sharing, and for the promotion of alternative delivery systems. These are currently being considered in Congress and President Reagan has strongly endorsed reliance on the market.[20] Legislative variations abound, but the essence of some is contained in a plan proposed by Alain C. Enthoven. Originally submitted to Secretary Joseph A. Califano in 1977, Enthoven's Consumer Choice Health Plan (CCHP) embodies four principles: multiple choice for consumers; a fixed dollar subsidy; specific governmentally established rules to govern insurance plans; and the inclusion of physicians in competing units.[21] Employer contributions would be included as taxable income. Furthermore, low-income groups would receive vouchers for the purchase of care; this would operate in a fashion similar to the negative income tax.

Enthoven believes that a competitive approach will stimulate the development of alternative delivery systems. Such a system will possess the economic incentives and the organizational capability to limit costs that currently are lacking among insurance companies, hospitals, and physicians. Under the proposal, consumers will pay larger out-of-pocket costs, graded by income level, which will provide consumers with leverage over providers of care. Consequently, providers will be forced by consumers to provide care efficiently or else lose business, and utilization will generally be curtailed by consumer cost-sharing.

This proposal is considered the most sophisticated embodiment of the competitive strategy, but its problems have been noted by proponents and critics alike. Certain trends suggest its weakness. First, direct out-of-pocket expenditures now amount to about 33 percent of personal health expenditures, which is approximately the same percentage under Enthoven's plan.[22] Second, the poor and elderly would be covered under CCHP so that its full financial effects would be felt by the middle class. It might be argued that the escalation of cost is the result of expanded coverage under Medicare and Medicaid. If so, reimbursement policy, rather than insurance cost sharing, is the appropriate focus of any successful strategy.[23]

Another trend is the increase in service intensity. Studies indicate that while 64 percent of the increase in costs has been due to general price increases, 30 percent is due to increasing service intensity.[24] Represented here are rapid technological developments as well as the escalation and proliferation of malpractice

[20] Demkovich, "Relying on the Market."

[21] Alain C. Enthoven, "A Brief Outline of the Competition Strategy for Health Services Delivery System Reform," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 419–23.

[22] Mark E. Rushefsky, "A Critique of Market Reform in Health Care: The Consumer-Choice Health Plan," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 5 (1981): 720–41.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

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insurance. Competitive plans seem incapable of reversing these trends and in any case, by focusing on consumers, do not directly address themselves to these problems.

It is not known how much can be saved under CCHP, but it is obvious that its success and that of the competitive approach generally require a complex series of interactions. That these will occur is far from certain, based as they are on rather frail assumptions about individual and organizational behavior. First, the efficient use of services requires that parties are able to compare costs and to refrain from purchasing additional insurance to cover their cost share. But patients cannot make judgments on sophisticated in-patient care, nor are they likely to want to be placed in that position. It is likely that preventive, nonessential care, which is probably cost-restraining in the long run, will be foregone. Moreover, consumers are inclined to purchase supplementary insurance. Only 11.6 percent of enrollees in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, for example, purchase the low option plan, and most Medicare recipients devote extra dollars to Supplementary Social Insurance.[25]

Second, the competitive strategy's success relies on alternative delivery systems, specifically, HMOs, to foster system-wide competition. The reliance on HMOs to lower costs is questionable. HMOs are generally credited with lowering hospital use,[26] but it is uncertain whether this results from patient self-selection, poor and insufficient quality, or true efficiency. There is also the problem of attractiveness to consumers. HMOs have not been widely accepted and there is no evidence that they can successfully compete with the prevailing fee-for-service system or with Blue Cross and Blue Shield.

Perhaps the most serious flaw, and that which most undercuts the competitive strategy, is that there are no real, direct incentives for providers to compete. Since there are no direct incentives applied to providers to lower costs, the amount that consumers will be forced to share may well be quite high. Does the market strategy really promote competition or does it actually rely on consumer restraint?[27]

Finally, there are the well-known problems of "cream-skimming" and "adverse selection." These problems violate an underlying principle of insurance that risk is distributed and costs are shared. Cream-skimming occurs if an insurer can attract persons of lower medical risk, thereby offering lower premiums. As Randall R. Bovbjerg, writing elsewhere, has noted: "The apparent health care savings due to multiple choice competition among insurance plans may in fact be due only to a realignment of insurers' risks, rather than to any efficiency gain."[28] A high cost-sharing plan may appear to be achieving efficiency

[25] Daniel W. Sigelman, "Palm Reading the Invisible Hand: A Critical Examination of Pro-Competitive Reform Proposals," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 6 (1982): 578–619.

[26] Jack A. Meyer, "Health Care Competition: Are Tax Incentives Enough," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 422–49.

[27] Sigelman, "Palm Reading the Invisible Hand."

[28] Randall R. Bovbjerg, "Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn Dichotomy," *Vanderbilt Law Review* 34 (1981), p. 986.

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by cost conscious patients when it instead achieves economies through cream-skimming. Adverse selection, the situation when patients shift their enrollment to a high premium plan at a time of anticipated high medical need, may further reallocate risk and exacerbate the problem. Aside from the potential inequity in penalizing high-risk patients with high premiums, effects of competitive proposals may also be inefficient.

Rights Versus Commodities: A Summary

There are two fundamentally different ways to view health care: as a right to which the government will ensure entitlement, and as a commodity, no different from any other and needing minimal public intervention. Rita Ricardo-Campbell writes that "medical care is a service like other services such as education" and that "competition encourages high quality and low prices; regulation does not."[29] Proponents of this view hold that government has regulated excessively, causing much of the current crisis, while critics of competition find the crisis to be the inevitable result of government's lack of will in making health care an entitlement. Zeckhauser and Zook epitomize the competitive ideology: "We believe that much government regulation has developed as a means for coping with the warped incentives attendant upon the present system—which is itself an outgrowth of government programs."[30] Paul Starr best captures the contrasting view: "Indirectly government bears responsibility for the incentives of private health insurance, cost-based hospital reimbursement and relative physician fees because of what it did not do: it did not pass national health insurance, vigorously enforce the anti-trust laws, or aid the prepaid alternatives that might have provided cost control at a high standard of care.[31]

The weaknesses of regulation are well known and numerous; regulation protects producers, encourages the cross-subsidization of uneconomic activity, limits innovation, and leads to inefficiency. Most of the weaknesses of competition are largely speculative, but some are known. Two competitive forces operating in health care—the nonprice competition for technology and the price competition of insurance companies—have both contributed to cost escalation.[32] Increasing competition in health care may also have grim consequences for distributional equity. With individuals treated as commodities and health viewed as a product available to those who can pay for it, the competitive system easily ignores the needs of the poor and near-poor. Enthoven's plan does include the voucher system for the poor and elderly, but generally the market model makes no provisions for equity. Indeed, the competitive model implicitly assumes that the distribution of income according to the market is just and that

[29] Ricardo-Campbell, *The Economics and Politics of Health*, p. 333.

[30] Zeckhauser and Zook, "Failures to Control Health Costs," p. 92.

[31] Paul Starr, "Commentary," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, p. 121.

[32] Lawrence D. Brown, "Competition and Health Cost Containment: Cautions and Conjectures," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 59 (1981): 145–89.

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differential access based on willingness to pay is desirable.[33] Ricardo-Campbell, for example, recommends that restrictions on allied health personnel be removed and that they be permitted to practice independently. Then, "consumers who wish to purchase less expensive and lesser quality care may do so."[34] It is highly unlikely that lesser quality care will be the preference of any consumer, but extremely likely that it will be the only option available to the poor and near-poor in a market-controlled system. Further, it seems inevitable that the 12 percent of our population not currently covered by any insurance plan whatsoever—a figure that will surely swell as unemployment spirals upward and as government subsidies shrink—will remain outside the health care system.

This argument reveals that the market model fundamentally contends that health is an individual matter, a contention that is an outgrowth, or really a perversion, of the movement to grant individuals more control over their own lives. This ideology of individual responsibility originated in the belief that individuals should play a larger role in their own health care, but it has come to mean that individuals are accountable for their own health or disease. Although this derivative view correctly indicts such behavior as smoking, drinking, and overeating as contributory to mortality, morbidity, and cost, it also suggests that "since people's own misbehavior is at the heart of the problem of health, people should *demand* less medical care."[35] Critics fear that the commingling of the market and individual responsibility ideologies will diminish social responsibility, and will ignore the relationship between individual health care and occupationally—and environmentally induced—disease. It may also, at its most insidious extreme, implicitly sanction disease-causing habits as long as the victim can foot the medical bill.[36] These are serious concerns, but they overlook the more fundamental and immediate problem of the market model, namely, that of choice. How much as a society do we choose to spend on health care? What is the level of adequate health care that we as a society choose for each citizen? It is morally indefensible and politically shortsighted not to establish an adequate level of health care benefit and to set a limit on expenditure. But we are not yet making these decisions, and the market model, with its reliance on individual decisions and its preclusion of political accountability, refuses to grapple with these issues. These issues must be confronted now. The problem of cost and unmet need will only worsen in the years to come as the postwar baby boom generation becomes older and places unprecedented demands on the health care system.

Is the case for competition persuasive? The empirical evidence indicates that rate-setting conducted by mature agencies has the potential to contain costs and

[33] Rand E. Rosenblatt, "Health Care, Markets and Democratic Values," *Vanderbilt Law Review* 34 (1981): 1067–1115.

[34] Ricardo-Campbell, *The Economics and Politics of Health*, p. 331.

[35] Crawford, "Individual Responsibility," p. 250.

[36] Rosenblatt, "Health Care, Markets and Democratic Values."

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that hasty, incremental solutions are unlikely to succeed. The market strategists do not promise immediate results, arguing that this approach requires about 10 years, which is probably the time needed for mature rate setting on a broader scale to be tested. It cannot be denied that the competitive approach may succeed in lowering costs, but it is highly probable that it will be at the expense of medical needs not being met for some in our society. Perhaps the most important question is whether we *should* proceed this way, "without changing the basic incentives or institutional structure of the system—without correcting the distributional consequences of such policies."[37] To some, at least, direct provision remains the only mechanism for resource allocation and cost control. Christopher Clague reminds us briefly that the major advantages are universal catastrophic coverage and cost control by the payor, the government.[38] There is no discernible support for a program of national health insurance either among economists or policymakers in Washington, who interestingly enough, appear to be the only proponents of the market model. Uwe Reinhardt writes:

> Remarkably while American economists were toiling in the trenches, scoring impressive victories in the realm of thought, their fellow citizens yawned and went right on socializing this well-behaved commodity. The notion continued to spread that health care is one of those commodities to which every citizen in a civilized society is entitled regardless of ability to pay. . . . What vexes a guardian of efficiency is that this sentiment now threatens to engulf *all* technically available health care, regardless of its cost. . . . Quite possibly economists, like good soldiers everywhere, may learn that they have been had by the folks on the home front.[39]

Those words were written over two years ago, before the forces to introduce market incentives to health care had welcomed their strongest supporters—the Reagan team—to Washington. Popular support for the competitive strategy still appears tenuous, and the major task of the administration is to convince consumers that health care costs must be contained. One hopes that in the process, the weaknesses of the market model will not be obscured, the notion of health care as an entitlement not forsaken, and the alternatives of rate setting and expenditure limits not ignored.

[37] Starr, "Commentary," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, p. 314.

[38] Christopher Clague, "Commentary," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, p. 314.

[39] Uwe E. Reinhardt, "Health Insurance and Cost Containment Policies: The Experience Abroad," in Olson, ed., *A New Approach*, pp. 151 and 171.

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State and Local Governments under Federal Grants: Toward a Predictive Theory

RICHARD P. NATHAN

In the United States, federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments can be said both to have a long history and to be quite new. Their history goes back to the nineteenth century, when the federal government granted land to state governments for the establishment of state universities. Yet the cash grant as an instrument of domestic policy of the national government emerged on the scene in a big way only with the New Deal. Moreover, until the Truman period, grants were made almost exclusively to state governments. Under Truman, direct federal-local grants were initiated. In the 1970s, these grants, made directly from the national government to local governments, grew rapidly and became a major factor in American intergovernmental fiscal relations.

Because cash grants on a major scale, and especially direct federal-local grants, are a relatively recent development, it is not surprising that the theoretical literature on grants does not have an extensive empirical base. In a survey of the literature of the subject published in 1977, Edward M. Gramlich stated that one of the barriers to understanding how fiscal subventions from the national government affect the states and localities receiving them is the "lack of an underlying theory of the behavior of state and local governments."[1]

[1] Edward M. Gramlich, "Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of the Empirical Literature," in Wallace E. Oates, ed., *The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977) p. 219.

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The purpose of this article is to contribute to the development of a predictive theory of the behavior of state and local governments under federal grants. This theory is based on a set of interdisciplinary studies that were conducted by field analysts—both economists and political scientists—and administered by the Brookings Institution and Princeton University. Referred to as "field network evaluation studies," they have investigated the general revenue sharing program, the community development block grant program, and the public service jobs component of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Case studies have also been conducted on the effects of all federal grants received by 11 major cities in 1978. With support from the Ford Foundation, a fifth study was recently initiated on the effects of the domestic budget cuts and policy changes made under Ronald Reagan.[2]

All five of these studies involve a central staff and academic policy analysts in the field. The field analysts are academic social scientists who are residents of the areas they are studying and participate in this research on a part-time basis. The samples are representative, not random, and typically consist of about 50 state and local governmental jurisdictions.

The Bargaining Process of Grants

A grant-in-aid is the product of a political bargaining process, not just in Washington where the grant is created, but also at the state and local levels where it is executed. The best way to think about this process is that there is a *horizontal* policy bargaining process, which consists of decision-making about policy goals and instruments for the country as a whole, and a *vertical* dimension, involving the way in which a particular grant is defined and executed by individual recipient jurisdictions. The larger the grant, the more important it is to consider both dimensions. A small grant can be formulated and administered in Washington, and it is feasible to do so. The urban development action grant (UDAG) program, which was judged to be quite successful, is an illustration.[3] But for a large grant to succeed, it is necessary for state and local governments to play a prominent and important role in both its formulation and execution. The administrative system of the national government under current and foreseeable conditions is too small to administer directly major domestic public services. The jobs program under the CETA is a good case in point.[4]

[2] For a description of these studies, see Richard P. Nathan, "The Methodology for Field Network Evaluation Studies," in Walter Williams et al., *Studying Implementation: Methodological and Administrative Issues* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1982).

[3] Jerry A. Webman, "UDAG: Targeting Urban Economic Development," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (1981): 189–207. This program, begun in 1977, has involved from $400 million to $675 million per year in grants for specific development projects individually approved by Washington-based officials of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

[4] Richard P. Nathan, Robert F. Cook, V. Lane Rawlins, et al., *Public Service Employment: A Field Evaluation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981).

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When the CETA public service employment (PSE) program was expanded dramatically under President Jimmy Carter in 1977, the horizontal policy bargain turned out to be a workable blend of two policy concerns—reducing unemployment and aiding disadvantaged persons. This workable policy bargain was expressed in the way hundreds of state and local governments behaved under the program. Most of them were able to get useful work done in the community by hiring additional workers from deeper down in the labor pool than usual, that is, workers with less skill and experience than they ordinarily would hire. Yet they did not hire workers from the very bottom layer of the labor pool, the most structurally disadvantaged persons. Nevertheless, recipient governments were generally satisfied with the terms of trade.

However, when the CETA–PSE policy bargain was recrafted in new legislation in 1978, policymakers concerned about aiding the disadvantaged got the upper hand in Washington. They insisted on and obtained requirements to tighten participant eligibility requirements and to target CETA jobs on structurally unemployed persons with very limited job skills and labor market experience.

Once Congress forced state and local governments to dig deeper into the labor pool, the earlier policy bargain came apart, and the program changed substantially. After 1978, state and local governments employed smaller proportions of entry-level workers in their own agencies and assigned larger proportions to nonprofit organizations. Many of the jobs in nonprofit agencies had much less potential for transition to permanent, unsubsidized positions than did the jobs in government agencies.

When the call for retrenchment hit Washington in 1981 (as it had earlier on the local and state levels), the CETA jobs program was terminated. Many observers were puzzled by how little resistance there was on the part of state and local governments to the elimination of this program, which at its peak spent nearly $6 billion. The reason for its quiet demise is obvious, however. The workable policy bargain of 1977 had fallen apart, especially its vertical dimension. The constituency that remained for this program, now dominated by community groups, was nowhere near strong enough to protect a $6 billion program in the new mood of austerity in Washington.

A similar process of changed intergovernmental relations was observed for the community development block grant (CDBG) program enacted in 1974. Originally, the Ford administration took a "hands off" position toward the administration of this block grant. Local officials were quick to take advantage of this greater flexibility.[5] Beginning in 1977, the Carter administration pressed for the "targeting" of CDBG aid on poor people and distressed neighborhoods, a policy that many local officials resisted. The Reagan administration has now

[5] Richard P. Nathan and Paul R. Dommel, "Federal-Local Relations Under Block Grants," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (1978): 421–42.

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shifted the policy bargain back to the "hands off" policy of the Ford administration.

In the case of both of these programs, the shift in the horizontal policy bargain changed the behavior of recipients. For the CETA–PSE program, the change in the horizontal policy bargain was so pronounced that the vertical policy bargain, in effect, came apart. The end result was that the program lost support and eventually was eliminated. In the case of the CDBG program, the horizontal policy bargain under the Carter administration was not changed as much. Local officials, however, resisted the Carter changes and lobbied against them. When the Reagan administration came to office in 1981, they reverted to the earlier approach. In both cases, although for different reasons, the way the vertical policy bargaining process played out caused the horizontal or national policy to change.

Perceptions of Grant Recipients

These changes in the CETA and CDBG policy bargains over time help to bring out a critical generalization about the behavior of state and local governments under federal grants. *The way the dominant political actors of a given recipient jurisdiction perceive and treat a given federal grant often shapes its character.* Research that concentrates on the horizontal policy bargaining process cannot tell the full story.

Three groups of actors involved in the political processes of recipient jurisdictions under federal grants-in-aid need to be identified. One group consists of *generalist* officials (governors, mayors, budget and planning officials); another is *specialist* officials responsible for the operations of a particular functional agency (for example, welfare, education, and transportation); and the third is the representatives of various *interest groups.*

Under the CETA public service jobs grant, it was found that different groups of actors at the local level regarded the CETA jobs grant differently and operated differently under it. Some officials, especially in the early period, saw this grant as similar to revenue sharing and acted accordingly. They treated it as a supplement to their own resources to be used for jobs to provide basic services. Other officials perceived the CETA–PSE grant as a social program. They, too, acted accordingly, isolating CETA funds from the jurisdiction's general fund and emphasizing training, counseling, and other services intended to aid disadvantaged persons in the program. In the former case, generalists tended to dominate. In the latter, it was the specialist officials in employment, training, and related agencies and interest groups that dominated.

Under the community development block grant, "the general pattern was that the local chief executive became the principal architect of the local CDBG process."[6] These generalist officials and the agencies they set up to administer the

[6] Paul R. Dommel, *Decentralizing Urban Policy: Case Studies in Community Development* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 226.

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CDBG program came to exert increasing influence over the use of these funds, most of which went for housing rehabilitation and various capital development projects, more than was the case under the prior categorical grants (urban renewal, model cities, and so on).

We can now add another generalization: The character of the vertical policy bargain on a particular grant is likely to be strongly influenced by the group of actors who dominate the decision-making of the recipient jurisdiction for that grant.

The Fiscal Variable

The way in which different groups of actors in the recipient jurisdictions define a particular grant tends to depend most heavily on one variable—*fiscal condition.* The more fiscally hard pressed a jurisdiction, the more likely it is to merge federal grant funds with its own resources and use them to pay for the basic services it provides. (For cities, "basic services" means police, fire, streets, sewers, and the like.)

This finding is neither surprising nor hard to explain. If they are strong enough, fiscal pressures may cause generalist officials to use as much federal money as they can to do what in their view "must be done."

Still, using federal aid funds to replace funds that would otherwise be obtained from other sources has costs. These costs arise from three factors: some federal administrators and auditors actively enforce requirements prohibiting the maintenance of existing programs and services with federal aid funds; local specialist officials and interest groups demand that federal funds intended for their programs actually be used for them; and federal grant programs are unstable.

It is primarily because of the third factor that state and local governments with the luxury to do so prefer to isolate federal aid funds and use them for their prescribed purposes. They identify these purposes as programs that will be carried out as long as the "feds" provide the necessary money. Our current study of the effects on state and local governments of the 1981 budget cuts and related changes in domestic policy bears out this point. State and local governments that have separated federal grant funds from local funds have been much more able to adjust to the cuts than have other jurisdictions.[7]

Why, one might ask, do recipient jurisdictions tend to play the federal aid game according to the rules, when they can easily use various fiscal and budgetary strategems to channel federal aid money to other purposes?

There are several possible answers. One—a simple one, but one that should not be discounted—is that the officials of the recipient jurisdictions desire to be

[7] See Richard P. Nathan, Philip M. Dearborn, Clifford A. Goldman, et al., "Initial Effects of the Fiscal Year 1982 Reductions in Federal Spending," in John W. Ellwood, ed., *Reductions in U.S. Domestic Spending: How They Affect State and Local Governments* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982).

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law abiding. A second is that state and local officials share the views of federal officials as to the purposes of federal aid. Third, generalist officials fear becoming dependent on federal aid because of the problems of funding unreliability and instability described above.

In the case of state and local specialist officials, the desire to use federal aid for its prescribed purposes is not hard to understand. Many specialist officials and interest groups have asked the national government to set requirements for the use of federal aid as a way to direct the money to their favored purposes and to protect it from other claims.

Partly in response to these requests from officials and groups and partly from a desire to avoid what might be perceived as a waste of federal funds, Congress has in many cases outlawed using federal aid to substitute for local money. But even thought it is illegal, fiscal substitution might not be bad in a practical sense. One of the arguments often made in favor of federal revenue sharing and block grants is that such forms of aid will help relieve the fiscal pressure on state and local taxpayers and in so doing shift the nation's tax system from local property taxation to federal income taxation, which is presumed to be more efficient and equitable.

In the studies of both the CETA public service jobs program and the general revenue sharing program, the pattern of substitutive uses was found to be U-shaped, that is, the highest rates of substitution were found for the most and least fiscally distressed places. We interpreted this as reflecting fiscal exigencies for the fiscally pressured group (discussed above), and in the case of the fiscally well-off jurisdictions to be a function of the generally more conservative orientation of these governments.

Characteristics of Grants

Three main points have been made: First, federal grants should be viewed as a two-dimensional policy bargain. Second, the way the dominant actors in the political process of a given recipient jurisdiction perceive and treat a given grant often shapes its character. Finally, the fiscal condition of the recipient jurisdiction is the most important determinant of the way in which a given recipient jurisdiction treats a particular grant-in-aid.

The next step is to consider the main types of grants; their characteristics, such as the degree of discretion allowed and their distribution system; and the way in which these characteristics can affect the behavior of recipient states and local jurisdictions.

Grants may be classified in a number of ways, and the literature is replete with typologies. One basic division has greater importance than others, however. This is the distinction between grants for *entitlement* programs that involve transfers of cash or direct services to individuals, and grants that can be used to pay for the *services* (operating or capital) that state and local governments themselves provide.

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Transfer grants—for example, aid to families with dependent children (AFDC), medicaid, and others aimed at poor people—tend to be regarded by state and local officials as "their" programs rather than "our" programs, that is, the federal government's programs rather than local programs. Evidence of this tendency is found in the effects of the 1981 domestic program cutbacks. We found that "although there were exceptions, state and local governments as a rule did not replace lost federal aid for the poor with their own revenues."[8]

Grants for the services states and localities themselves provide include programs that can also be regarded as "theirs," although not all operating and capital grants are so regarded. For example, the federal grant program to subsidize construction of wastewater treatment facilities is often seen as a federal program (theirs), because the environmental standards and requirements are strong. On the other hand, both the capital and operating grant programs for mass transit are not viewed this way, both because the federal funds involved are more easily merged into the general budget and because states and local governments spend a great deal of their own funds in this area.

The three points listed at the beginning of this section apply both to grants for entitlement programs and to grants for a government's own operations, but a jurisdiction's fiscal condition is less important as a determinant of behavior for entitlement grants than it is for other grants. This is because the main grants in this group (AFDC and medicaid) are open-ended grants. The amount a state spends is not determined in advance; it depends on eligibility rules, benefit levels, and economic conditions. The federal government reimburses each state government for a percentage—on average about 55 percent—of the amount the state spends under each of these programs. Since the average state uses its own funds to pay for only about 45 percent of total expenditures for these programs, it has less fiscal incentive to save money. A number of states strictly limit eligibility or the levels of benefits, but the reasons for doing so have more to do with ideology than with fiscal condition.

This is the primary way in which ideology can affect a jurisdiction's use of federal funds. Although our research has focused on operating and capital grants for the services provided by the recipient governments, information collected suggests that states in which a liberal political ideology prevails tend to have higher benefits and generally broader eligibility standards under grants for entitlement programs than do conservative states.

Ideology affects behavior under operating and capital grants to jurisdictions in a paradoxical way. Conservatives often want to avoid substitutive behavior under grants. They do not want to get "caught" funding a program with federal aid that is part of their basic services because of the fear that the federal government will withdraw its aid, forcing local governments to raise new revenue though higher taxes. Liberals also tend to resist the substitutive use of operating and capital grants, but for different reasons. They are more likely to favor addi-

[8] Ibid., p. 318.

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tional government services and activities and to view grants as a way to achieve this objective.

Grants can be arrayed along a continuum according to the degree of discretion they allow recipient jurisdictions. At one end of the scale is general revenue sharing, which allows the most discretion of any current grant. At the other end are various narrow-purpose categorical grants with block grants in the middle. The degree of local discretion can influence how a grant is used. As a general rule, the more discretion a grant allows, the more likely jurisidiction are to subsume these funds into their own treasury just like locally raised dollars and use them to provide basic services.

This generalization has limits and needs to be applied carefully. Local officials viewed even revenue sharing at first with uncertainty, even suspicion. As a result, many governments, especially smaller ones, tended to use revenue sharing funds for one-time capital projects.[9] Their reasoning was that if the federal government stopped this quite surprising behavior of providing basically unconditional funds, they would not get caught having absorbed this money into their fiscal bloodstreams. This is not an unreasonable view; revenue sharing payments for state governments were terminated in 1980, as had been promised by Jimmy Carter in his 1976 presidential campaign.

Distribution of Grants

Another characteristic of grants that needs to be taken into account is how funds are distributed. The two basic choices are a formula allocation system or the distribution of grants on a project-by-project basis. It is easier for recipient governments to engage in substitutive behavior if a grant is allocated on a formula basis. A number of examples can be cited. The evidence suggests that grant funds for community development (CDBG) are more likely to be used on a substitutive basis than funds provided under the action grant program for urban development (UDAG), which is a project-type grant.

Explanations of the behavior of recipient jurisdictions under federal grants that depend too heavily on either the flexibility or distribution system of a grant can be misleading. These characteristics are generally not as important as the fiscal condition of the recipient jurisdiction in explaining the way a particular grant is used by a particular recipient government. There are two reasons for this. First, mayors, governors, and state or local legislators have a great deal of room for maneuver in using federal grants of all types. Second, the capability of federal officials to control the behavior of the recipient state and local governments under grants is much more limited than is generally realized.

As an example, if the mayor, city council, and budget director of a city want to use a federal mass transit grant to reduce the cost of bus maintenance, it is

[9] Richard P. Nathan and Charles F. Adams, Jr., *Revenue Sharing: The Second Round* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977).

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likely that they will be able to do so. If they want to arrange their finances to use a highway grant for this purpose, they probably can do that, too, as they probably could even use employment and training grant funds for bus maintenance.

To reiterate, the reason that substitutive behavior under federal grants is not more widespread is that state and local officials, for various institutional and political reasons, do not behave this way—at least, not unless their fiscal situation is such that they feel they "*must*."

Dependence under Federal Grants

This leads to a definition of "dependence" under federal grants that is different from the conventional view,[10] which is that a jurisdiction is "hooked" on federal grants if it receives a large amount of grant money. Yet, as indicated earlier, if federal aid is kept to one side and used for purposes labeled as "federally aided," that jurisdiction clearly is not as dependent as one that has absorbed federal aid into its own fiscal bloodstream. *Dependence is a function of the way federal aid is used.* If a jurisdiction uses federal aid to pay for services that its officials and voters view as essential or very important, that jurisdiction will have much more severe withdrawal symptoms when federal aid is reduced or eliminated. Officials in this case cannot simply say that they have stopped providing a certain federally aided service because the federal government has stopped paying for it.

Viewing dependence as a function of fiscal substitution raises an interesting issue about the behavior of jurisdictions currently receiving federal aid. As levels of federal aid decline, which they have since at least 1981, we are finding that fiscally hard-pressed jurisdictions that have engaged in substitutive behavior under grants are having the most serious withdrawal symptoms.

Time as a Variable in Grants Analysis

Time is also an important factor in grants analysis. The effects of grants are manifest at different rates, depending on such factors as pay-out schedules, fiscal-year periods, budget processes, and accounting practices. Block grants provide a good illustration of this point.

When the Reagan administration won congressional approval of nine "block grants" in 1981, funding was set at about 25 percent less than the spending under the programs that were subsumed in the block grants. But when researchers in the field began to look for the effects of the changes, they found little impact, at least in the first few months of federal fiscal year 1982. The reason had to do with federal and state budgeting and accounting practices. Many states had un-

[10] See James W. Fossett, *Federal Aid to Big Cities: The Politics of Dependence* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming). Based on 11 federal aid case studies conducted for fiscal year 1978.

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spent federal funds for federal fiscal year 1981 left over when the new federal fiscal year began 1 October 1981. At the same time, such states received a letter of credit for the full amount of the "new" block grant money they were entitled to receive for fiscal year 1982. The result was not a reduction but a bulge, somewhat like the effect of a boa constrictor swallowing a pig. These changes will take longer to play out than we had expected.

Time is an especially important variable for capital grants. This has been referred to as the "lumpiness" phenomenon. Capital grants made in any one year are often spent over many subsequent years. Lumps occur if, as is often the case, the receipt of a grant is recorded when federal funds involved are initially obligated to be spent as opposed to when they are spent for the actual purchase of goods and services. This is not to say that the expectations discussed above about the use of grants by recipient jurisdictions will be materially different for capital grants. A federal grant to a local government for mass transit equipment or a wastewater treatment plant can be used for substitutive purposes just as easily as an operating grant. In fact, it is often easier to justify using a capital grant for substitutive purposes, because the jurisdiction in this case will not be faced with the problem of a federal-aid cutoff in the future.

Incidence and Institutional Effects of Grants

Incidence effects refer to the income groups affected by a particular grant. In studying this category of effects, it is ironic that the more control generalist officials had exercised to spread the benefits of a federal grant among a wide range of income groups, the more likely it is that that grant was protected from federal budget cuts in 1981. This point was suggested earlier in the discussion of the CETA jobs and CDBG programs. The CDBG program was not cut in 1981 because mayors fought to retain it, as they were using it for a wide range of things that had support from many groups who stood to benefit. The CETA jobs program, on the other hand, was likely to be more heavily targeted on the poor and disadvantaged. It notably lacked support from mayors—or from any other generalist public official, for that matter—when Washington caused retrenchment in 1981.

Federal grants changed the institutional machinery of domestic government in the United States during the 1970s simply because grants became a much larger source of outside funds than in previous decades. The job of making sure that existing grants continue and of obtaining new ones has produced a new specialization of "grantsmanship." In addition, new agencies have arisen to administer federally aided programs.

The emergence of new players is not the only institutional change in federalism that has resulted from the growth in grants. Existing players in state and local political processes behave in ways that reflect the growth in the role of federal aid in domestic affairs.

Now that federal aid is declining, we are interested in what will happen to in-

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stitutional arrangements that have come into being because of federal aid. Many governments, especially local governments, created departments of community development, employment and training, and social services because of the new availability of federal grants for these functions in the seventies. Likewise, planning offices and agencies came into existence in response to federal grants or requirements that are now being eliminated. Among the most interesting issues for grants analysis in the eighties are questions as to what will happen to these agencies and governmental arrangements.

Federal grants, especially larger ones, need to be viewed as involving both a horizontal and vertical political bargaining process. The vertical policy bargaining process—the way grants are treated by the recipient state and local governments—has a great deal to do with the way grants work. Analysts ignore this dimension at their peril. To assess the way a particular grant affects, or is likely to affect, a particular government or type of governmental recipient, it is necessary to study both how a grant's objectives change over time and the ways state and local governments behave under the grant. Studying the behavior of state and local governments is demanding and difficult. There are no readily available data sets that can be used to substitute for the time-consuming process of gathering and analyzing budget, program, and interview data at the state and local levels. For this reason, policy analysts have tended to devote more time and effort to historical studies of the grant-making process—the horizontal dimension of grants analysis—than to studies at the state and local level of the implementation process and effects of federal grants-in-aid. The studies we have conducted on the effects of major changes in federal grant-in-aid policies in the seventies, now continuing into the eighties, are beginning to yield what we believe are important theoretical lessons. Some readers may find the generalizations presented in this article surprising and counterintuitive. That would be fine. It would attest to the value for theory building of field research by social scientists on the effects of federal grants.

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DOD's Office of International Security Affairs: The Brief Ascendancy of an Advisory System

GEOFFREY PILLER

Foreign policy and national security advisory systems for the president and secretary of state have been given careful treatment in a number of studies.[1] Foreign policy advisory staffs for the secretary of defense, however, have received scant attention. Until changes made in 1979 by the Carter administration, the defense secretary's foreign policy advisory and general policy development staff was the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA), part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

One of the reasons for its relative obscurity in the literature is that after the Johnson administration, ISA's influence declined dramatically. This article examines the factors that enhanced or diminished the influence of ISA. As the current administration struggles with the problems of foreign policy management, the experience of one cabinet-level advisory agency offers a better understanding of what has been effective.

From the Truman through the Carter administrations, ISA filled two very different functions. It was a "line" agency,[2] administering the Defense Depart-

[1] See Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, *The President and the Management of National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1969); I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Robert L. Rothstein, *Planning, Prediction, and Policymaking in Foreign Affairs* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1972).

[2] For a discussion outlining the differences between line and staff, see Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats*, pp. 238–39.

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ment's role in arms transfers and in liaisons with the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department. ISA's other function—its role as the defense secretary's general policy planning and development staff—has varied widely from one administration to another and is the subject of this article. As a general policy development staff, ISA has extended its influence beyond defense-related issues. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, ISA became the source for major foreign policy initiatives. Under other administrations, however, ISA has wielded little influence as a policy development staff, reduced almost entirely to its line functions.

The Origins and Development of ISA

In the years immediately after the Second World War, the United States assumed a range of commitments and privileges commensurate with its size and strength. The shape of the postwar world was difficult to reconcile with prewar notions of how agencies dealing with foreign policy should operate. Postwar officials had to determine what institutional structure of the foreign and defense policy bureaucracy was best suited to enable the president to discharge new global responsibilities. Each president resolved this administrative dilemma differently. Straddled between the overlapping jurisdictions of the State Department, NSC, and the Defense Department, the Office of International Security Affairs under seven presidents reflected the institutional confusion surrounding the administration of foreign and national security policy.

In the fall of 1949, Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which enabled the United States to provide arms, military equipment, and training globally. To direct this program, President Harry S. Truman established the post of special assistant to the secretary of defense for international security affairs. Hitherto the secretary had had no explicitly mandated civilian politico-military affairs advisor. As the United States accumulated military commitments abroad, the responsibilities of the special assistant steadily increased. By the end of 1952, ISA was officially administering the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and NATO affairs, coordinating defense contacts with State and the NSC, and advising the secretary on politico-military issues.[3]

Outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Lovett recommended to Eisenhower's first secretary of defense, Charles E. Wilson, that the Special Assistant for ISA be upgraded to the assistant secretary level.[4] The post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD-ISA) was established in 1953 under the provision that it continue in the role it had assumed under the Truman administration. ISA was also assigned the task of "coordinating" Defense Department participation in all foreign-policy issues.[5] The introduction of this

[3] Thomas J. Bigley, "The Office of International Security Affairs," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 92 (1966): 61–72.

[4] *New York Times*, 5 February 1953.

[5] Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats*, p. 228.

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coordinative function raises two important questions about the role played by ISA during the Eisenhower years. First, what needed to be coordinated and with whom? Second, why could not the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to coordinate national security policy directly with the State Department as they had done during the Truman administration? The answers to both of these questions lie in the institutional approach of the Eisenhower administration to national security policymaking and in the role of Eisenhower's defense secretaries.

When ISA was upgraded to the assistant secretary level, one concern was whether the Joint Chiefs could provide the secretary of defense with advice on military aspects of political issues, thereby obviating the need for a civilian intermediary like ISA. While the secretary of defense advises the president on the basis of military considerations, his advice must comprehend a broader context that embraces the overall goals of the administration—its approach to foreign policy and budgetary restraints on the use of force—while weighing the validity of the Joint Chiefs' assumptions with respect to non-military factors.[6] Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not responsible to the secretary of defense alone, but have a statutory obligation to render military advice directly to the president and the NSC. At times this responsibility may have to be discharged by disagreement with the secretary of defense. Finally, like the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs have not always spoken with a single voice to the president.

Yet ISA's capacity to coordinate inter-service opinion was undermined by Eisenhower's defense secretaries. The president's background made him an obvious authority on military issues. He did not need politico-military advice from his defense secretaries. If some presidents have been considered their own secretaries of state, Eisenhower's background made him his own secretary of defense. He looked to his defense secretaries to implement a defense budget unpopular with the armed services, to carry out his decisions, to bear the weight of military objections to ceilings on defense spending, and to force the services to develop military policy within those ceilings, not to suggest alternative policies.[7] I. M. Destler suggests that a policy development staff like ISA has little basis for developing its own influence in an area of policy unless it is clear that its boss has an important influence in that area.[8] Because Eisenhower's defense secretaries were neither interested in nor encouraged to offer independent policy positions, ISA was not expected to bring its own analysis or initiatives to the task of coordinating the services' opinions on those issues.

It would seem that a talented bureaucratic in-fighter could have used ISA's role as Defense Department liaison to the NSC as a means of accumulating influence. Eisenhower's assistant secretaries of defense for ISA—Frank Nash, H. Struve Hensel, Gordon Gray, Mansfield D. Sprague, and John Irwin II—were generally experienced administrators. During the Eisenhower years, however,

[6] Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York: McKay, 1969), pp. 34–35.

[7] Morton Halperin, "The President and the Military," in Halperin, ed., *National Security Policy Making* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 32.

[8] Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats*, p. 219.

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ISA was caught in an NSC policy process that was unproductive, inflexible, and distant from the real sources of policy. As representatives of their agencies, members of the NSC felt constrained to cling to departmental views rather than to adopt a broader perspective. The result of these constraints on departmental representatives to the NSC, as Dean Acheson charged, was "agreement by exhaustion," with the large meetings struggling to reach consensus.[9]

Problems similar to ISA's difficulties in the NSC plagued the staff's efforts to act as Pentagon liaison to the State Department. ISA's ability to supervise interaction between the military and the State Department was dependent upon its support from above. Charged with the task of coordinating the services' views on political issues under Secretaries of Defense Wilson and Neil McElroy, who were not expected to assert influence over foreign policy, ISA could not implement its statutory authority as coordinator. When one branch of the service was opposed to having its position on a politico-military issue "coordinated" with the views of the other services, it often approached the State Department directly. The widespread perception within the administration was that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the White House, rather than the NSC, actually made national security policy. Accordingly, the Eisenhower ISA neither provided analysis independent of the Joint Chiefs, as it would under Kennedy and Johnson, nor coordinated the positions of the professional military services.

ISA UNDER KENNEDY

"There was a war on," as ISA staffers in the Carter administration explained ISA's high level of influence in defense and foreign-policymaking in the Kennedy and Johnson years. Well before the United States became directly involved in the Vietnam War, however, ISA had become the source for major foreign and national security policy initiatives. While ISA's high level of influence predated American intervention in Vietnam, the war did broaden the scope of ISA's activities and enhanced its impact.

Kennedy rejected Eisenhower's NSC-centered system of foreign and national security policymaking. In the belief that it was inefficient and cumbersome, he introduced a less centralized system. Kennedy's assistant secretary for ISA, Paul H. Nitze, was chosen to contravene the squabbling in the previous administration among the armed forces and resultant weakening of the president's power as well as the failure to bring foreign policy and military strength into harmony.[10] As Kennedy's hand-picked representative, Nitze saw that the president's decisions on foreign policy got "translated into coordinated actions by the Departments of State and Defense."[11]

[9] Stanley L. Falk, "The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," *Political Science Quarterly* 79 (1964): 403–34.

[10] "How Kennedy Plans to Run Defense and Foreign Policy," *U.S. News and World Report*, 9 January 1961, p. 38.

[11] Ibid.

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The Nitze appointment reflected the new administration's intention to return responsibility for policymaking to the departments' planning and operational staffs. Whereas Eisenhower had sought to extend White House control over policymaking through a tight chain of command emphasizing structural relations within the NSC, Kennedy built centers of strength at various points within its various departments. While Eisenhower's foreign policy initiatives were made through his secretary of state and the NSC, his successor sought to establish a more "open" system in which the president could obtain advice from officials far below cabinet rank. Yet Kennedy's intent to return greater responsibility for national security and foreign-policymaking to his secretaries and assistant secretaries ran aground at Foggy Bottom. On foreign policy the Democrats were divided into two camps: hard-liners on the Soviet Union, like Dean Acheson, and advocates of Soviet–American reconciliation, like Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson. Hoping to mediate tension within the department, Kennedy filled the State Department's highest positions with members of both factions.

By reducing the role of the National Security Council and filling the top State Department posts so as to promote intra-departmental divisions, Kennedy created a policymaking vacuum that Nitze's ISA rushed to fill. When asked recently whence the initiatives for national security policy under the Kennedy administration came, Nitze made this response: "Over at ISA we thought that task wasn't really being done, and I had a good competent staff, and so, so far as it was done, I think we did it. . . . [If] you have some competent people you worry about the issues."[12]

The State Department's hesitancy on issues soon taken over by ISA was also a product of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's approach to his job. While Kennedy looked to the State Department for initiatives on foreign and national security policy, Rusk did not feel compelled to make recommendations. Roger Hilsman recalls that Rusk ". . . seemed to view the Secretary not as the maker and advocate of policy, but at the President's side, as a judge."[13] Rusk's interpretation of his role and his expectation that the regional assistant secretaries should be the advocates of policy options prevented State from articulating an integrated national interest rather than regional or bureau interests.[14] Moreover, the State Department had no high-level focal point for politico-military affairs like the Defense Department's ISA. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) was created in 1961, but since its chief was well below assistant secretary's rank, it wielded little bureaucratic clout.[15] The Bureau also suffered from the constraints imposed by the State Department's foreign service corps. PM could not

[12] Paul H. Nitze, interview, Arlington, Virginia, March 1981.

[13] Roger Hilsman, *To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Dell, 1967), p. 59.

[14] Lannon Walker, "Our Foreign Affairs Machinery: Time for an Overhaul," *Foreign Affairs* 47 (1969): 309-20.

[15] Allison and Szanton, *Remaking Foreign Policy*, p. 135.

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attract foreign and defense policy specialists—"in and outers"[16]—as broadly as could ISA because it was staffed by a large number of foreign service officers. Consequently, many of PM's staffers had no particular expertise in politico-military issues.[17]

Kennedy quickly found Rusk impassive and his department sluggish and "totally unimaginative."[18] Hence, State's voice was heeded less often at the White House than that of the Defense Department. Rusk's refusal to back his subordinates in the president's presence diminished State's persuasiveness and made its officials increasingly reluctant to push novel ideas to the White House level.[19] The State Department not only performed badly in the battle of new ideas, it lost many "battles of the briefings." Morton Halperin notes an episode recalled by a Kennedy White House official:

> When he called for briefing papers on short notice from State for a Presidential overseas trip his first deadline passed without any response. He then turned to the Office of International Security Affairs which responded with a complete, concise, and thoroughly indexed briefing book. State finally crashed through with several cardboard cartons of unsorted cables on the countries listed in the President's itinerary.[20]

Thus Kennedy's use of informal ad hoc committees on a variety of foreign policy issues led him to turn to ISA. During the Cuban missile crisis Kennedy chose ISA's policy planning staff to support to "Excom" senior foreign policy advisors.[21] When the State Department's response to the growing crisis in Berlin in 1962 remained halting and timid, Kennedy called on Nitze at ISA to chair his Berlin task force.

If the State Department's weaknesses paralleled many of ISA's strengths, State's problems were to have an even greater impact on the role of Kennedy's NSC staff. Under McGeorge Bundy the NSC staff quickly assumed a more influential role than had any of its predecessors. Bundy's staff routinely reviewed State Department memoranda. The State Department lost control of its "paper" when it reached the White House because it lacked top-echelon staffing to review memoranda with sufficient breadth and depth.[22] Yet Bundy's staff never developed a defense orientation comparable to its expertise in foreign affairs. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara quickly demonstrated that he could

[16] Academic and research institute specialists who come into government as political appointees, as opposed to government careerists.

[17] Leslie H. Gelb, interview, Washington, D. C., July 1981.

[18] Kennedy is quoted in Henry L. Trewhitt, *McNamara* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 251.

[19] Robert H. Johnson, "The National Security Council: The Relevance of Its Past to Its Future," *Orbis* 13 (1969): 709-35.

[20] Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 229.

[21] Bigley, "Office of International Security Affairs," p. 66.

[22] See Clark and Legere, *President and National Security*, p. 165 and Walker, "Our Foreign Affairs Machinery," p. 313.

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handle defense matters to the president's satisfaction. McNamara was a strong administrator who offered Kennedy the detailed, systematic, and scientific approach to defense policy the young president needed to challenge the professional military. Kennedy needed a secretary of defense who, unlike Eisenhower's Pentagon chiefs, would not only implement the administration's decisions but also initiate policies regarding weapons selection and strategy. Defense Department memoranda and reports were of a quality that did not require Bundy's filter. Pentagon memoranda destined for the White House bore McNamara's personal imprint and rarely required supplementary analysis or information.[23] Moreover, Bundy and McNamara quickly developed a close relationship. This relationship was manifested in the Kennedy-Johnson policy process by creating a Bundy-McNamara alliance on a wide variety of issues and a mutual respect for each others' subordinates.[24]

McNamara's ISA supplied the same checks on data provided by the military bureaucracy that Bundy's NSC staff performed on the State Department's information and analyses. The Joint Chiefs' advice was perceived at the White House to be the product of consensus among the services rather than what was best for national security.[25] The Joint Chiefs also produced analyses and recommendations at a tortuously slow pace. It was readily apparent to Kennedy that it was far easier to turn to the secretary of defense and his staff for options and ideas on the use of force. Recalling Kennedy's use of ISA, Nitze described ISA's assets in comparison to the Joint Chiefs:

> It sometimes would take them three days to blow their nose. We would sometimes be able to get a position together within an hour. When you get into a rapidly moving situation, when the house is burning down, every president likes to see something reasonable put forward for his consideration promptly.[26]

Kennedy continued to meet with the Joint Chiefs in formal sessions of the NSC but received his military judgments through McNamara.

While McNamara was strongly combative, apparently without self-doubt, Rusk often appeared to be lacking in conviction. McNamara, Roger Hilsman recalls, "used whatever military component there was in a political problem as a beachhead." He often extended that beachhead "until he came very near to dominating the whole affair."[27] As McNamara cultivated influence in foreign policy, ISA supported him. For example, McNamara virtually dominated relations with Europe at the time of the Berlin crisis. The president's appointment of Nitze as head of the Berlin task force supported McNamara's high profile. McNamara took the lead in American relations with India following the

[23] Clark and Legere, *President and National Security*, p. 76.

[24] David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Crest, 1972), pp. 623–28.

[25] Halperin, "The President and the Military," p. 151.

[26] Paul H. Nitze, interview, Arlington, Virginia, March 1981.

[27] Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 55.

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hostilities with China in 1962, and Nitze went to India as McNamara's representative. McNamara's interest in arms control was unmatched by any preceding defense secretary. Since Rusk did not share McNamara's enthusiasm, an ISA official—Deputy Assistant Secretary John T. McNaughton—rather than a State Department or Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) representative, headed the State-NSC-Defense Department Nuclear Test Ban Treaty working group.[28]

Nitze's impact through ISA reflected an essential prerequisite for staff influence: the delegation of authority. In Morton Halperin's words,

> . . . ISA's influence depends entirely on people knowing that, if the Secretary of State picks up the phone and says, "Does the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA speak for you on this issue and is what he is saying to my staff what you will be saying to the President?", the Secretary of Defense will say yes. McNamara was prepared to give [the ASD-ISA] wide latitude . . . to say "yes, I will support him" and that's what gives his Assistant Secretary for ISA leverage. . . . If you don't speak for the Secretary, no one pays any attention to you.[29]

Rusk's refusal to delegate authority to his subordinates diminished State Department officials' ability to combat ISA's influence.

Nitze left ISA to become navy secretary in 1963. William Bundy, the next ISA chief, had been Nitze's deputy. Bundy's tenure as ISA head, however, was both short and difficult to trace. For the purposes of this study, Bundy's successor at ISA, John McNaughton, exemplified ISA's most successful efforts to influence foreign and defense policy.

Johnson, ISA, and Vietnam

In 1964 Lyndon Johnson was a new, untested president, unsure of himself on foreign policy, and McNamara was an experienced secretary of defense at the height of his reputation. Johnson's confidence in, and reliance on, his secretary of defense grew steadily in the first two years of his presidency. As McNamara's influence over Johnson increased, the number of competitors of comparable stature offering foreign-policy alternatives to the president declined drastically. In contrast with Kennedy, Johnson was wary of National Security Assistant McGeorge Bundy's reputation, background, and style. It was largely McNamara's efforts to "sell" Bundy to Johnson that enabled Bundy to keep his position until 1966.[30] Dean Rusk's influence rose greatly under Johnson. The secretary of state, however, regarded Vietnam more as a military than a political or diplomatic problem. Imposing a strict chain of command, he silenced Vietnam

[28] See Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, p. 360, and Richard Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 172, on McNaughton's role in the Test Ban Treaty.

[29] Morton Halperin, interview, Washington, D. C., November 1980.

[30] Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, p. 424.

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dissenters who proposed alternatives to Pentagon estimates.[31] If the State Department had doubts about the defense secretary's Vietnam policies prior to the 1965 escalation, these should have been voiced most forcefully by State's Office of Far Eastern Affairs. The official at State in the best position to offer alternatives to the Defense Department's perspective was William Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who had directed ISA's early analysis of Vietnam.

The interaction of personalities—Johnson, the Bundy brothers, Rusk, and McNamara—explains much of McNamara's powerful grip on the Johnson administration's foreign policy. The preeminence of military issues during these years was the other major factor explaining McNamara's authority and, in turn, ISA's influence. In addition to Vietnam, a major issue was the Soviet achievement of strategic parity. Vietnam and a shift in the strategic balance, both political problems with profound military implications, dominated the foreign policy agenda while an aggressive secretary of defense ran the Pentagon and the secretary of state studiously avoided military issues.

In his analysis of the influence of staff organizations like ISA, I.M. Destler poses three questions: How closely does the boss (the secretary of defense) support his staff chief? How involved is the staff in the important policy questions facing its boss? How wide can policy differences between the staff leadership and its boss become before the staff suffers from a loss of influence?[32] Assessed in terms of these questions for both Vietnam policy and Soviet-American relations, McNaughton's leadership reveals the reasons for ISA's influence during the Johnson administration.

McNaughton was not only involved in the essential day-to-day paper on Vietnam, he and his staff were largely responsible for the most important documents that led to the American commitment of troops to Vietnam.[33] McNaughton wrote or coauthored two of the three documents that David Halberstam calls "the most influential on deciding to commit troops to Vietnam"—National Security Memorandum 288 and the McGeorge Bundy Memo from Pleiku.[34]

The private memoranda passed between McNamara and McNaughton found in the *Pentagon Papers* show that McNaughton articulated his disenchantment over Vietnam long before McNamara did. Their close relationship, which intensified during the Vietnam escalation, suggests that McNaughton's doubts about the war made a profound impact on McNamara. The arguments mounted by his very closest aide must have been largely responsible for McNamara's August

[31] Ibid., p. 316.

[32] Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats*, pp. 235–38.

[33] See *The Pentagon Papers*, Gravel Edition (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1971–72), vols. III and IV. *The Pentagon Papers* were compiled by ISA's policy planning staff and leaked to the *New York Times* by former ISA staffer Daniel Ellsberg.

[34] Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, p. 635. The third document cited in this context is the Taylor–Rostow Report of 1963.

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1967 decision to go public against the bombing of North Vietnam. That McNaughton refused to voice his doubts to anyone but McNamara indicated that ISA's influence was inseparably linked to the secretary of defense. McNaughton could not afford to distance himself from the escalation of the bombing in public until McNamara had taken the lead.

"By the very act of appointing McNaughton," Halberstam concludes, "McNamara had, in effect, created a disarmament lobby in the Defense Department."[35] ISA was the agency of the federal government most responsible for attaining presidential approval of American acceptance of rough strategic parity with the Soviet Union;[36] the decision to sign a protocol with the Soviet Union limiting antiballistic missile systems (ABMs);[37] and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[38] Further, McNaughton's arguments for arms control, like his arguments against further escalation of the Vietnam War, represented a policy direction his boss found increasingly attractive. Destler concludes that, "without the sympathetic ear of the boss," ISA's initiatives on arms control or Vietnam would never have made any real impact on administration policy.[39]

McNamara replaced McNaughton with Paul Warnke, who soon gained a reputation as "perhaps the most anti-Vietnam high official in the building."[40] The influence wielded by ISA under Warnke was reflected in the transition from McNamara to Clark Clifford. The issues of Vietnam policy ISA pursued under Warnke were very different from those that had confronted McNaughton's staff. Under Warnke, ISA became the focal point of the anti-escalation forces in the Johnson administration. This change stemmed directly from the difference in the mandate and role assumed by McNamara and his successor.

Despite his influence on what became known as "McNamara's war," the defense secretary's contribution to the war and that of ISA in turn remained within very well-defined limits. McNamara and McNaughton gauged the level of success of the war, presented most of the options offered on politico-military aspects of the war, weighed the Joint Chiefs' requests for increases in troop levels, and, up until mid-1967, dominated the bombing strategy. There was one crucial component of the American presence in Vietnam that McNamara and ISA meticulously avoided: McNamara was reluctant to use his staff to provide an alternative strategy for the war because he did not believe that on this issue his competence was greater than that of the Joint Chiefs. Thus McNamara gained control over weapons selection, force levels, bombing decisions, and arms control issues at the expense of control over the most important foreign-

[35] Ibid., p. 358.

[36] Neil Sheehan, "Key Pentagon Group Dissolving," *New York Times*, 13 April 1969.

[37] J. M. Roherty, *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970), p. 119.

[38] Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic Politics in the Johnson Administration," in Halperin, ed., *National Security Policy Making*, p. 119.

[39] Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats*, p. 242.

[40] Ibid. McNaughton was killed in a plane crash in the summer of 1967.

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policy question faced by the Johnson administration, namely, how to fight the Vietnam War.

As the commitment of the president and the Joint Chiefs to Vietnam intensified and that of McNamara waned; the defense secretary's influence on Vietnam and in turn on other issues declined. Johnson recruited his old friend Clark Clifford to replace McNamara and restore a consensus in his administration on the war.

In January and February of 1968 then, a dovish ISA faced an incoming secretary of defense who was strongly resistant to its views. One might speculate on the kind of influence ISA might have had if Clifford had retained his original ideas on Vietnam. Did the stamina generated under the seven years of the "McNamara Monarchy" give ISA a power base independent of the secretary?

In January 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff filed a request for 206,000 more men. In February, Johnson created a task force to be headed by Secretary of Defense-designate Clifford to examine the request and determine its domestic implications. In view of the principal actors in the task force, their mandate from the president was to give General William Westmoreland what he had requested with acceptable domestic consequences. Clifford moved immediately to broaden the inquiry's frame of reference to the questions of whether the United States should continue to follow the same course in Vietnam, the consequences should another 200,000 troops be added to the war effort, and whether that increased commitment would bring the United States any closer to its objectives.[41]

The dominant voices on the task force, despite its State Department and NSC staff representation, were the Pentagon's civilian representatives. The group with the most experience on Vietnam issues and the most developed critique of the Joint Chiefs' strategy was ISA. When Clifford asked for a draft report from ISA in response to the troop request, it questioned the fundamental assumptions behind American strategy. Clifford released the ISA memo and as Morton Halperin recalls, "It was the first memo that got general circulation in the government which really attacked the fundamental motives of the Vietnam War—and the military had no answer to it."[42]

Clifford looked in earnest for the Joint Chiefs' strategy to win the war and found none. ISA's communications to the secretary of defense for well over a year had argued that additional forces would not make any real difference because Vietnam was a bottomless pit. Yet in February 1968, there was a new secretary of defense who had greater freedom to act on this assessment. Johnson needed Clifford's support and valued his counsel. Unfettered by any responsibility for the decisions of 1965 and the gradual escalation, Clifford pressed his opposition to the Joint Chiefs' plan for further escalation with in-

[41] See Hoopes, *Limits of Intervention*, p. 172, and Herbert Schandler, *The Unmaking of the President* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 128.

[42] Schandler, *Unmaking of the President*, p. 150.

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creasing strength and determination. ISA's efforts to force a reexamination of U.S. objectives and its own detailed critique of past policies culminated in a reversal of the policy of escalation largely designed by the very same staff agency.

ISA's role in the reversal of Vietnam policy under Johnson illustrates its complete dependence on the secretary of defense to effect its policy views. That ISA was most influential in this episode, as in many others in the Kennedy–Johnson years, also reflects the stagnation of the rest of the foreign policy bureaucracy. It is ironic, for example, that the burden of making the case against further escalation fell to the civilians at the Defense Department. Nominally, the role assumed by ISA should have been played by the White House or by the State Department. At the NSC, however, W. W. Rostow made his staff "a hotbed of cheerleaders" for the war, and at State, Rusk and William Bundy kept dissent on Vietnam to a minimum.[43] McNamara operated with a deep skepticism toward the Joint Chiefs of Staff that ISA imitated. Neither Rostow, Rusk, nor Johnson shared this skepticism. By nominating Paul Warnke to head ISA in 1967, McNamara ensured that this irreverance toward military judgment was perpetuated after he left the Defense Department. Clifford became increasingly receptive to this skepticism and encouraged ISA gradually to destroy the professional military's arguments for further escalation of the war effort.

James Forrestal, the first secretary of defense, once said that he was less interested in the jobs designated by the little boxes in charts of the Pentagon's bureaucratic structure than in the names of the individuals who filled those posts. The list of McNamara–Clifford ISA staff members reads like the membership of an elite club of the foreign policy establishment's best talent. Its ranks included Daniel Ellsberg, Leslie Gelb, Morton Halperin, Townsend Hoopes, Winston Lord, and Richard Ullman. An assessment of ISA's influence during the Kennedy–Johnson years must consider not only the huge role assumed by the secretary of defense in both administrations and that "there was a war on," but also that ISA attracted some of the brightest people in the government. ISA's influence reflected its talent.

The Nixon–Ford ISA

ISA's accumulated influence under Kennedy and Johnson did not prevent its decline into relative obscurity under the Nixon and Ford administrations. The perspectives of McNamara and his ISA deputies on defense issues were strongly civilian in orientation and often condescending toward the professional military. Under Nixon, ISA's policy stance moved, in the words of one observer, "180 degrees in the opposite direction."[44] Nixon's first ISA chief, G. Warren Nutter, brought to ISA a reputation as a hard-liner on Soviet policy, an opponent of arms control, and a firm anti-Communist. In an administration that was to pur-

[43] Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, p. 781.

[44] Sheehan, "Key Pentagon Group Dissolving," p. 3.

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sue détente with the Soviets and a rapprochement with China, Nutter and another former advisor to Barry Goldwater, Richard Ware, filled ISA's top posts with Cold Warriors drawn largely from Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

Nutter and his staff saw their role not as an independent source of analysis or advice, but as protectors of the interests and positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[45] This orientation substantially reduced ISA's ability to influence policy. The Nixon ISA appointees' deference to the prerogatives and expertise of the professional military returned the staff to the problem that plagued it during the Eisenhower years. Other departments bypassed Nutter's ISA and turned directly to the source of its positions—the professional military. In 1970, a senior State Department official appraised the difference between the Nutter ISA and its predecessor by remarking that "in the McNamara era State dealt with ISA because that was where the strong men were at Defense: Now we tend to deal more and more with the Joint Staff and the services."[46] Under Nutter's leadership, ISA made little effort to promote either the views of the secretary of defense or the goals of the administration.

The staff's parroting of the Joint Chiefs' views and ideological rigidity were not the only reasons for Joseph Kraft's conclusion that ISA had become "a corps of right wing clowns."[47] While Paul Nitze, William Bundy, John McNaughton, and Paul Warnke had all brought to ISA previous experience in the federal government, Nutter and his deputies had little background in Washington. Thus the Nutter ISA quickly became known for its poor understanding of how to operate effectively within the federal bureaucracy.[48]

ISA's impact on policy in the 1960s and its reputation for power within the bureaucracy were dependent on a secretary of defense who was anxious to use the staff for analytic purposes and who closely backed his assistant secretaries in their pursuit of influence on policy. Melvin Laird, Nixon's first secretary of defense, was less reliant on staff for analytic work or as a means for making his influence felt on policy.[49] If Laird's approach to policy development impeded ISA's influence in the new administration, so did his interpretation of his job at the Defense Department. ISA's role under Laird was consistent with his intention to be far more conciliatory toward the armed services than his predecessors. Laird saw his role as adjudicator of inter-service competition. He made a bargain with the military: service acquiescence to overall defense budget cuts in return for greater freedom for each service in allocation of its share of the budget, and a greatly diminished role for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

[45] Morton Halperin, interview, Washington, D. C., November 1980.

[46] William Beecher, "Foreign Policy: Pentagon Also Encounters Rebuffs," *New York Times*, 21 January 1971.

[47] Joseph Kraft, "Aides Failed a Weak President By Not Fighting Escalation," *Washington Post*, 5 May 1970, p. A17.

[48] I. M. Destler, interview, Washington, D. C., June 1981.

[49] Morton Halperin, interview, Washington, D. C., November 1980.

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civilian analysts in defense policy.[50] Therefore the diminution of ISA's influence must be seen, at least in part, as a concession to the professional military.

Laird's reduced range of goals and functions as secretary of defense was not wholly a situation of his own making. The role of both the secretary of defense and ISA under the Nixon administration also reflects the role assumed by Henry Kissinger's NSC. The Kissinger NSC worked to undermine independent analysis by the departments and the influence of cabinet members in policymaking. Morton Halperin, who helped design Kissinger's White House-centered system of foreign-policymaking, remarked, "The kind of ISA that existed in the 1960s would have been a constant challenge to the NSC staff because they [the Kissinger staff] were trying to fill that function."[51] Former Johnson ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Leslie Gelb, who covered the Kissinger NSC and State Department for the *New York Times*, agrees that "there is no question" that Kissinger intended to make ISA less competitive with the NSC staff.[52]

In the Kissinger NSC and its subordinate bodies, the Joint Chiefs were given equal status to the secretary of defense.[53] This equality at the NSC in turn reduced the secretary's influence in both intra-departmental and inter-departmental matters. The McNamara-Clifford ISA had been the main source of analysis on the bombing of North Vietnam in assessing its timing, targeting, and effectiveness. By contrast, the spring 1970 decision on bombing strategy and targeting was made without the participation of the secretary of defense or his deputies. Laird and his staff were not informed of these decisions until long after they had been made.[54] Even if Laird had wanted to use ISA as an independent source of analysis and initiatives, the staff's ability to compete would have been undermined by Kissinger's direct links to the Joint Chiefs.

Kissinger's use of inter-agency NSC groups to work on defense issues moved major defense decisions out of the Pentagon and into inter-agency forums where White House influence was dominant. The Defense Program Review Committee was formed in 1970 to treat defense issues, embracing responsibility for both defense fiscal policy and "strategic issues viewed from their diplomatic, political, and economic implications."[55] ISA should have been a major participant. Kissinger, however, raised the level of departmental representation to the under-secretary level, a move that excluded ISA's assistant secretary. Similarly, NSC sub-units, like the Senior Review Group on policy planning and the Washington Special Action Group, were created to provide contingency plan-

[50] See Clark Murdock, *Defense Policy Formation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), p. 174, and Beecher, "Foreign Policy: The Pentagon," p. 12.

[51] Morton Halperin, interview, Washington, D. C., November 1980.

[52] Leslie H. Gelb, interview, Washington, D. C., July 1981.

[53] Halperin, "The President and the Military," p. 148.

[54] See Murdock, *Defense Policy Formation*, pp. 174–75, and Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics,* p. 125.

[55] Nixon's 1970 State of the World Message quoted in Murdock, *Defense Policy Formation*, pp. 168–69.

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ning on the use of force, and moved national security issues beyond the Defense Department's control. While in the Johnson administration, the ABM debate went on almost entirely within the Defense Department between ISA and the services,[56] Kissinger moved arms control out of the Defense Department entirely and into NSC sub-units. Even ISA's contribution to military assistance programs, its longest held function, was substantially reduced. At NSC insistence, according to John Leacacos, control over foreign military assistance policy was awarded to the State Department in 1971 under the newly created Under Secretary for Security Assistance.[57]

High turnover at the assistant secretary's level and Kissinger's overarching authority projected from the White House (and later from the State Department) made it especially difficult for ISA to assert greater influence after both Nutter and Laird left the Defense Department at the start of Nixon's second term. Laird's successor, Elliot Richardson, did not move to reassert the authority Laird had lost. After being in office for less than a year, Richardson was unable to cultivate a reinvigorated ISA. As under secretary of state, Richardson had developed close links with Kissinger; it was therefore unlikely that he would have encouraged Nutter's successor, Robert C. Hill, to assemble a more competent staff.

Richardson's replacement, James Schlesinger, attempted to reassert the Defense Department's authority in foreign and national security policy development. He expressed the wish to restore ISA to the influential role it played in the 1960s.[58] Schlesinger's efforts coincided with a decline in Kissinger's fortunes. In early 1974 Watergate threatened even Kissinger, making it difficult for him to prevent Schlesinger's attempts to rebuild a rival to his NSC staff at the Defense Department. Schlesinger wanted to nominate Paul Nitze as ISA chief, but conservative Republicans vetoed his candidacy charging that he was soft on the Soviet Union.[59] A frequent critic of Kissinger's arms control negotiations with a widely respected reputation, Nitze's return to ISA, along with Kissinger's Watergate-related troubles, could have tilted the balance of power on a variety of defense and foreign policy issues back to the Defense Department.

Kissinger's move to the State Department and Ford's replacement of Nixon in 1974 altered the balance of power within the administration. At the White House, Kissinger rarely lost a policy battle to Laird or Schlesinger; at the State Department, however, Kissinger was forced to make many more compromises. In 1975, Schlesinger and his successor at the Defense Department, Donald Rumsfeld, had broad policy concerns and were effective within the bureaucracy. Kissinger's losses and the defense secretaries' gains on national

[56] See John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), pp. 109–21.

[57] John P. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat," *Foreign Policy* 5 (Winter 1971–1972): 3–27.

[58] John W. Finney, "Impeachment Politics May Cost Nitze Pentagon Post," *New York Times*, 22 March 1974.

[59] Ibid.

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security and foreign policy issues do not appear to have resulted in a revival of ISA's influence. Carter staffers complained of successive cuts at ISA's policy planning staff throughout the years 1972–76. "When the Democrats came in it was pretty much of a bare bones operation,"[60] according to John Rowe. ISA's activities did not seem to expand with the influence of Ford's defense secretaries. Neither Schlesinger nor Rumsfeld appears to have revived ISA as a policy development staff.

The experience of ISA under Nixon and Ford demonstrates that national security policy, perhaps more so than any other area of presidential activity, abhors a vacuum. I. M. Destler suggests that early in an administration there is "a sense of power lying around waiting to be grabbed."[61] When January 1969 heralded a new administration, Kissinger's NSC staff quickly assumed most of the functions that had made ISA so influential under Kennedy and Johnson. The Nixon–Ford ISA was not expected to play the role of Pentagon skeptic on the proposals of the professional military nor did its leadership want a more expansive role.

The Carter ISA

Jimmy Carter was determined that none of his top foreign policy advisors would monopolize presidential thinking or decision-making.[62] Carter created separate centers of strength within his administration, each competing over the basic direction of foreign policy. His system was anti-Kissinger in design, but the effect on the decision-making process was very "Kissingerian." The Carter system actually concentrated decision-making in the White House as much as Nixon's had.[63]

ISA's influence in the 1960s had stemmed, in part, from the absence of competing centers of analysis and initiative. During the Carter administration, ISA faced strong policy development staffs at the State Department and NSC. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance put his Policy Planning Council and Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs under capable leadership. Although the State Department was not always as effective as it might have been, it was much more formidable on all levels and over a wider range of issues than it had been during the Rusk years. National Security Assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski was more inclined to compete with the departments' analyses and policy development efforts than to coordinate their activities. Carter's decision-making style—his disinclination to delegate authority and his awareness of the domestic political implications of

[60] John Rowe, interview, the Pentagon, November 1980.

[61] Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats*, p. 245.

[62] Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper, Colophon Books, 1979), pp. 41–42.

[63] Leslie H. Gelb, "Why Not the State Department?" *The Washington Quarterly*, special supplement (Autumn 1980): 33.

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foreign policy decisions—gave his in-house NSC staff great input into a wide range of issues.

Despite the competing centers of politico-military expertise elsewhere in the administration, an aggressive secretary of defense could have used ISA to enhance his influence on a variety of issues. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown could not remain aloof from the intra-administration battle lines, but, in the words of one participant in those battles, Brown "signalled early on that he would not engage in any intramural infighting."[64] He did, however, take a very active role in issues that had a clear defense component. On the predominant defense-related issue of Carter's presidency, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), Brown took a very active role. As previously emphasized, ISA's ability to influence policy decisions is a function of the defense secretary's interest in the issues at hand. Brown's interest in arms control and SALT afforded an opening for ISA's influence as a policy development staff within the Carter administration.

Brown's closest aide on SALT was Walter Slocombe, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA.[65] Slocombe brought ISA to SALT issues only through his title. Though he was ISA's second-in-command, Slocombe contributed to SALT policy as head of the Defense Department's SALT working group rather than through ISA. The Defense Department SALT Task Force was neither part of ISA nor staffed by ISA personnel, and ISA's policy planning staff did not work on SALT issues.[66] Therefore, it would be incorrect to conclude that the influence of Slocombe and Brown on the Carter administration's SALT policy reflected ISA's involvement.

Under Harold Brown, ISA's impact on foreign and national security policy did not become much greater than was the level of its influence at the end of the Ford administration. This was a product of institutional changes in ISA's role and activities and the problems of adjustment to these institutional changes. Brown's reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense policy development apparatus from 1977 through 1979 changed the relationship between the assistant secretary for ISA and the secretary of defense by introducing an under secretary for policy as their liaison. This reorganization pointedly diminished ISA's importance. A strong, direct working relationship between the assistant secretary for ISA and the secretary of defense was an essential prerequisite of ISA's influence as a policy development staff. The creation of the intermediary under secretary for policy post reduced ISA's autonomy and consequently diminished ISA's status and opportunity for involvement in policy.

During the first 18 months of the Carter administration, Assistant Secretary David McGiffert's ISA was not distinguished either for its influence with Harold Brown or for the quality of its analysis and initiatives. Congressional

[64] Ibid. p. 35.
[65] Talbott, *Endgame*, pp. 59 and 85.
[66] Walter Slocombe, interview, Washington, D. C., July 1981.

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sources and unnamed Pentagon officials are cited in newspaper accounts which called ISA's performance under McGiffert "disappointing." McGiffert was widely perceived to be opposed to the creation of the new policy post and had threatened to resign over the change in his agency's status.[67] Over McGiffert's objections, an under secretary for policy took office in the summer of 1978. In an effort to retain as much autonomy over his agency's activities as possible, McGiffert tried to bypass the under secretary in two ways. As assistant secretary for ISA, McGiffert retained control over both ISA's regional desks and its policy planning staff. He made himself the sole point of contact between ISA and the under secretary. McGiffert also endeavored to limit under secretary Stanley Resor's role in ISA decisions in a manner that served to isolate Resor from the agency's activities. According to one ISA staffer;

> Everything had to go through McGiffert. . . . One time I forgot and sent something to Resor directly. Oh boy, I was told not to do that again. What I saw was a kind of bypassing. . . . The word went out quickly, "He's not really supposed to be doing that. Let's not send it to him."[68]

By undermining his official liaison with the secretary of defense, McGiffert retained control over his staff at the expense of ISA's involvement in Brown's activities. Yet ISA could exert a high degree of influence only through involvement in the day-to-day activities of the secretary.

McGiffert also circumvented Resor's control by shifting decision-making further down the chain of command. On issues involving security assistance or liaison with other departments, ISA's response to the military was, "You solve it, don't bring it up here."[69] The services, which also felt threatened by the new top policy post, were glad to bypass Resor and ISA and appealed directly to Brown. In effect, therefore, McGiffert's efforts to retain control over ISA by isolating Resor reduced the number of issues requiring ISA's consideration.

Resor declined to explore fully the possibilities for influence in the top policy post. His replacement, Robert Komer, played bureaucratic entrepreneur, reaching out boldly to see where and how he could operate successfully. The most explicit demonstration of Komer's still as an administrator was his reorganization of ISA in late 1979. Komer deprived the Assistant Secretary for ISA of the ability to control the work of his staff by transferring ISA's planning activities to a Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning. The truncated ISA left after Komer's changes included the four regional desks and the Security Assistance, and International Economic Affairs staffs.[70] ISA was no longer a

[67] Bernard Weinraub, "Defense Chief Creates New Civilian Post in Move to Bolster Policy Role," *New York Times*, 19 January 1978.

[68] Weinraub, "The Pentagon 'Club' Closed Ranks to Shut Out Resor," *New York Times*, 18 March 1979.

[69] Ibid.

[70] The four regional ISA desks are: East Asia and Pacific Affairs; European and NATO Affairs; Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs; and Inter-American Affairs.

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general policy development staff, for these functions involved only arms sales and aid, and the administration of joint State and Defense programs. As a result of these changes, the Assistant Secretary for ISA fell from the defense secretary's principal advisor on foreign policy to the administrator of a line agency.

In the 1960s ISA was the defense secretary's independent source of analysis and initiatives. The Brown ISA, according to McGiffert's executive assistant, was

> . . . not set up to do analysis. ISA is a very small staff. We're just not capable of performing that function. We, in turn, ask the Joint Staff [the Joint Chiefs' planning organization] for analysis.[71]

From the perspective of the 1980s the McNamara-Clifford ISA seems "an anomaly."[72] Since 1969, ISA has been stripped of its ability to compete with the State Department or NSC staff over the development of foreign and national security policy.

Conclusion

ISA's influence over defense and foreign policy stemmed from two sources: internal factors, namely, the structure and staffing of the agency, and external factors—the larger environment in which ISA operated. External factors included the president's policymaking style, the roles of other agencies in the government working on politico-military issues, the kinds of issues that took precedence in each administration, and the role assumed by the secretary of defense.

ISA's level of influence reflected the interests and personalities of its leadership. A good working relationship between the head of the staff and the secretary of defense was essential to ISA's influence. ISA's leadership had to remain closely attuned to the needs and orientation of the secretary. Once this trust between the secretary and his assistant secretary for ISA was established, the staff was able to extend its influence. When they were effective within the bureaucracy (or at least were perceived to be), ISA's leaders extended their influence to a wide variety of issues. Links to the secretary explain the level of influence wielded by ISA under Paul Nitze or Paul Warnke, G. Warren Nutter or David McGiffert.

Under an activist secretary of defense who used ISA to enhance his influence, ISA's linkage of planning and operations in a single staff gave the Defense Department an advantage over the State Department. Under assistant secretaries who were intimately concerned with the day-to-day priorities of the secretary of defense, ISA's policy planning staff was used for issues high on the department's list of priorities. The separation of planning and operations in

[71] Commander Philip Bazzelli (USN), interview, the Pentagon, November 1980.
[72] John Rowe, interview, the Pentagon, November 1980.

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agencies dealing with foreign policy has often produced work of little relevance to reality. The continued separation of Defense policy planning and ISA (as, for example, under Jimmy Carter) raises the very same question about the Defense Department's planning efforts that has handicapped the State Department's Policy Planning Council: Can a planning staff without clear operations responsibilities ever exert much influence over foreign and national security policy? It is not yet clear whether the Pentagon will be any more successful than the State Department in resolving this central problem of policy development.

The role played by ISA in each administration was the product of presidential styles. The presidents discussed here used two methods to extend their control over the foreign policy bureaucracy. Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter all sought, in one way or another, to keep the policy development process within the White House. Eisenhower sought consensus within the bureaucracy through the use of the NSC. Nixon and Carter relied on personal aides and their national security assistants to retain control over major foreign policy issues and, as a result, systematically undermined the authority of their cabinet secretaries. Such White House-centered systems of decision-making invariably circumscribed ISA's influence. By contrast, Kennedy and Johnson delegated broad authority to their cabinet secretaries and especially their secretaries of defense. Kennedy restrained the defense establishment's influence through two appointments: a strong manager as secretary of defense and an experienced foreign-policy-maker as assistant secretary for ISA. Johnson achieved finely-tuned control over the escalation of the Vietnam War through his secretaries of defense. In these environments, ISA exerted considerable influence. McNamara and Clifford's broad mandates from the president led both to rely heavily on ISA.

The ISA discussed in this article bears little resemblance to the agency left after the reorganization of 1979. Although ISA has lost its general policy development role, the same types of questions that determined ISA's influence in past administrations will arise under the Defense Department's new policy development apparatus. What does ISA's experience suggest about the under secretary for policy's impact on future defense and foreign policy? What conditions in the external environment will enhance the influence of the under secretary for policy? Will the influence of the under secretary be as dependent upon a personal relationship with the secretary of defense as was that of the assistant secretary for ISA under the old arrangement? The answers to these questions will offer a valuable contribution to our understanding of the secretary of defense's role and efforts to improve the depth and quality of presidential management of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracy.*

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Forward-Based Nuclear Weapons and SALT I

STEPHEN M. MILLETT

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) commenced in November 1969 as the most ambitious attempt by two great powers, each with ample nuclear power to destroy much of the globe, to negotiate a code of strategic arms restraint. As the talks wore on, ambition turned to dogged persistence and culminated in exhaustive desperation to reach an accord worthy of the effort. In 1972, the United States achieved one principal goal—a treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems—but had to settle for a five-year agreement limiting offensive strategic weapons. Perhaps the biggest frustration for the Americans was the belated realization that the Soviets dogmatically held significantly different perceptions of security and nuclear deterrence that precluded precise definition of terms and consensus of objectives.

No single point of contention in SALT I better illustrated the divergent American and Soviet perceptions than the issue of forward-based systems (FBS). The Americans were inclined to define "strategic" nuclear systems by their technical capabilities. They wanted to negotiate limits on "central" systems, the ones with intercontinental ranges. These were the only kinds of Soviet weapons that directly threatened the security of the United States. On the other hand, the Soviets defined "strategic" weapons as those that threatened the security of the USSR regardless of where they were deployed. The Soviet negotiators insisted on including in the scope of SALT not only American intercontinental missiles but also those of its NATO allies (the United Kingdom and France) and American theater nuclear forces (TNF) that might hit targets in the

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Soviet homeland. A compromise was reached in May 1971 that provided the "breakthrough" in the talks, leading directly to a treaty and interim agreement one year later. Yet the ramifications of the FBS issue, which was temporarily put aside in 1971, had a great bearing on the terms of the accords of 1972 and on the subsequent negotiation and failure of the SALT II treaty.

In the last few years, scholars of international relations have turned greater attention to the study of perceptions. Psychologists have known for decades that the way one views the world often determines one's behavior. Likewise, the way national policymakers—the top leadership as well as the supporting bureaucrats—perceive the world influences their actions. The study of perceptions in international relations is a relativistic approach that suspends reliance on absolute standards of truth and concentrates on views of reality without judging them against a uniform frame of reference. In this context, the scholars of international perceptions study the intellectual models of world views and the manner in which government officials process information, interpret it, and act upon it. The FBS issue in SALT I provides an excellent case study to illustrate how the American arms control decision-makers and negotiators took a radically different view of security needs and objectives than the Soviets did. Moreover, it took years for the American side to comprehend that the Soviets had different interpretations of security and arms control than those generally accepted in the United States.

This article will review in some detail the history of the FBS question in SALT I from 1969 to 1972, in order to explore further the divergent Soviet and American perceptions of nuclear arms issues. The first part will recount the negotiations on FBS and how the divergence affected the final accords. The second and third parts will examine both American and Soviet perceptions of FBS. The final section will discuss briefly the implications of FBS for strategic arms control since 1972.

NEGOTIATIONS ON FBS, 1969–1972

According to numerous American accounts of SALT I, the Nixon administration was totally surprised when the Soviet delegation raised the FBS issue in the first round of talks at Helsinki in November 1969. According to one commentator, John Newhouse: "It never occurred to anyone in Washington at any time, whether then or in the Johnson days, that these weapons, which the United States regards as tactical, not strategic, would figure in SALT."[1] A recent account by Ambassador Gerard Smith, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the head of the U.S. delegation at SALT during Nixon's first term in the White House, related that it was, in fact, the Americans who first outlined limitations on medium-range nuclear weapons.

[1] John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 175.

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On 24 November 1969, seven days after the talks officially began, Smith presented to the Soviet delegation a paper entitled "Illustrative Elements." He presented these as suggestions for topics of negotiation rather than as concrete American proposals. Along with limitations on ABM and offensive strategic missiles at their 1969 deployed levels, Smith suggested limitations on Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) of over 1,000-mile range and all sea-launched cruise missiles. He also proposed a ban on mobile MRBMs and IRBMs, although he did not suggest a similar ban on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Smith made no mention of American bombers, either intercontinental bombers or European-based bombers.[2]

On 26 November 1969, V. S. Semenov, the head of the Soviet delegation, formally raised the FBS issue. He had informally mentioned FBS two days earlier, indicating that the Soviet position had been prepared in Moscow. He began with the dogmatic Soviet rendition of the principle of equal security, namely, that strategic arms limitations must preserve world peace by according each side equal security from nuclear attack in denying unilateral military advantage to either party. He then defined "strategic" weapons as those nuclear delivery systems that were perceived as being able to hit targets in the other's homeland. Since Soviet MRBMs and IRBMS could not hit targets in the United States, they were therefore not "strategic" and should not be included in any SALT limitations. On the other hand, there were hundreds of U.S. aircraft stationed in Europe or European waters that could deliver nuclear bombs on Soviet soil. Semenov insisted that these weapon systems, the FBS, were "strategic" and should be included in SALT. Later during the first round in Helsinki, Semenov further raised the question of curbing attacks from "third parties" that might trigger a Soviet–American confrontation, and he warned about possible circumvention of any SALT accord by transferring nuclear weapons to one's allies. In this context, Semenov seemed to be suggesting that the nuclear weapons of all NATO countries, including the United Kingdom and France, might also be addressed in SALT, in addition to American FBS.[3]

Smith later characterized the FBS matter as "the nadir of SALT I." As soon as he related Semenov's proposal to Washington, Smith received instructions from the White House that in no way was the U.S. delegation to include tactical nuclear weapons (as the United States defined them) or allied nuclear forces in its agenda of topics for negotiation in SALT. Nevertheless, Smith found that he had to respond to Semenov's persistent arguments for inclusion of FBS. Smith warned the Soviet diplomat that the question unnecessarily complicated the already difficult technical issues of ABM and strategic offensive weapons limitations. He insisted that the question was also outside the scope of SALT,

[2] Gerald Smith, *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1980), pp. 88–90. Telephone interview with Ambassador Raymond Garthoff, 30 December 1981.

[3] Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 90–91, 96–97.

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since this forum was for bilateral negotiations and could not cover the weapons of non-participating nations. Resorting to technical arguments that forward-based aircraft with nuclear ordnance could not be distinguished from those with conventional arms, Smith further argued that any accord on such limitations would be extremely difficult to verify by national technical means. American aircraft did not need to be limited to maintain a stable nuclear balance, according to Smith, because they could hit Soviet targets on one-way missions only and probably could not adequately penetrate thick Soviet air defenses. Semenov was unmoved by these points and continued to insist that his definition of "strategic" weapons had to be covered in any offensive arms controls.[4]

During the second round of SALT at Vienna, from April to August 1970, Semenov presented the formal Soviet proposals entitled "Basic Provisions for Limiting Strategic Armaments." (Because they were general propositions with no specific numbers, Smith characterized these Soviet points as being principles rather than proposals.) The Soviets put forward a plan for limitations on strategic nuclear weapons with the broadest definition of "strategic." There would be an unspecified total ceiling for ICBM launchers, missile launchers on nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers. In addition, all FBS within the range of targets in the Soviet Union would be liquidated or moved out of striking distance of the USSR. It appeared to the Americans that the Soviets were much more cooperative in their desire to achieve controls on ABM systems than on offensive arms. As for the FBS issue, the Soviets continued to press for "a radical solution of the question of bases beyond the limits of national territories," and the Americans adamantly resisted all efforts to include TNF in the negotiations.[5]

On 4 August 1970, Smith presented detailed American proposals for a SALT treaty. He put forward an aggregate ceiling of 1,900 ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy (intercontinental) bombers, with a sub-ceiling of 1,710 missile launchers and 250 heavy missile launchers (the large Soviet SS-9). He also proposed an ABM limit of one site, the national capital, or none; limits on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and on submarine-launched cruise missiles; and a freeze on current deployment of Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs.

These proposals became the focus of negotiations during the third round of SALT in Helsinki from November to December 1970. Smith recalled later that "FBS infected the atmosphere and set a discordant note for the whole round."[6] The delegates went over and over the issue with neither side wishing to give any ground. By their persistence, the Soviets forced the Americans to discuss FBS and thereby distracted the Americans from concentrating on the issues they wanted to press. Then in December, Semenov suddenly dropped his insistence

[4] Ibid., pp. 91–93, 97–98, 127–30.
[5] Ibid., pp. 123–29.
[6] Ibid., p. 179.

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on the "radical solution" to FBS and suggested that the United States "compensate" the Soviet Union for American FBS. The implication of this proposal was that the United States would have to sacrifice strategic missiles and bombers in order to accommodate FBS under an aggregate ceiling or else the ceiling would have to be high enough to include all strategic systems as well as FBS, which in effect would allow the Soviets more ICBM and SLBM launchers than the Americans. Smith rejected this proposal, but he realized that the United States would have to offer the Soviets some satisfaction on the FBS issue if there were to be any ceiling on offensive weapons. His fear was that the Soviet insistence on FBS would block the American goal of one treaty coupling offensive and defensive systems.[7]

Indeed, early in December Semenov suggested to Smith that the talks concentrate on an ABM treaty but that a treaty on offensive arms be deferred because of American intransigence on FBS.[8] Smith was much opposed to this, but he did not know that this prospect was being discussed in the "back channel" in Washington between A. F. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, and Henry Kissinger, assistant to President Nixon for national security affairs. Kissinger later recorded that as early as mid-1970 he had realized the United States would have to settle for a freeze on offensive weapons, as opposed to a ceiling of equal numbers, just in order to get the Soviets to stop building more ICBM silos, which already numbered more than America's.[9] The domestic political risk, however, was that the Soviets would be allowed more ICBM launchers than the United States, which might cause concern among some Americans that the United States was militarily inferior to the USSR. On the other hand, a freeze at current levels would remove FBS as an issue for negotiation.

On 4 February 1971, Ambassador Dobrynin informed Kissinger that the Politburo was agreeable in principle to negotiation on an ABM treaty with a freeze on further deployment of offensive missiles. He reiterated this message six days later. In March, after the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the "Peace Congress," at which Brezhnev emerged as the principal architect of Soviet foreign policy), Dobrynin and Kissinger began detailed negotiations over the terms of the "breakthrough." The Soviets wanted an ABM treaty to be determined first and the freeze on offensive weapons decided upon afterwards. The White House, on the other hand, insisted that the terms of both the ABM treaty and the offensive arms agreement had to be negotiated in tandem. The Soviets yielded. On 20 May 1971, Nixon and Brezhnev publicly announced the deal.[10]

The May 20 accord was brief and cryptic. The ABM treaty was to be the

[7] Ibid., pp. 149–53, 180–91.

[8] Ibid., pp. 192–97.

[9] Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), pp. 525–29, 545–48.

[10] Ibid., pp. 813–21; Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 813–21.

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centerpiece of SALT and was to be concluded by the end of the year, while the two powers would "agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons."[11] At a White House news conference on June 1, Nixon was more direct. He stated that an agreement on offensive arms "might be at an understanding level at this point and be at a treaty level at a later point."[12] Exactly what the May 20 accord meant was revealed only after the Moscow summit of May 1972. The United States and the USSR entered into a treaty of unlimited duration on ABM restrictions and a five-year "interim agreement" on offensive arms pending a treaty on them to be achieved in SALT II. In effect, on 20 May 1971, the Soviets accepted a freeze on the beginning of construction of new ICBM silos and a freeze on SS-9s (and the succeeding SS-18s). Whether or not it included SLBM launchers did not become established until later, but the Soviets did not want to include them. Furthermore, the Soviets temporarily dropped the FBS issue, which was not considered settled but merely postponed to SALT II.[13]

The culmination of SALT I was achieved in the Moscow summit meeting of Nixon and Brezhnev and the Moscow accords of 26 May 1972. There had been several difficult issues, but the FBS question, although not directly addressed in the final accords, had been perhaps the most influential single issue. In order to placate the Soviets, the United States had accepted the decoupling of a defensive and offensive strategic arms treaty and had acquiesced to an offensive arms freeze that gave the Soviets numerical advantage in ICBM and SLBM launchers. In several different ways, some non-central weapons were integrated into the final accord. The freeze on ICBM launchers—including some obsolete Soviet above-ground pads as well as all missile silos that were already completed or whose construction had already begun—allowed the Soviets a maximum of 1,618 to 1,054 for the U.S. This freeze included all Soviet SS-11s, some of which were believed to be aimed at European targets rather than at American ones. Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs were excluded from this ceiling.[14]

The limits for SLBMs were more complicated. The Soviets were permitted 740 "modern SLBM launchers" on 62 "modern" SLBM-carrying nuclear submarines; the United States was allowed 656 and 41, respectively. By permitting the substitution of SLBMs for ICBMs under the freeze, the Soviets could deploy

[11] "President Announces Major Step in SALT Negotiations," *Department of State Bulletin* 64 (7 June 1971): 741–42.

[12] White House news conference, 1 June 1971, published in the *Department of State Bulletin* 64 (21 June 1971): 790–91.

[13] Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 222–25; Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 819–21; Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, pp. 222–25, 819–21.

[14] For the text of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, see the *Department of State Bulletin* 64 (26 June 1972): 918–21; for an interpretation of them, see John B. Rhinelander, "The SALT I Agreements," in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds. *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond* (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 125–59. Also see Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 189.

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an absolute limit of 950 "modern SLBM launchers" on 62 "modern submarines;" the United States was permitted 710 and 44, respectively. These limits included 10 H-class Soviet first-generation nuclear submarines with 30 SLBM tubes, but excluded 20-G-class diesel-powered submarines with 70 SLBMs.[15] The H-class was included, although it posed little threat to the United States, and the G-class was excluded because it posed virtually no threat to America, although it did pose a decided threat to Western Europe. All 41 U.S. nuclear-powered submarines with 656 tubes were counted, including forward-based submarines that operated in European waters under the unified NATO command. The Soviets believed that they were entitled to more SLBM launchers as compensation for American FBS and NATO submarines, although the Americans refused to accept that explanation for the inequity.[16]

In addition to the treaty and the interim agreement with its accompanying protocol, both sides exchanged "agreed interpretations, common understandings, and unilateral statements." Both agreed that "intercontinental" in the context of the accords meant missiles with a minimum range of about 5,500 miles. This did not mean that the Soviets accepted that definition for "strategic" systems, but only for the ones covered by the accords. Semenov also presented a unilateral statement that tried once again to interject the FBS issue. He asserted that the total number of NATO nuclear submarines with SLBM launchers should be no more than 50 with a total of 800 SLBM launchers. Should these numbers increase beyond these limits, he asserted, then the Soviets would be justified in increasing their nuclear submarines and SLBM launchers accordingly. "In the opinion of the Soviet side," Semenov affirmed, "the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the U.S." [17] The issue of liquidating American submarine bases outside the United States would be addressed in future negotiations, he concluded. Consistent with his previous stance, Smith rejected this Soviet interpretation.[18]

Immediately after the signing of the accords in Moscow on 26 May 1972, Kissinger justified the numerical differences in two ways. First, he said that the ceilings curtailed the Soviets from deploying even more missiles than they already had. "Therefore, he argued, "the question to ask in assessing the freeze is not what situation it perpetuates, but what situation it prevents."[19] Secondly,

[15] Different numbers are given for these depending on how Soviet submarines are counted. Those cited here follow Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 420, 427.

[16] Rhinelander, "The SALT I Agreements," pp. 146–50; Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 330–31, 361, 391, 420, 423, 427–31.

[17] "Agreed Interpretations, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements," reprinted in Willrich and Rhinelander, eds., *SALT*, p. 307.

[18] Rhinelander, "The SALT I Agreements," pp. 143–50.

[19] Text of Kissinger's and Smith's press conferences at Spaso House, released by the White House, 26 May 1972, in U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d

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Kissinger argued back in Washington that the freeze did not restrict certain strategic systems in which the United States enjoyed superiority, namely bombers and FBS (thereby acknowledging the Soviet term). He urged Congress "to keep this fact in mind, when assessing the numerical ratios of weapons which are subject to the offensive freeze."[20] Implicitly, Kissinger seemed to admit that American TNF in Europe were a threat to Soviet targets and should be accounted for in viewing any overall comparison of American and Soviet nuclear power. When asked about the Soviet unilateral statement on maximum NATO nuclear submarines and SLBM launchers, Kissinger replied that the United States never accepted this view and did not feel obligated to it.[21]

American Perceptions of FBS

The Americans felt frustrated throughout SALT I with the relentless Soviet harping on the FBS issue. Ambassador Smith concluded afterwards that this issue more than any other prevented a treaty on offensive arms, which was a major objective of the United States.[22] In order to understand American perceptions of FBS, one needs to examine the reasons the United States has nuclear arms in Europe and why it refused to count these systems in any strategic ceilings.

The United States had nuclear weapons deployed in "forward" positions, both in Europe and Asia, principally for geostrategic purposes. In the late 1940s, the United States adopted the policy of containment to shield Western Europe and Japan from Soviet military encroachments and political intimidation. The military corollary to containment was deterrence. Yet America had no assured means to destroy the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons until the summer of 1948, during the Berlin Crisis, when it deployed for the first time in Great Britain B-29s capable of carrying nuclear weapons. American medium-range bombers based in England provided the nuclear capability that made American deterrence credible until the full deployment of intercontinental bombers, which was not realized until large numbers of B-52s became operational by the late 1950s.[23]

Because of the great distance between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the close proximity of the Soviet Union to Western Europe, American

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Sess., *Military Implications of the Treaty on Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,* 6, 20, 22, and 28 June and 18, 19, 21, 24, and 25 July 1972, p. 98.

[20] Text of Congressional Briefing by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, State Dining Room, released by the White House, 15 June 1972, in Senate Armed Service Committee hearings, *Military Implications*, p. 120.

[21] Ibid., p. 129.

[22] Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 92.

[23] See Stephen M. Millett, "The Capabilities of the American Nuclear Deterrent, 1945–1950," *Aerospace Historian* 27 (1980): 27–32.

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bombers with nuclear capability stationed in Europe had significant geostrategic importance. In the early Cold War, the relative geopolitical power of the Americans and the Soviets was about even. The United States enjoyed its nuclear monopoly (until 1949) and its vast nuclear weapon superiority (until the late 1960s) as its main lever against the USSR. The Soviets enjoyed their vast conventional military superiority on the Eurasian land mass and its proximity to Western Europe as a lever against the United States. Likewise, the Soviets were much closer to Japan than the United States. The Americans deployed nuclear weapons in Asia to counteract Soviet regional military advantages as well as to counteract any threats to American interests in Asia from the People's Republic of China.

Before its widespread deployment of ICBMs, the United States stationed first generation medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe as a counter-threat to Soviet missiles. From 1959 to about 1963, it deployed 60 Thors in Great Britain, 30 Jupiters in Italy, and 30 Jupiters in Turkey. These missiles could hit targets in the USSR at a time when the numbers of ICBMs were limited, but they were also highly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. By 1963, these American missiles were considered obsolete and unnecessary and were withdrawn.[24]

By the time of SALT I, the United States had several thousand nuclear weapons deployed in "forward" positions. It has been estimated that there were as many as 7,000 American tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater and another 5,000 with the Atlantic fleet. Most of them were small-scale weapons designed for battlefield operations, but several were bombs of several kiloton yields carried by fighters that could hit targets inside the USSR. During SALT I, the United States had about 750 aircraft with nuclear capability stationed within striking range of the Soviet Union from American bases and aircraft carriers. About 600 were in Europe. These were called "lighter delivery aircraft" (LDA) by the American delegation to SALT, instead of the Soviet term of "forward-based systems." They consisted of F-111s (the heavier FB-111s were stationed in North America, but could rapidly be deployed to Europe), F-4s, A-6s, and A-7s. The American delegates tried to convince the Soviets that these aircraft were primarily meant for intra-theater missions and posed no real threat to the Soviet homeland. But the Soviet delegates considered them very troublesome to Soviet defenses and viewed them with as much alarm as American B-52s because they were so close to Soviet territory and had such short striking times. In addition to the aircraft with nuclear weapons capability, the United States had assigned nuclear submarines with SLBMs to the NATO commander. These submarines operated in European waters from bases at Rota, Spain and Holy Loch, Scotland.[25]

[24] See Francis A. Beer, *Integration and Disintegration in NATO* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 64, 67.

[25] Barry Schneider, "Big Bangs from Little Bombs," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 31 (1975): 24–29, and Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 184.

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Besides the American TNF, there were the independent British and French nuclear forces. In 1969 the British had three operational nuclear powered submarines each with 16 Polaris A-3 missiles, and a fourth submarine almost operational. They also had Vulcan and other medium-range bombers, although the British phased many of these out as strategic systems. The French were creating their own triad of nuclear deterrent forces. The first generation of 18 IRBMs became operational in the summer of 1971. The first French nuclear-powered submarine with SLBMs became operational early in 1972. Three more such submarines became operational by 1975, and a fifth was scheduled for the end of the decade. In addition, the French had 36 Mirage IVA light bombers with reasonable capability of hitting targets in the Soviet Union. Opposing these forces was the Soviet theater nuclear arsenal of about 500 SS-4 MRBMs (1,200-mile range), 90 SS-5 IRBMS (2,300-mile range), at least 78 SLBMs on older submarines, an unknown number of newer SLBMs on modern nuclear submarines, an unknown number of SS-11 ICBMs targeted against Western Europe, at least 450 medium-range bombers, and maybe thousands of fighters with potential nuclear delivery capabilities.[26]

By 1969 the geostrategic importance of American TNF had declined, but these weapons remained very important as symbols of the American commitment to the deterrence of Soviet encroachments on Western Europe. The second principal justification for the American TNF was largely political, as they represented American resolve to use nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO allies. Many West Europeans feared that the United States would abandon their defense if the cost was the loss of American cities in a major war with the Soviet Union. They feared that they would be the political sacrifice of strategic nuclear parity between the two superpowers. Indeed, the British and French had created their own nuclear arsenal partly as insurance for continued American nuclear participation in the defense of Western Europe.[27]

The matter of the political unity of NATO was perhaps Kissinger's greatest concern about the Soviet FBS issue in SALT I. He feared that if the United States failed to assure the West Europeans of its total commitment to their security, then they would drift into demoralized submission to Soviet pressures and into impotent neutralism. The problem was compounded by the often conflicting goals of the West Europeans. They wanted the American military presence, including nuclear weapons, but they did not want the United States to

[26] Ian Smart, "Perspectives from Europe," in Willrich and Rhinelander, eds., *SALT*, pp. 185–208; Peter Nailor and Jonathan Alford, *The Future of Britain's Deterrent Force*, Adelphi Paper no. 156 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980); Raymond Aron, "French Deterrent Capabilities and the Atlantic Alliance," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* 15 (1977): 156–167; and Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," *International Security* 3 (1978–79): 17–52.

[27] A great deal has been written about American defense policy and the political problems of NATO. One excellent article is Stanley Hoffmann, "New Variations on Old Themes," *International Security* 4 (1979): 88–107.

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have to use the weapons on their soil. They wanted an absolute American deterrence, yet they feared the capability of the United States to wage war in Europe. Kissinger believed that the United States had to have a credible nuclear option to fight in Europe without immediate escalation to all-out nuclear war with the USSR.[28]

In this context, Kissinger adamantly opposed the inclusion of American TNF in SALT I. He viewed the FBS issue as a Soviet attempt to confuse the real issues of SALT, which in American eyes were the limitation of Soviet and American "central" offensive systems (ICBMs and SLBMs) and strategic defensive systems (ABM). He perceived the Soviet "scheme" as a diplomatic ploy to complicate the already difficult talks and to drive a wedge between the United States and its West European allies. As Kissinger related the Soviet FBS stance to members of Congress: "We opposed [the Soviet] approach, since it would have prejudiced our alliance commitments and raised a distinction between our own security and that of our European allies."[29]

A second American objection to the inclusion of the TNF limitations was that it would, from the American perspective, merge theater nuclear systems with central strategic systems, whereas the United States wanted to draw a distinction between the two. The White House believed that it needed TNF within the scope of NATO in order to provide theater deterrence in Europe without necessarily committing the global American strategic nuclear arsenal and risking total war. This distinction was a direct corollary to Kissinger's view of the U.S. problem of assuring the rest of NATO of the American commitment to deterrence at the theater level without unnecessarily jeopardizing the security of the United States itself.

A third American objection was that the inclusion of FBS in SALT jeopardized achieving a freeze on the approximate balance of Soviet and American strategic ("central") offensive arms, which the Americans defined as those that threatened the security of the United States. If American TNF were included under an equal aggregate ceiling, and if Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs and medium-range bombers were not likewise included, then the United States would have to give up some of its own ICBMs and SLBMs or accept a very high ceiling that would permit the Soviets an unacceptable advantage in total numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs. The inclusion of American TNF worked against American objectives in SALT, one of which was to curtail Soviet ballistic missiles to a number that precluded a successful Soviet first strike against the United States. Therefore, the Americans viewed the FBS issue as a crass Soviet attempt to gain unilateral military advantage out of SALT.

A fourth American objection to FBS related to the internal bureaucratic politics of the Nixon administration. As John Newhouse observed: "Little of the

[28] Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 82–86, 218–19, 394–405.

[29] Text of Congressional Briefing by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, 15 June 1972, and Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 150.

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preparation for SALT had much reference to Moscow's attitudes; Washington didn't know what these were. The concern was, not what might be negotiable with Moscow, but what could be negotiated within the Pentagon."[30] During 1970, Smith and most of his American delegation, ACDA, and the Department of State were willing to consider the merits of the Soviet FBS question. The Department of Defense, the Armed Services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were adamantly opposed to consideration of American TNF in SALT. Kissinger realized as he formulated SALT policy in the White House that he could not alienate the Pentagon on this issue if he expected to win the military over to ABM and ballistic missile limitations. The Soviet FBS issue was totally non-negotiable in Washington and hence had to be so in Helsinki and Vienna.[31]

Finally, the Soviet insistence on FBS threatened to obstruct a SALT treaty and a Brezhnev-Nixon summit meeting that Nixon wanted very badly before he ran for re-election as president in November 1972. Even as early as spring 1971, he wanted a major U.S. success in Soviet-American relations, and particularly in SALT, to counteract the growing public criticism of his policy in Asia. He also believed that Moscow could push Hanoi into a negotiated armistice. With this domestic political linkage between SALT and Vietnam, the White House could not afford to allow negotiations on FBS that might delay or prevent a SALT treaty before autumn 1972, yet it could not afford to ignore FBS altogether if that meant that the Soviets might break off the talks. For this partisan political reason, as well as the other reasons mentioned earlier, the compromise of 20 May 1971 was the most expedient way at the time to break the FBS impasse and move on toward a treaty, even though it would be an ABM treaty only and even though the United States had to accept unequal aggregates of ICBMs and SLBMs.[32]

In summary, the American perception was that the FBS issue threatened to undermine major U.S. foreign policies and its specific objectives in SALT. American perceptions were influenced by domestic bureaucratic and partisan politics, American problems with its NATO allies, and by general foreign and defense policies formulated over the preceding 25 years. Perhaps not surprisingly, American perceptions of the FBS issue had very little to do with Soviet perceptions.

Soviet Perceptions of FBS

The Soviet delegates at SALT I persistently argued that American FBS and associated allied nuclear forces posed a strategic threat to the USSR. Since the

[30] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, p. 125.

[31] Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 185-86; Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, pp. 194-95.

[32] In their memoirs, Nixon, Kissinger, and Smith mention the linkage between SALT and Vietnam, but they place it in the context of Moscow helping Washington to end the war by exerting Soviet influence on Hanoi. They do not mention a direct linkage between SALT, the Moscow summit, and the election of 1972. The mention of this domestic political linkage is made by Newhouse,

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purpose of SALT was to negotiate on strategic systems, they insisted that FBS should be within the scope of the talks. Why did the Soviets perceive that American FBS were a threat to them, and why did they push this issue when the Americans so adamantly rejected their views?

First, Soviet perceptions of FBS were in large part derived from Soviet doctrine on nuclear war, which in turn was extracted from Marxist–Leninist ideology. Karl Marx espoused a philosophy of dialectical materialism in which human history was explained in terms of class conflict over material wealth. In the industrial age, Marx asserted that this class conflict existed between the capitalists (bourgeoisie) and the exploited working class (proletariat). V. I. Lenin took this dogma and developed his own theory of imperalism, "the highest stage of capitalism." Lenin concluded that the imperialists resorted to military power to exploit the working and peasant classes of the world. Not only did the imperialists wage war against weaker peoples, they also fought each other for material spoils, which was Lenin's interpretation of World War I. Therefore, Lenin asserted that the greatest threat to the proletarian class and the largest obstacle to socialism was the militarism and adventurism of imperialists.

The doctrines of Lenin became institutionalized in the Soviet state, created and dominated by the Communist party. The foundation of Leninist foreign policy was the hostile dichotomy between imperialism and revolutionary socialism. Beyond Lenin's writings, Russian and Soviet historical experiences and the Soviet regime merely reinforced the concept of the Soviet Union under seige by outside predatory interests. The civil war of 1918–21, the great hardships of Soviet economic development in the Stalinist era, and the near disaster of World War II were explained by the Soviets as challenges and victories against imperialist threats.[33]

The Soviets interpreted the fascist–militaristic axis of Germany, Italy, and Japan as an extreme imperialist coalition aimed at destroying the Soviet Union (indeed, the alliance was called the Anti-Comintern Pact and was very hostile to communism and the USSR). In a similar vein, the Soviets viewed NATO as a post-World War II imperialist alliance aimed at the Soviet Union. After all, its members included the most advanced capitalist states and the primary colonial powers (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, and West Germany). Soviet literature has consistently portrayed NATO as an aggressive alliance that is dominated by the United States and that has the objective of applying force, even the threat of nuclear attack, against the Soviet Union.[34]

Cold Dawn, p. 119; Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 119; and Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT I: An Evaluation," *World Politics* 31 (1978): 1–25.

[33] Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G. Hyland, *Soviet Perspectives on Security*, Adelphi Paper no. 150 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979).

[34] The theme of NATO as a capitalist-imperialist bloc formed as an aggressive threat to the USSR is replete in Soviet military literature. For examples, see A. A. Grechko, et al., *Nuclear Age and War* (Moscow: Izvestiia Publishing House, 1964), translated by the Foreign Technology Division (U.S.

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Since the Khrushchevian doctrinal reforms of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviets have maintained that war between the imperialist and socialist systems is neither inevitable nor desirable, but always possible as long as imperialism exists. Since that time, the Soviets have relied heavily upon the concept of the "correlation of forces" between capitalism and socialism. This "correlation" has steadily shifted since 1917 against the imperialists and toward the socialist bloc. The "correlation" will continue to favor socialism, unless the imperialists in desperation try to resort to force to impede it. The Soviets greatly fear nuclear war as a possible threat to economic and social evolution, yet they view nuclear war as possible and as winnable by the socialist forces. In this context, the purpose of Soviet armed power is to deter imperialist attack, and if that is not possible because of the irrationality of the imperialists, then to wage war successfully.[35]

In this ideological frame of reference, the Soviets viewed American FBS as a potential imperialist first-strike force against the USSR. They saw little distinction between the United States and its NATO allies, since they believed that the Americans totally dominated their treaty allies. The Soviets viewed the American FBS and British and French nuclear forces as largely integrated systems under American operational command. Therefore, the Soviet delegation at SALT found it difficult to accept the American contention that theater systems were not "strategic" and that other NATO nuclear forces were beyond the scope of the bilateral negotiations.

The Soviet delegation at SALT persisted on the FBS issue for several reasons, the principal one probably being the Soviet perception of threat, as explained above. Ambassador Smith came to the conclusion that the Soviets largely believed in what they said about FBS and tenaciously held to their views despite American counter-arguments.[36] Raymond Garthoff, who was the executive officer of the U.S. delegation and a prominent American scholar of Soviet military doctrine, also believed that the Soviets were largely sincere in their FBS arguments.[37]

Air Force, 1965), AD610662 (especially pp. 119–29); V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy,* Third ed. (Moscow, 1968), English version edited by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975); and Colonel B. Byely, et al., *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army.* Fifth ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976). Also see Robert W. Clawson and Glee E. Wilson, "The Warsaw Pact, USSR, and NATO: Perceptions from the East," in Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, eds., *NATO After Thirty Years* (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1981), pp. 109–32.

[35] Stephen M. Millett, "Soviet Perceptions of Nuclear Strategy and Implications for U.S. Deterrence," *Air University Review* 33 (1982): 50–61. See also Millett, *A Model for Understanding Soviet Perceptions.* Economics and Policy Analysis Occasional Paper no. 23 (Columbus, O.: Battelle Columbus Division, 1981).

[36] Smith, *Doubletalk,* pp. 92–93.

[37] Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism* 24 (1975): 21–37, especially p. 32. Ambassador Garthoff reaffirmed this view in a telephone interview with the author, 14 July 1981.

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It seems also that the FBS issue was a major concern of the Soviet military, which played a conspicuously large role in the Soviet delegation at Helsinki and Vienna and in the SALT decision-making apparatus in Moscow. Several very important Soviet generals served on the delegation, reflecting the high level of concern of the Ministry of Defense. Among these generals was N. V. Ogarkov, who served on the delegation during the first two rounds until he returned to Moscow after being elected a full member of the Central Committee at the party congress in spring 1971; later Ogarkov became the chief of the General Staff and first deputy minister of defense. Another prominent general was N. N. Alekseyev, a principal manager in the Soviet weapons acquisition system who later became the deputy minister for defense for armaments. These men were replaced at the talks by Generals K. A. Trusov, another leading figure in the weapons procurement system, and I. I. Beletsky. These generals were apparently involved in the negotiations in order to protect the interests of the Soviet military establishment.[38]

The Soviet military may not have been totally satisfied with the way FBS was handled in the accords of 20 May 1971. An article analyzing FBS by two military men (a colonel and a captain) appeared in *Red Star*, the official daily organ of the Ministry of Defense, in July. They conceded that "U.S. tactical aircraft are not part of the strategic forces in an organizational sense," but they posed a threat to the USSR nonetheless, "especially since their main forces are to be found in European bases, where more than 7,000 nuclear warheads are concentrated." The authors further stated that the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons was blurred since the use of the former would likely lead directly to the use of the latter and since they had ranges that included many important strategic targets. They fully criticized the American resistence to include FBS in the scope of SALT: "This approach to the talks is aimed at obtaining unilateral military advantages. It in no way corresponds in practice to the principle of equal security."[39] The authors were not high-level policymakers, so their views were not considered an authoritative statement of official party and government policy, but the fact that their article was published in *Red Star* indicated a certain level of military discontent for the dropping of FBS from the Soviet agenda in SALT.

Brezhnev and his staff may have been as sensitive to the bureaucratic politics of the Ministry of Defense as Nixon and Kissinger were to those of the Pentagon. It is plausible that Brezhnev had to appease the military for dropping the

[38] Ibid., and Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 184, 197. Also see Thomas W. Wolfe, *The SALT Experience: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decisionmaking*, RAND report no. R-1686-PR, (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1975); Douglas F. Garthoff, "The Military and Arms Control," *Survival* 19 (1977): 242–50; and Igor S. Glasgolev, "The Soviet Decision-Making Process in Arms Control Negotiations," *Orbis* 21 (1978): 767–76.

[39] Colonel V. Kharich and Engineer-Captain Second Rank G. Koloskov, "Gambling on Nuclear Might," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 16 July 1971, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report/Soviet Union*, 19 July 1971, p. H-2.

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FBS issue in May 1971 with promises of numerical superiority in ICBM and SLBM launchers, a minimal ceiling on SS-9s, and Soviet insistence on equal ABM sites, although the Soviets had deployed only one.

Third, the Soviets were probably deeply concerned about the impact other NATO nuclear forces would have on ABM limitations. Whereas the United States worried about nuclear attack from only one potential adversary, the Soviets worried about attack from four—the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the PRC. The Soviet ABM system might not be very effective in defending Moscow from an American saturation attack, but it might be significant against lesser nuclear attacks. The Soviets probably raised the issues of accidental attacks and measures against nuclear provocations by "third parties" in part because these were elements that might afford the Soviets greater security with only two sites allowed (and only one in existence) by the ABM Treaty.[40]

Fourth, the Soviets may have realized that the FBS issue might further larger goals in the negotiations. It is difficult to determine whether they used FBS in order to accomplish other objectives, or whether they accepted other objectives in lieu of satisfaction on the FBS question. In retrospect, the "compensations" that the Soviets received, especially the offensive arms freeze that gave them numerical superiority in missile launchers, was very much in the Soviet interest. Certainly they were more favorable to the Soviets than the American proposed ceiling of 1,900 launchers in the 4 August 1970 propositions. Yet the Soviets raised the FBS issue before that time and in the context of equal aggregate ceilings. They may have seen the FBS issue, at least in part, as a tool to negotiate rather high ceilings (such as the 2,400 limit of the Vladivostok Accord of 1974) that would allow them to deploy as many missiles as they had already planned and budgeted to deploy. When the White House accepted the freeze of 1971, which was outside the ABM Treaty, the Soviets probably saw less urgency in the FBS question, which would be raised again in SALT II.

Finally, the Soviets argued that if FBS was not included in the scope of SALT, then the United States could circumvent any intercontinental missile launcher ceilings by increasing its theater nuclear forces. The Soviet delegates argued this several times in the negotiations.[41] From the Soviet perspective, SALT would provide no improvement in its security if it permitted further increases in American theater nuclear weapons that possibly could hit the USSR in relatively short firing times while it curbed intercontinental weapons that had up to 30 minutes launch-to-target times.

Implications of the FBS Issue

In conclusion, the American and Soviet perceptions of the FBS issue were both highly subjective and self-serving. The American policymakers and negotiators

[40] See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," *International Security* 1 (1977): 3–24.

[41] Smith, *Doubletalk*, pp. 96–97, 185.

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at the beginning of SALT had little idea what Soviet perceptions and sensitivities were and perhaps were indifferent to such considerations. It took several years for Washington to learn to cope with Soviet logic in strategic and arms control theories. Washington was deeply concerned with arms control agreements that would be domestically acceptable. In the period of SALT I, there were few interest groups in the United States that could lobby successfully for strategic arms control, but there were potent interests which advocated further nuclear arms and increased defense spending. Also at this time, the White House experienced great domestic pressure to end the war in Southeast Asia, and the Nixon administration believed that improved relations with Moscow was the key to releasing the American entrapment in Vietnam. There was indeed "linkage" between SALT and other political priorities, but the strongest link may have been the domestic political connection between success in SALT as a counterweight to disappointment in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, the Americans wanted to maintain two separate levels of nuclear deterrence. One was the "central" system deployed in North America with intercontinental capabilities; the other was the European theater deterrent. Washington wanted to divorce these two deterrent systems and include the first within SALT but not the second. Therefore, the Americans applied a narrow interpretation of "strategic" in order to circumscribe the scope of SALT.

The Soviet perception of FBS was highly ideological in that the Soviets had great difficulty dealing with the issue except on the basis of a self-evident conclusion derived from the authoritative generalizations of Marxism–Leninism. They refused to take an inductive approach to negotiating SALT and repeatedly rejected individual arguments that might contradict their preformed assertions. The Soviets found dealing with the Americans as frustrating as the Americans found the Soviets. The principal problem with SALT I was not so much the particular issues but the vast gap between American and Soviet perceptions of security, strategy, and arms limitation. Little progress was possible until both sides came to comprehend the thinking of the other.

One critically important divergence of perceptions concerned the nature of NATO. The United States viewed the North Atlantic alliance as a principal means of containing Soviet expansion and preventing its tentacles of power reaching into Western Europe. But the United States worried that NATO lacked the military means and the political unity to withstand Soviet encroachments. America perceived nuclear weapons in Western Europe as necessary tools to bolster the defensive effectiveness of NATO against regionally superior Soviet might. The Soviets, however, viewed NATO as a largely unified alliance of imperialist interests dominated by the United States and aimed at threatening the security of the USSR and its East European socialist allies. They viewed American, British, and French nuclear weapons as potential first-strike weapons against them.

The FBS issue was put aside in 1971 by the agreement to freeze the numbers of intercontinental missile launchers at deployed or under-construction levels. One wonders now whether that was a good trade-off for the United States or

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whether it would have been better in the long run for the United States to have grappled with the FBS issue then in order to achieve equal aggregate numbers of launchers, even if that had meant postponing the timetable for a treaty.[42] The ABM Treaty was approved by the Senate and the Interim Agreement by both houses of Congress in 1972, but with the attached Jackson amendment, which stipulated that future agreements had to provide equal ceilings for both parties. This restriction created several problems for the United States during the negotiations of SALT II, which lasted nearly seven years, from November 1972 to June 1979. The Vladivostok Accord of November 1974 between Brezhnev and President Ford established a ceiling of 2,400 which included intercontinental missile launchers and heavy bombers but which did not include FBS. The Carter administration tried unsuccessfully to reduce significantly this high ceiling, but settled for eventual reductions to 2,250 in the SALT II Treaty of 1979. Carter faced considerable domestic political opposition to this high ceiling, as well as some other aspects of the treaty. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably endorsed the treaty, with several attached qualifications, the treaty never reached the Senate floor for debate. The Senate has not considered the treaty since January 1980 and probably will not do so during the tenure of President Reagan. One of the major political objections to the treaty was the high aggregate ceiling, which several critics charged gave an advantage to the Soviets, especially since they would have more ICBMs than the United States. The ceilings of the treaty derived directly from the course of negotiations in SALT I. The unequal ceilings of 1971 became a major barrier for strategic arms control in the United States rather than a major "breakthrough" as heralded ten years ago.

The issue of theater nuclear arms control seems more urgent today than it did during SALT I. Soviet perceptions of the FBS issue remained largely unchanged.[43] In the mid-1970s the Soviets began to deploy their SS-20, a mobile, MIRVed IRBM with ranges of over 3,000 miles. These missiles, along with Backfire bombers, posed a new and very serious threat to the security of Western Europe. The United States responded with plans in 1979 to deploy American ground-launched cruise missiles and new Pershing II MRBMs in Europe by 1983. These new systems are called "long-range theater nuclear forces" (LRTNF) to distinguish them from shorter range battlefield-nuclear weapons. In November 1981, the Americans and Soviets began special talks on LRTNFs in Geneva, while the SALT II Treaty hung in suspended animation. After years of resisting Soviet insistence on discussing FBS, the Americans saw a new urgency to find limitations of LRTNFs in order to preclude a major arms race in this category of weapon systems.

President Reagan announced on 18 November 1981 his "zero option" for no

[42] Garthoff, "SALT I: An Evaluation."

[43] Stephen M. Millett, "Soviet Perceptions of the Theater Nuclear Balance in Europe and Reactions to American LRTNF's," *Naval War College Review* 39 (1981): 3–17.

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American or Soviet theater missiles in Europe. He pledged that the United States would not deploy its new missiles if the Soviets liquidated their SS-20s and older SS-4s and SS-5s, but he did not mention American submarine missiles and bombers or British and French nuclear systems.[44] Brezhnev rejected Reagan's "zero option" and complained that "it is demanded of us that we disarm unilaterally while hundreds of ground and sea-based rockets aimed at our country as well as against our allies, aircraft with atom bombs on board, this whole menacing arsenal which belongs to the U.S.A. and other NATO countries in the European area, should remain untouched."[45] The Soviets want a freeze on current levels of LRTNFs that would allow their SS-20s but preclude the new American missiles, since they assert that there is a balance of theater nuclear systems now. Nearly a decade after SALT I, neither the United States nor the USSR had modified their basic perceptions of the European theater nuclear systems.

The FBS issue illustrates very well the problems of divergent American and Soviet perceptions of strategic issues. A better understanding of perceptions, what they are and how they influence behavior in international politics, is a prerequisite for satisfactory negotiations between adversaries. Perhaps the ultimate goals of security through arms control will be achieved eventually when the United States and the Soviet Union come to appreciate, if not accept, the merits of each other's perceptions and find ways to accommodate fears, insecurities, and misapprehensions.*

[44] *New York Times*, 19 November 1981, pp. 1, 8, 9.

[45] Brezhnev quoted in the *New York Times*, 24 November 1981, p. 4.

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Corporatism, the NRA, and the Oil Industry

DONALD R. BRAND

The National Recovery Administration (NRA) of the 1930s was the most extensive corporatist experiment in American history, and its administrative history challenges widely accepted conclusions in interest group theory. The NRA exemplifies almost every characteristic of government regulation of business which interest group theory has associated with the capture of bureaucratic agencies by private interests. A broad delegation of congressional power in the National Industrial Recovery Act gave bureaucrats little guidance in identifying the public interests to be promoted by the NRA, increasing the likelihood that the New Dealers would turn to the industries they regulated for aid in defining the goals of the program. Cooptation of the NRA appeared even more likely because trade associations were formally incorporated into the administrative agency responsible for the program. Yet, surprisingly, business efforts to control the program failed. As this case study of the oil industry under the NRA demonstrates, big business was neither the interest group sponsoring the NRA nor its beneficiary. Even the independents in the industry who did benefit from the act were forced to accept benefits as favors granted by these bureaucrats, who remained firmly in control of the program. The conclusion which emerges from a study of the NRA is that of the robustness of the American state and its capacity to coopt private interests in the pursuit of its own ideologically defined goals.

Support for the pluralist conclusion that political power in the United States is widely distributed has suffered steady erosion over the last decade. Even prominent pluralists of the late 1950s and early 1960s have repudiated their earlier contributions, acknowledging theoretical deficiencies in their own paradigm. Criticism of pluralism has focused on two related assumptions of the plu-

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ralist model: the assumption that interest groups organize spontaneously and the assumption that the state passively reacts to pressures exerted by interest groups located in civil society. These assumptions had supported the pluralists' optimism that public policy, derived from mutual bargaining among spontaneously organized groups representing all relevant interests, would be roughly even-handed. Skepticism regarding these assumptions contributed to a far less sanguine view of the capacity of liberal democratic states to promote distributive justice.

The pluralist assumption that interests are spontaneously organized and represented was discredited by the discovery that organization entails costs and that those costs may be sufficiently prohibitive to deter collective action. According to Mancur Olson's pathbreaking analysis, collective action will be forthcoming only if the benefits from organization outweigh the costs for each relevant actor.[1] The calculations of individual actors, however, are complicated by the possibility that collective goods may be supplied by others without every beneficiary bearing a proportionate share of the costs, a possibility which tempts rational actors to a "free ride." Collective action will be sustained only if additional benefits are selectively available to those who work for the group.

Olson tried to confine his collective action dilemma to large groups and argued that smaller groups could overcome organizational disincentives through powerful social norms. He concluded that a system of voluntary interest groups would have an inherent class bias. Trade unions would find it impossible to organize large numbers of workers, while trade associations would be able to overcome the free-rider problem in organizing their smaller constituencies. Yet Olson's logic is more corrosive than he acknowledges. Most trade associations represent groups larger than those for whom a sociological theory of small groups is applicable, and they should be subject to the same dilemmas of collective action that inhibit labor union organization. Consistently applied, the logic of collective action points less to the class bias of a voluntary interest group system than to the general incapacity of interests to organize.

The corporatist model attempted to correct problems associated with the pluralist conception of the state.[2] By focusing attention on the role of the state in the formation and maintenance of interest groups, it simultaneously addressed Olson's challenge to pluralist theory. Whether state promotion of interest groups occurs through the direct delegation of coercive authority to groups—as when the state confers a licensing power on a private association—or through the transfer of resources to preferred groups for use as incentives for collective action, a transfer ultimately dependent upon the coercive taxing power of the

[1] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[2] See particularly the discussion of corporatism in Philippe Schmitter's "Still the Century of Corporatism," in Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979).

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state, the role of the state has expanded beyond the earlier pluralist notion of a passive state. If the rediscovery of the state as an autonomous actor provides an indispensable mechanism for organizing dispersed constituencies like labor and small business, then corporatism could be used to circumvent the theoretical weaknesses of the pluralist approach while partially resurrecting pluralist conclusions concerning the distribution of political power in the United States.

In principle, the state could reinforce the class biases of a voluntarist interest group system by conveying resources and power to established social and economic elites or counter that bias by contributing to the resources of the organizationally disadvantaged. Until recently, the literature on corporatism has emphasized the role that quasi-public institutions play in fulfilling the organizational imperatives of capitalist development and promoting the interests of economic elites because capitalists enjoy an advantage in organizing voluntarily. Ironically, even among theorists of corporatism, the concept of the state remains underdeveloped. As long as the dominant model of political conflict posits the derivative status of the state, its propensity merely to mirror the configuration of societal forces, the conclusion is preordained that the corporatization of interest groups will reinforce the inherent bias of voluntaristic collective action.

The evolution of interest group theory from the pluralists' description of a fluid society with widely distributed political power to the elitists' description of corporatism as an institutional nexus designed to thwart democratic forces was implicit in the initial assumptions of pluralism. In diverting attention from the formal institutional structures which contained the informal political process, the pluralist model abstracted from the equalitarian dimension of politics.[3] Once the focus of analysis was on the role of private groups in policymaking and implementation, the superior resources of established business elites favored their preeminence. Only the erroneous assumption that interests were spontaneously organized saved pluralism from the conclusions of its contemporary rival, elite theory. To recapture the empirical strengths of pluralism without its conceptual weaknesses, it is necessary to reexamine its analysis of power. The capacity of economically disadvantaged groups to resist the power of economic elites is more securely grounded in the tension between the unequal distribution of "informal" power—especially economic power—and the equal distribution of "formal" political power than upon a presumed rough balance of "informal" power among various groups.

The corporatist model radicalized the pluralist analysis by focusing on the extent to which the informal political process described by pluralism had become formalized and institutionalized within certain policy arenas with the assignment of a quasi-public role to private groups. With this transformation, descrip-

[3] Thus it is not surprising that David Truman concludes *The Governmental Process*, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971) with "Guardianship will emerge out of the affiliation of the Guardians," a more elitist note than had been sounded in earlier chapters (p. 535).

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tions in terms of an informal group process constrained by a beneficent social consensus were replaced by descriptions of the self-interested behavior of rational actors constrained by formal institutions. But the institutional nexus was no longer the equalitarian one of liberal democracy. Business elites, no longer fettered by the pluralists' social consensus, were free to exploit their superior economic resources within corporatist arrangements. The crucial and unresolved issue in a theory of corporatism is the relationship between corporatist institutions and the traditional institutions of parliamentary democracy.[4]

Constitutionally, the electoral system is the gateway to power in the modern democratic state. An alternative to both pluralist and corporatist modes of analysis would restore the significance of this formal characteristic of the state, albeit without degenerating into a lifeless formalism. Within such an analysis corporatism would become a mechanism through which the class bias of a strictly voluntaristic interest organization system is overcome. The role of the "outsider" in organizing groups has been portrayed through the concept of entrepreneurship.[5] As long as interest group entrepreneurship is confined to the assumptions of voluntaristic interest organization, resource-rich corporations should be able to buy off entrepreneurially based challenges to their economic hegemony. If, however, the perimeters of entrepreneurship are expanded to encompass the incentives available through the electoral system and if the entrepreneur is a public official who can channel public resources into group maintenance, then the equalitarian significance of that quintessential political resource, the vote, provides a countervailing force to the organizational advantage enjoyed by business elites.

The institutionalization of quasi-public agencies in policymaking and policy implementation has occurred in the United States as well as Western Europe. The highpoint of such developments in the United States was the National Recovery Administration, the keystone of Franklin Roosevelt's early New Deal. In this somewhat abortive experiment in corporatism, trade associations were permitted to draft and supervise codes of fair trade competition, each code becoming "law merchant" for all members of the relevant industry. As the culmination of a democratic reform movement, the New Deal could be expected to exemplify the democratic variant of corporatism. The divergence between political and economic elites during the New Deal was intensified by the widespread disenchantment with business elites who were held responsible for the Depression. Indeed, the Depression was attributed by many to the disproportionate share of the national income extracted by business elites for speculative purposes while depriving workers of sufficient income to sustain

[4] Bob Jessop, "Corporatism, Parliamentarism and Social Democracy," in Schmitter and Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends*.

[5] Terry Moe, *The Organization of Interests* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 36-39; Robert Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13 (1969): 1-32.

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adequate national purchasing power.[6] Since the New Deal, political elites were electorally accountable to a coalition of farmers, labor, and small business; an emphasis on the electoral system as a source of power leads to the expectation that the state would serve as an entrepreneurial platform for disproportionately mobilizing these constituencies.

Contradicting this expectation, the traditional account of the NRA supports the assertion that corporatism reinforces the class bias of voluntary collective action. Not only did the NRA come under heavy contemporary attack for promoting business cartels dominated by large corporations, but the judgment of its contemporary critics has been ratified by subsequent scholarly research. Ellis Hawley's authoritative study, *The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly*, emphasizes the role of big business corporate liberals in formulating and legitimating the program, as well as their control over its administration. Bernard Bellush, focusing on labor's position under the NRA in *The Failure of the NRA*, concludes that big business strengthened its hand vis-à-vis labor.[7] Even studies of specific industries, such as Sidney Fine's study of the automobile industry or Norman Nordhauser's study of the oil industry, have generally supported the conclusion that big business provided the impetus behind the NRA and disproportionately reaped its benefits.[8]

Despite this consensus, the NRA remains an enigma to historians and social scientists. The traditional description of the NRA cannot account for the pattern of support for its extension in June 1935 after its two-year trial. The judgments of the relevant groups constitute at least a *prima facie* case for determining the beneficiaries of the act. Even before the Supreme Court had overturned the program in the *Schechter* decision, the effective operation of the NRA had been doomed by the disenchantment of substantial sections of the business community. Both the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, for example, formally repudiated the NRA.[9] Unfortunately, at this level of aggregation the distinctive interests of big and small business cannot be clearly distinguished. A critical element in the standard interpretation is the assertion that big business supported the program as a strong form of cartelization which guaranteed monopoly profits. Small business, squeezed by the inequitable operation of a cartel controlled by big business, aligned itself with labor, which was coopted by the growth of company unions under the NRA, and opposed extension. In fact, the configuration of forces which emerged around the issue of extension was far more complex.

[6] Ellis Hawley, *The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[7] Bernard Bellush, *The Failure of the NRA* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1975).

[8] Sidney Fine, *The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963); Norman Nordhauser, *The Quest for Stability: Domestic Oil Regulation 1917–1935* (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1979); Gerald Nash, *United States Oil Policy 1890–1964* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968).

[9] Hawley, *The New Deal*, pp. 154–57.

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The organizational impetus of the NRA alone might suggest that the organizationally deprived would be the beneficiaries. Organized labor gained 900,000 members during this period, reversing a general decline throughout the 1920s and early 1930s.[10] A burst of trade association formation also occurred, but the industries organized were invariably those with predominantly small firms. Firms in oligopolistic markets had organized long before the NRA without the entrepreneurial services of government bureaucrats. Even isolated farmers were given a powerful organizational push by the New Deal.[11] Of course, the organizational outcome of the NRA could have been the unintended consequence of an attempt to construct a corporatized state responsive to the interests of big business. In order to distinguish the intended from the unintended consequences, it is necessary to identify the objectives of its architects and to contrast these with the goals of affected groups.

Among all of the interest groups, none has been more systematically misconceived than big business. Contrary to the hypothesis that big business behavior was guided by a corporate liberal strategy of cooperation with government and labor unions in order to coopt them, many prominent industrialists were already moving to oppose the New Deal through such groups as the American Liberty League. Even those corporate liberals serving on the Business Advisory Council of the Commerce Department who supported an extension sought to modify the program in a fundamental manner.[12] A simple tabulation of big business attitudes toward the extension of the NRA would reveal far more opposition to the act than the traditional view of the NRA predicts, but this tabulation would still overestimate big business sympathy for the NRA. Many businessmen only reluctantly accepted the NRA as the best politically feasible alternative to the passage of more unfavourable legislation, such as Senator Hugo Black's thirty-hour-week bill. Senator Black's bill would have imposed a costly uniform 30-hour work week across the board for industry.

Small business was similarly divided, but nevertheless provided some of the strongest support for the NRA. The Industry and Business Committee for NRA Extension, which spearheaded legislative lobbying on behalf of the extension, primarily consisted of firms in the textile, clothing, and natural resource industries.[13] These industries were characterized by highly competitive markets

[10] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the U.S., Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 97–98.

[11] Kenneth Finegold and Theda Skocpol, "Capitalists, Farmers, and Workers in the New Deal—The Ironies of Government Intervention." Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 31 August 1980.

[12] "Resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the Business Advisory and Planning Committee," 13 March 1935, President's Official File No. 3Q, Box 9, folder 1933–35. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

[13] Hawley, *The New Deal*; Louis Galambos, *Competition and Cooperation* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966); and James Johnson, *The Politics of Soft Coal* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979).

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and predominantly small firms. The American Federation of Labor (AF of L) also came out in support of an extension of the NRA. These groups supported the extension of the NRA because the benefits outweighed the costs in their overall evaluation of the program. This does not suggest these constituencies were uniformly pleased with the NRA. Both small business and organized labor bitterly opposed some aspects of the NRA, and a fully elaborated explanation of the program would have to account for the tensions between the New Dealers and its constituency groups. The abbreviated version of a theory of democratic corporatism advanced in this article subordinates those tensions in order to focus on the fundamental conflict that shaped the NRA—the conflict between big business and the New Dealers.

The plausibility of an artificial distinction between the early "probusiness" New Deal and a later "antibusiness" New Deal has rested largely on the presumption that the NRA delegated public power to private associations controlled by major corporate interests. Yet despite the appearance of a devolution of public authority onto private trade associations, the NRA was ultimately predicated upon executive supremacy over industrial codes. The president or his authorized representative retained the power to suspend, modify, interpret, and even impose code provisions upon an unwilling industry. The token representation of government on code authorities, often cited as evidence that government abdicated its supervisory responsibilities, actually reflected a general de facto separation of interests between business-dominated code authorities and a politically dominated central NRA administration. Power never rested solely in the hands of the code authorities, and they were progressively stripped of significant functions as the central bureaucracy grew in power.[14]

Emphasizing big business fears of growing central bureaucratic power during the NRA remedies both the one-sided focus of contemporary political economy on the avoidance of economic risks as the dominant motive determining the behavior of firms and an overestimation of the political advantages enjoyed by large corporations. But the NRA was no more a pure manifestation of central bureaucratic planning than it was a pure manifestation of self-government of industry. The NRA was an ambiguous and unstable mixture of both, a mixture which has provided important evidence for the traditional interpretation of a business-dominated NRA. Precisely because it was a mixture, some prominent industrialists could support it in the hope that it could be transformed into industrial self-government. Only further empirical research can reveal whether the growth of the state—and particularly the bureaucracy—represented the dominent element in this complex historical period or merely a residual one. Ultimately, a balanced judgment of the NRA would not only have to take into account the relative importance of bureaucratic and self-governing elements, but also examine the abruptly truncated historical trajectory of the NRA as well. Potential threats played a major role in business calculations, and the

[14] Hawley, *The New Deal*, p. 89.

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trend from 1933 to 1935 had been away from self-government and towards intensified bureaucratic control.[15]

The opposition of bureaucratic and business elites does not strand bureaucracy as a reified institution detached from economic interests. It does link bureaucrats to the electoral constituency of the political branches, particularly when the program is staffed outside of regular civil service channels as was the NRA. Despite this link to an electoral constituency and their economic interests, the focus on bureaucratic elites is justified by their crucial intermediary role in organizing and mobilizing these groups. The politicization of conflict is a crucial factor in overcoming the centrifugal forces among those groups which have difficulty organizing. The oil industry during the NRA provides a compelling example of corporatist developments counteracting the organizational advantages enjoyed by major corporate interests.

Oil and the NRA

The oil industry during the NRA is a microcosm of the conflicting forces which determined the outcome of this national experiment in corporatism. The demand for stability and relief from cutthroat competition, the motive which purportedly propelled businessmen from a *laissez-faire* economy into the protective arms of government regulation, was intensified in this industry beyond the levels characteristic of manufacturing industries. The oil market, already glutted by production from big fields in Texas, Oklahoma, and California, was further destabilized with the discovery of the enormous East Texas field in October, 1930. The price of oil in East Texas dropped as low as 4 cents a barrel.[16] Whatever the long-range prognosis for diminishing supply and the need for conservation, the immediate problem of the market was overabundance. But unlike manufacturing industries, which could respond to a condition of excess supply by restricting production, the oil industry was incapable of turning off the spigot.

The physical properties of underground oil, in combination with the legal system governing proprietary rights, subverted the self-regulating qualities of the petroleum market. Consistent with the Lockean notion of property, ownership of petroleum was conveyed under the "law of capture" by mixing one's labor with the natural resource in lifting it to the surface. The migratory character of underground oil, however, compelled each joint owner of a pool to maximize individual production to prevent rival owners from capturing potential production. Thus, plummeting prices would not cause a contraction in pro-

[15] Hugh Johnson, *The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1935); Donald Richberg, *The Rainbow* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1936), pp. 65–77.

[16] *National Petroleum News*, 31 May 1933, p. 10; Norman Nordhauser, *The Quest for Stability*, p. 108.

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duction unless a near unanimous agreement among the joint owners of a pool was secured to prorate output. These voluntary agreements were almost impossible to conclude in practice because many of the small owners viewed their investments as "get rich quick" schemes rather than seeking to maximize long range profits and because of the prohibition imposed by antitrust statutes.

A businessman's response to this market failure varied according to his economic interests and his fundamental beliefs. Contrary to the hypothesis of political capitalism, most of the majors sought to avoid extensive government controls. They feared government controls even more than the rigors of the competitive market, perhaps because they were the firms best equipped to emerge victorious in a competitive battle. The independents, on the other hand, were far more likely to trade their autonomy for the relative security of a regulated solution. While the Petroleum Code under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) contained concessions to each business faction, fundamentally, the code was the culmination of the legislative program of the independents.

The crucial regulatory battles for the oil industry in the 1930s focused on the choice between federal and state control, rather than the choice between a regulated and an unregulated industry. Given the prevailing market chaos, everyone acknowledged the need for some controls. While state controls were perceived by the Independent Producers Association of America (IPA), the foremost trade association of the independents, as an indispensable element in a more comprehensive package of market controls, the majors viewed effective state controls as a sufficient means to effect long-term stability in the industry, without resort to more extensive controls.[17] State prorationing of production certainly circumscribed a critical area of managerial discretion for firms, but they retained considerable autonomy to choose independent strategies under these new market rules. A far more radical threat to industry profits and managerial discretion was posed by price controls, a threat primarily from the federal level.

Actually, during this period the price of crude was so low that price controls would only have been used to increase price and benefit the industry. But the majors were aware of the long-range potential for price controls to diminish profits and were willing to forgo a short-term gain for a long-term interest in autonomy. Many smaller producers could not afford the luxury of a long-term perspective. Having gone into debt to finance their capital investment for production, they wanted to maximize their immediate returns to forestall bankruptcy.[18] While one group of independents sought to control supply by erecting

[17] *API Quarterly*, April 1933, pp. 2–11; *National Petroleum News*, 5 April 1933, pp. 7–8; *National Petroleum News*, 17 May 1933, p. 27; *National Petroleum News*, 28 November 1934, p. 7; *National Petroleum News*, 12 December 1934, pp. 15–16; *National Petroleum News*, 26 December 1934, p. 7.

[18] Wirt Franklin could not attend the Senate and House Committee Hearings considering oil

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import barriers and leaving domestic production unfettered, a majority of independents followed the leadership of Wirt Franklin's IPA and demanded immediate price controls to raise the price of a barrel of crude from 10 cents to as much as $1.11.[19]

Federalism and Industry Regulation

The constitutional and political limits on state and federal action illuminate the respective intentions of the majors and independents in supporting state or federal controls. Politically, industries could lobby against the imposition of state regulatory controls by threatening to move operations other than production wells to other states. Constitutionally, the majors could play the states off against the federal government by advocating a jurisprudence of dual federalism which left corporations in the unregulated middle.[20] To the extent that the oil industry found some form of government production controls necessary, these well-established defenses against federal and state controls had to be modified to accommodate essential regulation.

According to reigning constitutional interpretation, federal control over interstate commerce did not extend to production, which remained within the sphere of state control.[21] This limitation of federal power guaranteed the states a role in any comprehensive scheme of production allocation. States had jurisdiction over their own wells, but state controls could not stabilize an interestate market unless the producing states acted jointly to allocate production among themselves and equalize aggregate production and aggregate demand. Thus, the independents demanded additional federal production controls to allocate production among the states and *fully* stabilize the market. The majors, on the other hand, were deterred from advocating any form of federal production controls by the possibility that federal controls over production might be broadened to include federal price controls.[22]

Constitutional doctrine not only compelled the participation of the states, but also set limits to that participation. Since the power to regulate interstate commerce was lodged in the federal government, the undue expansion of state control over an interstate industry like the oil industry would have been constitutionally challenged. As long as the states were not preempted by federal legislation, they had some authority to regulate indirectly interstate commerce

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legislation in May and June 1933 because his own business was temporarily in the hands of receivers. *National Petroleum News*, 7 June 1933, p. 11.

[19] This minority insurgent group of independents called themselves the IPA Opposed to Monopoly. See Nordhauser, *The Quest for Stability*, pp. 101–06.

[20] Edward Corwin, *The Twilight of the Supreme Court* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1934).

[21] *U.S.* v. *E.C. Knight Company*, 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

[22] *National Petroleum News*, 28 November 1934, pp. 7–8.

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in order to secure the legitimate ends of state government; the courts, however, construed this power narrowly when state legislation impeded interstate commerce. The courts not only restricted the state in the name of federalism, but in the name of individual rights as well. State regulation of the oil industry must be subsumed under the general police powers of the state. While the police power is broadly defined as the power "to promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare," in practice the Supreme Court imposed severe limits on the states through a narrow interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth Amendment, at least until 1937, when substantive due process went into eclipse as a judicial doctrine.[23] Indeed, the Court had struck down a Tennessee law fixing gasoline prices and differentials between wholesale and retail prices as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in *William* v. *Standard Oil Company* in 1929.[24] Thus, the majors could secure limited regulation by favoring state control while opposing federal control, whereas the independents' program of extensive regulation required joint federal-state cooperation.

Despite the imposition of statewide proration orders in Texas and Oklahoma by 1930, the chaotic oil market had not stabilized by the beginning of the New Deal. An account of the majors' disenchantment with state regulation during the Hoover years permits the plausible, but incorrect, inference that the majors turned to comprehensive federal controls as the only viable alternative to market chaos.[25] Many of the weaknesses of state controls during this period were attributable to the problems of institutionalizing state controls and reconciling them with accepted constitutional doctrines. The completion of this task by the beginning of 1933 held out the promise, at least to the majors, that the market could be stabilized without extensive federal controls.[26]

If state production controls permitted the majors to maximize their leverage in resisting the imposition of further controls, one might anticipate that the majors would have opposed any federal role in stabilizing the oil market. This proves not to have been the case. Indeed, the support for federal regulation during the New Deal can be attributed to the failure of state regulation during the Hoover years. Yet the response to this failure was conditioned by the same

[23] Edward Corwin, *The Constitution and What It Means Today* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 388-90.

[24] *Williams* v. *Standard Oil Company*, 278 U.S. 235 (1929). Concerning the majors' fight against Wisconsin's price fixing order during the code, see *National Petroleum News*, 10 October 1934, pp. 11-15.

[25] Robert Hardwicke, "Legal History of Conservation of Oil in Texas," in Hardwicke, et al., *Legal History of Gas and Oil* (Chicago, Ill.: American Bar Association, 1938); Nash, *United States Oil Policy*, Chs. 6 and 7.

[26] The institutionalization of state controls in Oklahoma was only completed on 10 April 1933, not nearly enough time to dismiss them as ineffective. While the majors did envisage a role for supplementary federal controls, their primary reliance on state controls was manifest in their recommendations at the oil conference convened by Roosevelt from 27-29 March 1933. *API Quarterly*, 2-3 April 1933; *National Petroleum News*, 12 April 1933, p. 11.

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distinctive interests which prompted the support for state regulation: The majors sought a narrowly constrained federal role to correct the specific deficiencies of state regulation, while the IPA sought a broad federal role to extend market controls beyond the production quotas imposed by states.

The Demand for Federal Intervention

The completion of a legal framework for restricting production at the state level had proved to be a hollow victory, at least in the short run. Efforts to restrict production at well sites posed insurmountable problems of enforcement as long as a recalcitrant minority of well owners continued to evade the law. With over 15,000 wells in East Texas alone, and with numerous deceptive techniques available to unscrupulous producers, a small army of enforcement officials would have been required to monitor every producer.[27] Fortunately for the advocates of production control, a more realistic means of enforcement was available. The Achilles' heel of hot oil production was transporting the oil to distant markets. Transportation via railroads and ships, the dominant modes of shipment, were particularly vulnerable to government regulation. Interstate and intrastate oil were usually commingled for shipment, and effective regulation required federal–state cooperation.[28]

In response to this situation, the independents demanded the immediate imposition of federal production and price controls as the only effective short-term remedy for market chaos. Small business was confident that an administration sympathetic to their plight would use controls to guarantee a "fair" minimum return on their investment. From their perspective, market risks were far more salient than the political risks of government interference. Aware of the extent to which public opinion held business elites responsible for the Depression and of the potential political repercussions of the hostility towards major corporations, big business was prepared to accept more uncertainty in the market as the price of autonomy. Wherever possible, big business would control market uncertainty by extending corporate modes of market rationalization, but corporate political strategy demanded only those minimal public controls that were a prerequisite for the success of private endeavors.

The minimal requisite control sought by the majors included legislation which would have made it a federal crime to transport in interstate commerce oil produced in excess of state conservation statutes.[29] Despite business suspicion of

[27] Indeed, a small army had been used to enforce state prorationing when the governors of both Oklahoma and Texas declared martial law in 1931 to cope with runaway production; see Nash, *United States Oil Policy*, pp. 120–71.

[28] According to Marland: "At present the carriers have no authority to refuse to ship illegally produced oil in interstate commerce," in *National Petroleum News*, 19 April 1933, p. 7; *National Petroleum News*, 26 April 1933, p. 15; and *National Petroleum News*, 31 May 1933, p. 10.

[29] Federal control of hot oil was the highest common denominator in regulation proposals agreed upon by the majors and the independents in the first oil conference sponsored by President

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growing federal control over economic activity, this minimal role appeared inescapable. Confining this federal role to support for the exercise of state police powers had historical precedents in federal restrictions on the interstate commerce of such items as lottery tickets, impure and falsely advertised foods, prostitutes, or liquor. With the federal government acting only as a policeman for the state, the effectiveness of control could be increased without significant expansion of the scope of government regulation. As long as the state operated as an intermediary between the federal government and the industry, constitutional restrictions on state power established the limits of regulation.

If the regulatory controls preferred by the majors combined state production controls with a federal ban on hot oil, a control package which provided the minimum requisite stability while maximizing the autonomy of firms, their support for such a program was not consistent. The legislative history of the period reveals occasional support by the majors for more extensive programs of federal control. Specifically, the majors supported the National Industrial Recovery Act in June 1933, eventuating in federal price and production controls; and they supported the Thomas-Disney bill in the spring of 1934, which would have permanently institutionalized federal production controls.[30] In each case in which the majors deviated from supporting their preferred program of regulation, they did so as a compromise to avoid more radical measures which threatened even greater controls over the industry. Support for the National Industrial Recovery Act was a timely maneuver to substitute a bill of indefinite powers for the Marland-Capper bill. Similarly, the majors' support for permanent federal production controls in the Thomas-Disney bill was an effort to forestall the introduction into Congress of the Margold bill, which would have established price controls and set retail and wholesale margins in both refining and marketing as well as introducing federal production controls.

The National Industrial Recovery Act

The support given by the majors for the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act has often been cited as evidence that the majors wanted federal regulation of their industry. In retrospect, the National Industrial Recovery Act led to federal production controls and would have permitted federal price controls. But these powers were not inherent in the NIRA. They were derived from the Petroleum Code which was subsequently drafted under the NIRA to govern the industry. The only provisions relating specifically to the oil industry in the NIRA were those of Section 9. Sections 9(a) and 9(b) dealt with rate control for

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Roosevelt. Many independents wanted more extensive controls, but the majors would not go along. See *National Petroleum News*, 5 April 1933, pp. 7-8.

[30] *National Petroleum News*, 28 November 1934, pp. 3-4; *National Petroleum News*, 31 May 1933, pp. 9-11; *National Petroleum News*, 7 June 1933, pp. 7-11; and Nordhauser, *The Quest for Stability*, pp. 108-10.

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petroleum pipelines, including possible divestment proceedings against holding companies accused of monopolistic practices, and were clearly objectionable to the interests of the majors. Section 9(c) provided the minimal federal ban on hot oil which the majors supported. The identification of provisions clearly objectionable to the majors in the NIRA supports the assertion that the majors saw the NIRA as the best compromise version they could hope for, rather than an expression of their own preference for an extended regulatory state.[31]

Indeed, despite the ominous potential of Sections 9(a) and 9(b), the majors had succeeded in bringing oil industry legislation within the rubric of general industrial recovery, in the belief that aligning themselves with other industries would moderate regulatory controls.[32] Above all else, the majors feared being singled out as a problem industry, a designation which could become a prelude to public utility status. Wirt Franklin had helped to draft the legislation which embodied the majors' fears. Introduced in both houses on 19 May 1933 by Congressman Ernest W. Marland and Senator Arthur Capper, this bill called for the secretary of interior to allocate mandatory production quotas to the states and to the various pools within a state on the basis of his determination of market demand, to limit imports and withdrawals from storage of petroleum and refined products, to determine equitable rates for transportation and storage, and to set minimum and maximum prices to prevent either unfair competition in the sale of petroleum or its products, or the exploitation of the public. Thus the majors' support for the NIRA, in light of the more radical Marland–Capper alternative, was consistent with their ultimate intention, always pursued in a flexible and pragmatic manner, to avoid federal controls.

In the struggle over the Marland–Capper bill, the success of the majors in resisting the extension of federal controls was at least partially derivative from the strategic advantage which our political system bestows on any group resisting a new federal program. Roosevelt's desire for quick passage of a general recovery measure gave him little leverage against obstructionists who preferred the disciplining power of unimpeded market forces to federal price and production controls. Yet if proponents of federal oil control lost the battle for specific amendments to the NIRA, they won the war when power shifted to their side after the NIRA was enacted. Since the recovery act provided the president with the power to impose a code if the industry could not come to an agree-

[31] *National Petroleum News*, 26 April 1933, p. 18, indicates the majors' views on divestment. Warren C. Platt, editor of *National Petroleum News*, urged acceptance of the NIRA as the best alternative available. *National Petroleum News*, 31 May, 1933, p. 7. See also the *New York Times*, 23 May 1933, p. 16, and *National Petroleum News*, 31 May 1933, p. 7. This attitude was characteristic of other industries as well. Even Gerald Swope, the big business leader most favorable to the NIRA, saw the NIRA as a compromise to avoid worse alternatives. Swope did not claim credit for the NIRA because the emphasis in the program has shifted from industrial self-government to bureaucratic control. David Loth, *Swope of G.E.* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 223.

[32] *New York Times*, 27 May 1933; *National Petroleum News*, 17 May 1933, p. 27; and *National Petroleum News*, 14 June 1933, p. 16.

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ment, and since the president favored more extensive controls, the independents were in the driver's seat when the Petroleum Code was drafted.[33] Now the pressure was on the majors to compromise their resistance to federal regulation, since autonomy within a federal program would be maximized if the industry presented a united front.

Taking advantage of the expanded scope for legitimate cooperation offered by the NIRA, the industry gathered in Chicago on 16 June 1933 to draft an industrial code. Despite the opposition of most of the majors, Wirt Franklin successfully marshalled the large majority of votes at the Chicago conference held by independents in favor of both production and price controls. The price fixing clause, in particular, was the most hotly debated item on the agenda of the convention.[34]

Harry Sinclair, E. B. Reeser of the Barnsdall Corporation, and Judge Amos Beaty of Phillips Petroleum were prominent industry officials who for idiosyncratic reasons favored this clause; most of the other corporate leaders strongly disagreed. While the oil market had displayed the specific structural defects which result when ownership is not conterminous with use, the application of broader remedies than necessary would treat symptoms rather than causes. This threatened to rigidify the market and strip the majors of important competitive advantages over smaller unintegrated firms. They acknowledged the need for state coercion to limit supply, but once production was limited, the "natural forces" of the market would bring prices to an acceptable level. Crucially, limitation of supply could be accomplished without creating a vast federal bureaucracy to monitor the activities of the oil industry. Indeed, it had been suggested that most of the federal responsibility for preventing the shipments of hot oil could be discharged through the Internal Revenue Service and preexisting state programs. Price fixing, on the other hand, involved continuously sifting and monitoring huge amounts of information. Such a task would have required a specialized bureaucracy of the scope of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which fixed rates for the railroads. Whatever fond memories of government-business cooperation during World War I still lingered, they were not memories of the price fixing during this period.[35]

Judge C. B. Ames, chairman of the board of Texaco, warned that price fixing was doomed to failure if supply was not brought into line with demand, and that price fixing was superfluous when such a balance existed. C. C. Herndon, vice president of Skelly Oil Company, indicted the code for inviting the government to take charge of prices and profits and predicted the industry would look

[33] The industry was aware that a failure to agree would maximize government control over the industry. See *National Petroleum News*, 14 June 1933, p. 11.

[34] *National Petroleum News*, 21 June 1933, pp. 7–12.

[35] *National Petroleum News*, 31 May 1933, pp. 7–8. Later, even as strong a proponent of federal control as Wirt Franklin admitted that the scope of organization proposed by the Department of Interior to implement price fixing "filled us with alarm." Franklin to Ickes, 18 October 1933, Box 194, RG 232. National Archives, Suitland, Maryland.

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back upon the step with sorrow. R. G. A. van dear Woude, the president of Shell Petroleum Corporation, described his experience in conducting business in the Netherlands, where price fixing was an established fact. He asserted that government price fixing was a benefit to the consumer at the expense of the producer because prices would be frozen at unprofitable levels by politicians subjected to public ire when prices increased.[36]

The arguments of these speakers were of no avail against the rhetoric of the independents, who outvoted the majors to include a price-fixing provision. Wirt Franklin's rejoinder that he opposed "letting the powers that have fixed the prices in the past continue to fix them in the future" recast the issue for the independents from whether to fix prices to who would fix prices: the majors or the government. The majors vowed to continue their opposition at the public hearings on the code scheduled for late July.

On 26 June 1933, American Petroleum Institute (API) representatives reported back to their board of directors on the proposed code, and a vigorous discussion ensued concerning the implications of price fixing by the federal government. The API was aware of the dangers of disapproving the proposed Chicago code, for if that only set the stage for the president to impose a code, they might end up with even less entrepreneurial autonomy. Nevertheless, several of the majors were adamantly opposed to the proposed code. The API board resolved this dispute by approving the Chicago Code without denying the right of any member to oppose particular provisions at the upcoming fedearal hearings on the code. Gulf, Shell Union, Standard of Indiana, Standard Oil of New Jersey, The Texas Company (Texaco), Sun Oil, Atlantic Refining, Mid-Continent, Ohio Oil, Magnolia, and General Petroleum all approved the code with a reservation attached in opposition to the price-fixing clause.[37] Despite their opposition, and the well-known reservations of General Hugh Johnson concerning price fixing, the influence of the independents was sufficient to retain the controversial power in the final code. In the legislature, even a minority of representatives sympathetic to the interests of the majors had some power to obstruct legislation, but once the political battle shifted to the administrative arena, power shifted dramatically in favor of the independents and the bureaucracy.

The Privileged Position of the Independents

The role of the federal bureaucracy as a catalyst for the organization of private interests was clearly displayed in the oil industry. The replacement of informal coordination of interests by a more formal organized mode of coordination was not a disinterested manifestation of a systemic organizational revolution but instead had a direct impact on the interests which gained access to political

[36] *National Petroleum News*, 21 June 1933; pp. 10–12.

[37] *New York Times*, 18 June 1933; *Baltimore Sun*, 10 September 1933; Nordhauser, *The Quest for Stability*, p. 119.

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decision-makers. The ability of the majors to coordinate informally their political efforts reflected the ease of communication among a handful of dominant firms. The independents, fragmented into a large number of regional and specialized associations, required formal organization to realize their potential political clout. When the NIRA forced these associations to agree upon a common code and establish an industry-wide committee to supervise the administration of the code, a corporatist arrangement between private interests and government actors emerged, which overcame the organizational disadvantage of the dispersion of the independents.

On 29 August 1933, Roosevelt named Harold Ickes, secretary of the interior, to administer the oil code. By this single administrative action, he upset the carefully calculated legislative strategy of the majors prior to the passage of the NIRA to align the oil industry with other manufacturing industries under a general recovery measure. Now every other industry was subsumed under the National Recovery Administration, a new agency to be headed by Hugh Johnson, while the oil code was administered by the Interior Department. Ickes was a progressive Republican whose outspoken views of public regulation of business were more worrisome than those of the more moderate General Johnson. The administrative isolation of the oil industry subjected it to the threat of far more extensive controls than any other industry. Nevertheless, since the conflicts which emerge in the administration of this code were similar to conflicts which dominated the NRA in other areas, its case study cannot be dismissed as idiosyncratic.

The institutional mechanism established to administer the code raised the most fundamental issues broached by the NRA. Poised between industrial self-government and federal bureaucratic control, administrative arrangements would determine the eventual locus of control. However willing the independents were to turn to federal relief from ruinous competition, even they were sensitive to the issue of outside control. Thus the Chicago proposal called for administration of the code by a National Emergency Committee of 54 oil men, equally divided between producers and refiners, on the one hand, and marketers, on the other. The power of the president remained the negative one of approval or disapproval of code provisions, including the right to suspend any provision which operated to the detriment of national recovery.[38]

This arrangement was unacceptable to the administration, and the structure which finally emerged duplicated the ambiguous public–private mixture of the NRA as a whole. The final code established a 15-member Planning and Coordination Committee (P&CC), primarily representing the industry, but including three government representatives as well. All of the members of the P&CC were to be appointed by the president, but nominations for the industry representatives were solicited from the various groups within the industry. Officially, the P&CC only acted in an advisory capacity to the code administrator, a federal

[38] *National Petroleum News*, 21 June 1933, p. 25.

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official.[39] The petroleum administrator would be aided by a federal agency, to be designated by the president, which had the power to investigate conditions in the industry and make an independent determination of reasonable market demand upon which all production restrictions would be based. When Roosevelt selected Secretary Ickes to supervise the code, Ickes promptly established a Petroleum Administration Board (PAB) within the Department of Interior to carry out these functions. The struggle for power between the P&CC and the PAB shaped the later history of the Petroleum Code.

Ickes and Roosevelt were confronted by a divided industry when they sought nominations for the Planning and Coordination Committee. The code called for 12 industry appointees and three representatives of the National Recovery Administration, but each of the three factions in the industry put forward a slate of 12 nominees. Had the president's primary concern been to achieve a balance among these factions, some nominees from each list would have been included in the final board. Instead, Roosevelt selected all his appointees from the nominees of the Committee of 54, leaving most of the majors unrepresented on the final committee.[40] The limits of the government's commitment to industrial self-government was thus apparent from the very beginning. By excluding such prominent oil men as C. B. Ames of the Texas Company, C. E. Arnott of Socony Vacuum, W. H. Farish of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and J. Edgar Pew of Sun Oil Company, the P&CC became more reliant on its privileged relationship with government as the source of its authority than any other major industry's code authority.

Stabilization without Rationalization

The intention, if not always the effect, of administration under the oil code was to preserve the position and market share of small entrepreneurs by detailed controls which sought to mitigate competition and preserve individual competitors even at the expense of economic efficiency and rationality. That state-imposed stabilization of a chaotic market existed, at least in part, as an alternative, rather than a supplement, to the mode of stabilization sought by the majors is most clearly demonstrated by the controversy which erupted over vertical integration.

In the majors' program for industrial stabilization, market discipline played an important role. It was precisely the harshness of the market which made independent marketers flock to the relative security of contractual arrangements

[39] Article VII, Section 3; Lewis Mayers, ed., *A Handbook of NRA: Laws, Regulations, Codes* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Codes, Inc., 1933), p. 254. See also *National Petroleum News*, 30 August 1933, p. 4.

[40] *National Petroleum News*, 23 August 1933, pp. 11–19, and 7 September 1933, p. 12; Nordhauser, *The Quest for Stability*, pp. 130–31. The P&CC did include Standard of California and Standard of Ohio, but none of the prominent anti-price fixing group.

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with the majors. The majors sought a method of achieving vertical integration without investing exorbitant amounts of capital in the already over-developed market network. In 1929 they discovered a method of promoting exclusive dealing which violated the spirit, but not the letter, of the Clayton Act. Lease and agency agreements, in which the refiner leases the service station from its owner and then reappoints the owner as the refiners exclusive agent, spread like wildfire throughout the industry from 1929 to 1932. By the latter year it was estimated that as much as 65 percent of marketing capacity of the industry was under this form of agreement.[41]

Offering the independent retailer a fixed margin on his sales and gasoline at a discounted rate, some small businessmen had eagerly traded their independence for the greater financial security of these arrangements. Others, compelled by economic necessity, resented being driven into such contracts. Those who resisted these blandishments resented the entry of the majors into the retail market and objected to the "unfair" discounts given to lease and agency outlets. The disposition of this hotly disputed practice deadlocked the Chicago Code conference, and General Johnson resolved the conflict by freezing the status quo and relating the final decision to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).[42]

This status quo was extended for the next 16 months when neither the FTC nor Ickes committed themselves to a final ruling. The status quo was, however, disruptive of the majors' plan for market stabilization. Control of 65 percent of marketing capcity would be of little value in mitigating competition as long as the other 35 percent remained fiercely competitive. When Ickes finally rendered a decision on 4 March 1935, he doubtlessly intended gradually to phase out lease and agency agreements without unduly disrupting the fragile recovery which was gaining momentum. Making permanent the temporary prohibition on lease and agency contracts, he also attacked the exclusive dealing incentives for such arrangements for both refiners and retailers.[43] The ruling never had a significant impact on the marketing structure because the NIRA was ruled unconstitutional shortly thereafter, but it exemplified the conflict between bureaucratic and business elites. Once the state, rather than the corporation, became the agency of stabilization, the superior political clout of the independents compensated for their weakened market position.

Conclusion

The conflict between business elites on the one hand, and bureaucratic elites responsive to democratic constituencies on the other, has not received the attention it merits because of the pervasive influence of consensus theories of American history. These theories have posited an enduring social consensus to

[41] Myron Watkins, *Oil: Stabilization or Conservation* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937).
[42] *National Petroleum News*, 28 June 1933, pp. 11–12.
[43] Watkins, *Oil: Stabilization or Conservation*, pp. 188–91.

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explain an exceptional characteristic of American political history when contrasted with that of Western Europe: the weakness of the American socialist movement. Without dismissing the question "Why no socialism in America?" entirely, one can argue that the pervasive influence of it has seriously hampered the study of government–business relations. Focusing solely on the character and ideology of the working class and on expropriation as the path to political power, the emphasis on socialism has obscured other threats to business leadership. If the essence of socialism is public control over the means of production, would not the extension of public control through effective government regulation represent the functional equivalent of socialism?

Certainly this has been the view of the major contestants in twentieth-century American reform history. Businessmen have often perceived a radical threat from regulation as they railed against the encroachments of the bureaucracy as creeping socialism. While the foremost representatives of American reform movements have eschewed the socialist alternative as inconsistent with the American individualist heritage, they have sought to control the abuses of corporate capitalism by strengthening the bureaucracy and enhancing the regulatory capacity of the state. Woodrow Wilson once described the principle guiding the construction of this progressive, democratic state in the following terms:

> For it is very clear that in fundamental theory socialism and democracy are almost if not quite one and the same. They both rest at bottom upon the absolute right of the community to determine its own destiny and that of its members. Men as communities are supreme over men as individuals. Limits of wisdom and convenience to the public control there may be: limits of principle there are, upon strict analysis, none.[44]

The NRA suggests that majoritarian democracy in the United States is more likely to take the guise of corporatism than of socialism. Precisely because such democratic constituencies as labor or small business do not have the cohesion found among economic elites, the corporatist strategy for mobilizing latent interests has conveyed power to bureaucratic coordinators. The growth of central bureaucratic power, even in a program legitimated by a rhetoric of industrial self-government, implemented by an ad hoc agency staffed without regard to the impersonal norms of civil service expertise, and guided by a vague, discretionary delegation of congressional authority suggests that the American state is more robust and autonomous than acknowledged by contemporary interest group paradigms. Like the concept of "democracy," the "state" easily becomes an ever-receding ideal rather than a category for empirical analysis. But the corporatist focus on the role of the state in the formation and maintenance of interest groups, once liberated from the debilitating premise of the hegemony of big business, should offer new insights on the role of political elites in a democratic society.

[44] *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 35 vols., ed. Arthur S. Link et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 5:561.

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Book Reviews

Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy *by John Lewis Gaddis. New York, Oxford University Press, 1982. 432 pp. $25.00.*

This life-and-times volume might better be subtitled *The Mistakes We Made Between Kennan and Kissinger.* Gaddis is a thorough researcher who brings together a great deal of material and assembles it into impressive models, which he then labels "symmetrical containment" and "asymmetrical containment." Kennan and Kissinger were practitioners of the latter. In between, the general thrust of American security policy was symmetrical and proceeded, Gaddis says, from the tenets put forth in National Security Countil (NSC) Directive 68. Already by the end of the Truman administration there was "very much a sense of direction without destination" (p. 126).

Symmetrical containment involved meeting the Soviet thrust at every point, a policy tied perhaps not incidentally to expansionist Keynesian economic objectives at home. As one might therefore expect, asymmetrical containment flourished best when the Republicans were watching over national finances. Asymmetrical containment had the great advantage, in theory, that it allowed American policymakers to choose their own ground in responding to Cold War situations, and in initiating various political counter-force strategies. What had been begun in NSC-68 reached its logical end in the Kennedy administration. Contrary to those historians who believe that Lyndon Johnson distorted Kennedy's Vietnam policy, Gaddis asserts that "Johnson followed the strategy of 'flexible response' faithfully in Vietnam, perhaps more so than Kennedy himself would have done" (p. 238).

The argument is persuasive. It is bolstered by the use of key documents cited from the Kennedy and Johnson libraries, most especially a 284-page draft statement by Walt W. Rostow, "Basic National Security Policy." In the Kennedy administration it all came together: Rostow, a founding father of modernization theory; Walter Heller, a sophisticated Keynesian; and Robert McNamara, the genius from Ford with a better idea

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for running the Pentagon. As Heller put it, henceforth there would of necessity be a place for "the political economist at the President's elbow" (p. 227).

At the beginning of the American build-up, McNamara informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "there is an unlimited appropriation available for the financing of aid to Vietnam" (p. 262). He could make that statement in an atmosphere that had been created, in the last analysis, not by a Russian military threat, but by the triumph of the Keynesian revolution. Gaddis draws the point together nicely in his epilogue: "To a remarkable degree, containment has been the product, not so much of what the Russians have done, or of what has happened elsewhere in the world, but of internal forces operating within the United States" (p. 357).

Despite this appraisal, however, Gaddis finds that containment in both forms was a remarkably successful policy that gave the postwar era peace and stability. It is to the author's credit that he has supplied us with material for reaching exactly the opposite conclusion.

The book rests on the assertion that Kennan, at the outset of the Cold War, and Kissinger, who is charged with limiting the damage after Vietnam, eschewed ideology and applied "realist" brakes on what threatened to become a runaway effort to straddle the globe. Whatever one might conclude about these two men, it will not do to dismiss their thoughts on Soviet power as non-ideological. Kennan, for example, always saw communism not as a product of grinding poverty, but of the basic Adam in humankind. The foreign policy conclusions drawn from such assumptions are quite different from those based on a simple evaluation of Russian military capability. Was Kissinger's concern that Chile under Salvador Allende would add to the Soviet Union's missile arsenal?

Gaddis has done his readers a great service in setting out the aims of each variant of the containment strategy and placing them alongside performance and results. The book will be a hit in the classroom with teachers and students alike as it simplifies complex issues and yet leaves plenty of room for argument. Gaddis has ably demonstrated that political scientists can no longer claim sole title to the appellation "defense intellectual." So completely acclimated to that world is he that he suggests future historians may criticize the Kissinger–Nixon years most because the Soviets surpassed America in strategic weaponry.

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The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America, and the State of Israel *by Harold Wilson. New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1982. 406 pp. $24.95.*

Those accustomed to thinking of the United States and its leaders as Israel's sole friends in the international community might find this book by Harold Wilson an important reminder that for much of twentieth-century Zionism, Palestine and the Jewish homeland have been a constant preoccupation of British domestic and foreign policy. Wilson points out that since the Balfour Declaration of 1917, his Labour Party has staunchly backed Jewish aspirations for a homeland. In fact, he states emphatically, "It would not have been possible for a political party to be more committed to a home for Jews in Palestine

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than was Labour" (p. 123). What emerges, then, is a tribute to the moderate Zionist and Israeli leaders and their courage, as well as an acknowledgment of the efforts of British leaders like Winston Churchill, Arthur Balfour, and Arthur Greech-Jones on behalf of the Israelis.

Wilson would be less than human, and certainly no politician, if he did not seize an occasional opportunity to knock his foes and even toot his own horn a bit. Both the knocking and tooting are handled with statesman-like restraint, save perhaps in his reaction to Menachem Begin, *Der Stern*, and other terrorists who claimed the lives of innocent Britons caught during the postwar years in the crossfire of what was for them an unwanted and untenable situation. He refers to the current Israeli prime minister as the "murderous Begin" and ruefully describes his impression of Israel under Begin's rule as "the unhappiest I have known" (p. 121). Among his own compatriots, Wilson faults Ernest Bevin for his defection from traditional Labour positions on Israel.

Scholars looking to Wilson for insight into British policy are likely to be disappointed. Save for an occasional personal appraisal of major British or world figures, the book offers little new in the way of information on the inner workings of the British government. Wilson has a subject without a thesis. Any reader not already familiar with the flow of events and the positions of major figures, factions, and nations will often be at a loss to sort through the explanation of the evolution of policy. Perhaps it should not surprise us that someone who labored so long in the center of the British and international political machinery should not have a more schematic or detached sense of their operations.

At one point Wilson remarks that "this work relates to Britain's political reactions to Israel and her neighbors and initiatives concerning them" (p. 362). That sentence, better than one a reviewer might compose, captures the opaque interpretive lens of the book. The author makes no pretense, however, at scholarly intent. The book has little academic apparatus and relies on a few monographs, memoirs, and official sources (for example, *Lords' Hansard* and the *Peel Commission Report of 1937*) for much of his material.

Wilson seems intent on closing out his long political involvement with Israel by expressing his admiration "for the courage and tenacity of the Israelis" (Preface). Undoubtedly, he hopes, too, that the book will strengthen support for Israel in the world community, while quietly urging Israelis to turn away from Begin and his theocratic obsessions, which threaten to undermine Israel by dividing it. Thus, this book is for partisans of Israel, not for scholars or readers eager to learn more about the history of British or American involvement in the Middle East.

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Sadat *by David Hirst and Irene Beeson. Winchester, Mass., Faber and Faber, 1982. 384 pp. $19.95.*

The unthinking adulation accorded Anwar Sadat in the West made this sharply critical political biography by two seasoned journalists a necessity. Those close enough to the Egyptian scene to be familiar with the exorbitant price Egypt eventually was made to pay

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for Sadat's peace, with the ruinous impact of his economic policies on the mass of Egyptians and with the authoritarian underside of his experiment in democracy, will welcome this myth-shattering indictment of the man and his regime.

The Sadat legend was built in no small part by the late president's quite spectacular skill in manipulating the media. It is perhaps appropriate, then, that in Hirst and Beeson's study the press has scored a first blow in a "corrective revolution" in the evaluation of Sadat. Yet it must also be said that we are very far in this volume from an authoritative study of the man and his era. The tone is too carping, the method too casual, the evidence offered for important judgments too slight. What we do have, however, is an exciting and provocative opening round in what will undoubtedly be a prolonged debate on the historical place of a great Arab ruler.

Sadat's media charm has obscurred the fact that he was in many ways an irritating personality. Nevertheless, too much is made by Hirst and Beeson of his dandyism and his penchant for the good life. The authors cast too small a net, and Sadat does break out of it. Two hundred and fifty pages that lay bare every shady political indiscretion and every personal vanity still do not diminish the drama of Anwar Sadat addressing the Israeli Knesset. Chapter Six, chronicling the pilgrimage to Jerusalem in November 1977, involuntarily recreates the high drama that made of Sadat a world figure. Even in these heavily ironic pages Sadat *does* appear for these brief moments as "a prince of peace" in "the lion's den" (pp. 272 and 264). Later there was disillusionment as Egyptians watched the Begin government drain the comprehensive peace of all content. Despite this, the shiver of that first excitement was genuine and left its mark on a long-suffering Egyptian people whose aching for peace was expressed by Sadat. The rhetoric of the book is simply too trivializing for so large a figure.

A more basic shortcoming of this engrossing volume is the tendency to engage in highly entertaining, often plausibly argued but essentially unsupported psychologizing. This is a problem of both method and evidence. The study is based on Sadat's public record of words and deeds, yet it aims to go beyond an analysis of that record. The authors judge that, given the weakness of Egyptian political institutions, the personality dimension of their story is often paramount. Aside from a heavy and appropriate reliance on the two unfortunately contradictory Sadat autobiographies, however, there is no sign of a systematic effort to reconstruct Sadat's sense of his situation and his own intentions in it. It is simply not convincing to infer from the public record someone's subjective intention, as the authors do so colorfully.

The tendency to attribute the worst to Sadat is not helpful on some troubling and important puzzles of the Sadat era. The authors argue that "the betrayal of the Palestinians" (p. 321) was understood by Sadat to be built into Camp David and the subsequent peace treaty. Yet there is hard evidence unconsidered here for a quite different reading. The case can be made that Sadat thought he had firm American promises that would ensure the protection of his commitment to the Palestinians. Carter, we know, did promise Sadat both that something real would be done for the Palestinians and that the United States would deliver moderate Arab support for the Camp David process. Had those promises been kept, the fate of Camp David (and the fate of Sadat, too) might well have been

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different. The prejudging of Sadat by the authors makes it unnecessary to consider such a case.

Hirst and Beeson know the Arab world and they know Egypt. Their harsh but inconclusively argued evaluation of Sadat does bring to the Western reader an assessment widespread in the Arab world and among opposition currents in Egypt. And that is an important contribution.

RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER
Williams College and the American University in Cairo

Mussolini *by Denis Mack Smith. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982. 429 pp. $20.00.*

Mussolini *by Anthony James Joes. New York, Franklin Watts, 1982. 405 pp. $18.95.*

Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War *by MacGregor Knox. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 385 pp. $29.50.*

These three volumes raise long-debated issues about the writing of history. Should the model be Thucydides, whose adherence to narration would leave history's "lessons" to the good judgment of the reader? Or should the guide be Herodotus, who sought as much to entertain as to inform? Denis Mack Smith hews to the first approach, disarming the reader with the warning that his is strictly a narrative biography. Anthony Joes assays the second approach, with infelicitous results. His humor is forced; his effort to give Fascism a human face seems perverse; and his fascination with Mussolini's sexual escapades borders on the prurient. MacGregor Knox takes a middle course. His exhausting, day-by-day account of 18 months of Mussolini's catastrophic diplomatic and military leadership is now and then relieved by ad hoc interpretations, which lack coherence, however, and provide unsatisfying answers to very perplexing problems.

One might argue that the writer's approach doesn't really matter. The subject of these biographical studies is compelling. We are dealing, after all, with a complex, flamboyant, arresting man who set in motion sometimes cataclysmic events that more than any others have imprinted this century's politics. These volumes contain something for everyone. Those who see Mussolini as a poseur, a brute, or a buffoon will feel vindicated, as will those who believe that, human frailties aside, this angry journalist from the Romagna was touched with genius. Nor will the partisans of psychohistory be disappointed. Mack Smith in particular has sifted the scant evidence on the private life of this very private man, and he finds it loveless and friendless. He considers Mussolini's vaunted achievements overblown, his industry and stamina questionable, his passions tumultuous, his instincts acute but contradictory, his relationships with women compulsive, his ambitions prodigious, and his judgments flawed.

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But of course the writer's approach matters very much indeed, in that facts do not walk on two legs and speak for themselves, and strict narration, assuming it were possible, would be impossibly boring. Joes intends his "portrait" of Mussolini to cast the dictator in a better light. Mack Smith and Knox consider the man an arrogant, brutal improviser, and they lose few opportunities to heap scorn and ridicule upon him. Mussolini is an easy target for the latter. Mack Smith and Knox remind us that the Duce trusted few of his associates and believed that he could run the military and civil bureaucracies all by himself. Consumed by the desire to create the "Third Rome," he led his country from one disaster to another—in Albania, Greece, North Africa, and, finally, in France. Facing unexpected adversity in Albania, he raged against his incompetent Fascist subordinates by ordering those under 45 to the war front, admonishing them not to take along their servants. As a declining dictator, he callously permitted, indeed he compelled, the execution of Galeazzo Ciano, his son-in-law, on dubious charges of treason. At one moment of acute insight, he was able to describe Nazi Germany as a racialist insane asylum peopled by degenerates; at another he launched Fascism's own programs, which were immensely more vicious than apologists like Joes would have us believe. This man was clearly a misanthrope who, in his public functions, changed roles and direction so often it seems impossible, even today, fully to lay bare his motivations and character.

Yet why should one wish to do this at all unless to relate Mussolini in some persuasive way to the Fascist movement and the Fascist state? Did Mussolini organize the Fascist party single-handedly? One might easily infer this from Mack Smith's discussion. Did government really stand still when the Duce was absent from Rome? This is either highly unlikely, or it signals nothing more than the kind of indecision and paralysis in the face of difficult decisions that have characterized Italian government before, during, and after Fascism. Was Mussolini, as Mack Smith claims, just a circus performer whose propagandistic manipulations perplexed more than persuaded the Italians? Or was he, rather, a shrewd innovator who anticipated the instrumental use to which aspiring and established politicians everywhere today put the apparatus of mass communications?

All three of these authors, and Knox in minute and often startling detail, spell out how ill-served was Mussolini by those who occupied high places in the regime. Evidently, and to a striking degree especially in the military, promotion was based on seniority. Throughout the civil and military bureaucracies, we find men of infinite capacity who intrigue, dissemble, procrastinate, escape responsibility, and, above all, frustrate and defeat their leader. Eighteen years after the march on Rome, Mussolini's generals and admirals could get away with lying to him about the state of military preparedness. Pietro Badoglio and Rodolfo Graziani, one way or another and sometimes flatly, often disobeyed direct orders from the Duce. What kind of a dictatorship was that! What does all of this evidence tell us about the prototype of the so-called totalitarian state? If Mussolini, despite his best efforts, failed to bend the Church, the monarchy, the industrialists, the bureaucrats, and the military to his and the Fascist party's will, what are the more basic and interesting inferences that we might draw from this experience?

And what about economics? Whatever else may have happened to Italy under Fascism and however faulty and ill-considered may have been the regime's preparation for war, the country surely did not stand still economically. Important economic transformations,

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beyond the draining of the Pontine marshes, were wrought under Mussolini's leadership, but one searches these pages in vain for any serious commentary concerning them. In the best of these three volumes, Mack Smith devotes about seven pages to economics, and these are limited to Mussolini's ill-fated dismissal of Alberto De'Stefani, and to the regime's manipulation of economic data. Mussolini may not have gained full control of the Confindustria and the industrialists, but he surely worked with them hand-in-glove to bring about a considerable degree of economic modernization.

Narrative history, undisciplined by explicit theory, places too great a burden of good judgment on the reader. Even worse, it leaves somewhat to chance the discernment of what might be the writer's underlying motives in choosing and arraying the evidence reported. Particularly in the hands of someone like Mack Smith, who has often written so insightfully about modern Italy, the reader would have been better served by a biography that explicitly tied the evidence about Mussolini to our deeper concerns regarding the kind of political regime he helped to invent.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

The Superpowers and Regional Tensions: The USSR, the United States, and Europe *by William E. Griffith. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 135 pp. $18.95.*

The aim of this book, according to the author, is "to analyze the interaction between Soviet-U.S. bilateral relations and European problems" (p. vii). The book deals, in fact, far more extensively with European problems than with the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The author tends to focus either on strains between the United States and its West European allies or on the instability and problems that afflict the USSR and Eastern Europe. The actual interaction between the superpowers and the specific effect of European problems on that interaction receive less attention than the title and preface lead the reader to expect.

The first two chapters are concerned with such problems as arms control, the decline of détente, and divergences between U.S. and West European foreign and defense policies. These two chapters, particularly the second, constitute the best portion of the book. Here the author manages to keep the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship constantly in view as the background against which European problems are played out. His treatment of the issue of long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF), perhaps the most urgent of all the problems discussed in the book, is particularly cogent and thoughtful.

The remaining five chapters of the book are devoted to five separate subjects: economics and the energy crisis; dissidence in the USSR and Eastern Europe; Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism in Western Europe; the Polish crisis; and the crisis of the Atlantic Alliance. These chapters tend to treat U.S.-Soviet relations only marginally. The author's analysis of the Polish crisis, for example, is quite well informed and detailed, but it hardly mentions U.S. policy towards Poland or towards the prospect of Soviet intervention in Poland. Similarly, Chapter 4 promises to analyze "the effect of dissidence

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upon Soviet–U.S. relations in general and in Europe in particular" (p. 67), but it is largely a discussion of the origins and nature of dissidence as a domestic phenomenon, with only a few sentences devoted to U.S.–Soviet relations.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of the book is that it lacks a well-developed theme or central argument. It is instead a collection of rather disparate assertions and descriptions. Though the author's assertions are generally sound and occasionally quite lively and provocative, the book would have profited greatly had he taken a little more time to develop each chapter and to draw together the numerous points he makes into well-defined conclusions. This weakness is particularly evident in the chapters on economic problems and on dissidence, both of which lack any kind of focused argument or concluding analysis. The problem may be that the author attempts to treat an incredibly large number of issues in an insufficiently long space—only 110 pages of actual text. While it is refreshing to see a small book on a vast subject, the tendency being just the opposite, Griffith's work might have been considerably improved by the addition of a few dozen pages, devoted largely to synthesis and conclusion.

Despite its flaws, the book merits attention from anyone interested in the main foreign policy issues of contemporary European politics. Because it focuses heavily on recent events, the book is very relevant to the current debate on issues such as Poland or the pipeline dispute. The writer's grasp of European affairs is considerable, and the breadth of his perspective makes for stimulating reading throughout.

BRUCE D. PORTER
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

The Imperious Economy *by David P. Calleo. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982. 265 pp. $17.50.*

This book chronicles the decline of the American empire of productivity and power. According to David P. Calleo, the decline began in the last years of the Eisenhower administration, when ambitious foreign aid and military programs, together with large overseas investments by American firms, strapped the United States with a burdensome payments deficit that threatened to destabilize the liberal international system the Americans had created. President Kennedy's efforts to cope with this deficit proved ineffectual and contradictory. He was unwilling to reduce foreign aid and military expenditures, curtail private overseas investment, or abandon his Keynesian plans for domestic expansion. Instead, by the end of the 1960s, the cost of the Vietnam war and of the New Frontier–Great Society programs had led to a steady inflation that wrecked hopes for domestic growth and world stability. Nixon responded by reducing social expenditures, manipulating interest rates, and raising taxes, but the result was a stagflation that posed unacceptable political risks. Following the Republican party setback in the 1970 elections, Nixon reversed course, reinflated the economy, and thus brought on a major dollar crisis in world markets. Faced with a choice between deflation at home or devaluation abroad,

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he opted for the latter in a policy that replaced the Bretton Woods system with a wreckless and rapacious American mercantilism.

Floating the dollar seemed to permit the Nixon administration and its successors to manage the payments deficit without abandoning their expansive domestic policies. It permitted increasingly inefficient American firms to compete in international markets and forced friend and foe alike to subsidize America's prosperity, the decline of its productivity, and the cost of its global commitments. It inflicted inflation on the world economy and allowed American leaders to escape the need for those internal adjustments that alone could boost productivity and lead to domestic and worldwide stability. It was a strategy, moreover, that America imposed on the world less by the force of its faltering economic power than by the political and military leverage it exerted over allied countries still dependent on the United States for protection.

In Calleo's view no administration, from Kennedy to Reagan, has been willing to make the important adjustments needed to revive productivity and halt inflation. They have been reluctant to live within limited resources at home or to curtail the aid and military programs that have supported America's imperial role in the postwar era. Yet such adjustments are clearly inevitable, if only because the success of American policy in revitalizing Europe and Japan has created a more pluralistic world in which major allies are no longer willing to accept American economic hegemony and political leadership at the expense of their own interests.

Calleo rightly debunks as gimmickry all previous policy prescriptions for dealing with the American economic crisis, as well as the convenient rationalizations that professional economists have invented to justify each flawed initiative. But his own book is deficient in recommendations. In the end, Calleo calls for a new American corporatism founded on enlightened action and cooperation by the federal government and private institutions, especially big business and organized labor. Yet he does so without fully appreciating the dangers inherent in such a centralization of power and without persuading the reader that new authorities will be more responsible than their predecessors. Indeed, one could argue, as some historians have, that something like a corporatist system has been emerging in the United States since the turn of the century and that Calleo's recommendation amounts not so much to a new institutional framework for economic planning and coordination, but to a shift of power from private to public institutions within an existing framework. This indeed may happen, especially if current policies, which point in the opposite direction, should fail to arrest the American decline. If it happens, will the results really amount to much more than another New Deal?

MICHAEL J. HOGAN
Miami University, Ohio

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Foreign Policy Making in Times of Crisis *by John R. Oneal. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1982. 358 pp. $27.50.*

With the twentieth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis and the resurgence of concern about the risks of nuclear war, crisis management has resurfaced as a central focus of scholars and policymakers. Several new pieces on the subject have already been produced and several more are on the way. Many of these pieces tread familiar territory—retelling history, gaming U.S.-Soviet conflicts, or describing the crisis decision-making milieu. Some, however, push the argument in important new directions. John R. Oneal's effort clearly belongs in this category. Rich in evidence and insight, it sheds some much-needed light on a well-researched but still poorly understood subject.

Focusing his analysis on three crises from the Truman years, Oneal's purpose is twofold: first, to clarify the impact of international crises on "the structure, process, and content of foreign policymaking" and second, to identify ways in which crisis decision-making can be conducted "to increase the likelihood [of] effective response," that is, of advancing national interests while avoiding war (p. 5). On both counts, he is largely successful. Unfortunately, this success is clouded by a somewhat labyrinthine presentation. Moving between and among the various levels of Oneal's analysis—his "phases," "functions," "system states," and "dimensions"—is not an easy task. Indeed, at times, the book's analytic structure simply gets in the way, a problem compounded by the amount and diversity of information Oneal attempts to synthesize. In the process, "what's important" is often lost, or at the very least, not as sharply stated as it could be.

But that is largely quibbling. With a small dose of patience, one quickly discovers that much of what Oneal has to say is, in fact, very important and deserves serious consideration. First, the book provides a fresh look at three critical events of the early Cold War era. Firmly in control of his sources, Oneal uncovers new material and offers several interesting insights on the evolution of America's postwar Soviet policy, its process as well as its content. Second, despite its density, Oneal's "phase model" seems a useful frame within which to view the development of foreign crises. His three crisis phases (destabilization, decision and response, and restabilization), and the several policy functions attached to each, appear quite close to the mark. Policymakers as well as analysts should find them of interest. Third, Oneal makes a reasoned and compelling intervention in the debate over bureaucratic politics and presidential power. Yes, he argues, presidential action is limited by organizational procedure and delegated authority. But, once mobilized, the president is clearly first among equals. The book's analysis of the changes within Truman's inner circle provides helpful evidence.

Finally, Oneal offers a number of important lessons for policymakers. His key point may well be this: that the most successful examples of crisis management are those that turn problems into opportunities. The ultimate result of the U.S. response to the Greek Civil War is a case in point. Playing "an instrumental role in alerting the Truman administration to the vast economic needs of the European nations in general," the crisis catalyzed a series of innovative and ultimately enormously successful initiatives—the Marshall Plan, the Military Defense Assistance Program, and Point Four (p. 310). Creative leaders, Oneal stresses, are always on the lookout for such circumstances; they constantly ask themselves: "What is the opportunity in this situation?"

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In this and the book's many other lessons resides, of course, a large measure of common sense. What Oneal contributes is much-needed evidence and analysis. This volume has laid a solid foundation on which, one hopes, others will now build.

PAUL ZIGMAN
Harvard University

Economists in Government: An International Comparative Study *edited by A. W. Coats. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1982. 365 pp. $19.75.*

This collection of essays seeks to understand the roles of economists in modern governments by defining the functions, professional standards, and political and bureaucratic environments in which they work. It is an ambitious project, not least because there is no generally accepted definition of an "economist." (The Japanese government, for example, employs no professional economists; indeed, there is no word in Japanese corresponding to "economist.") Nevertheless, in a dozen crisply written and well-documented essays examining a broad range of governments, we learn that those who specialize in analyzing and forecasting prospective changes in supply and demand have come to play an increasingly important role in the processes of government since World War II. Particularly in Brazil, Hungary, and India, these specialists have led the process of professionalization in government. Their average level of technique and analytic rigor has risen markedly over the period, spurred largely by American methods and standards of graduate education. They have had increasing influence in the middle and upper ranks of government, especially with regard to agriculture, trade, transportation, and labor policies, and at the highest ranks of government, in fashioning macroeconomic policies.

Of the nations surveyed, the influence of these specialists has been most dramatic in Norway, Brazil (since 1965), and Hungary (since 1968); they have had considerable influence in Australia, Israel, and India. Their influence in the United States, Japan, and Britain is large but—for a variety of reasons—more difficult to measure, and they have had comparatively little influence in Italy. As the influence of these specialists has grown in many nations, their techniques have become steadily more sophisticated: Their tools now include econometric forecasting and model-building, sophisticated methods of cost-benefit analysis, and planned program budgeting systems.

None of this is very startling. It confirms casual observation: an extraordinary number of issues entailing value judgments about social justice or a nation's collective quality of life are now presented as questions of "economic policy" to be debated with graphs and numbers. Policy analysts, typically applying microeconomic principles, now swarm over capital cities, their studies filling the briefcases of bureaucrats, lawyers, and lobbyists.

But what does it all mean? Precisely why are economists now in greater demand? Why do political and bureaucratic actors feel that they need them? Does the increased presence and visibility of economists have anything to do with a special kind of legitimacy they confer upon decision-making processes—processes that can no longer rely on more traditional sources of political legitimacy, that is, democratic representation? Are analytic and economic tools for discerning the "public interest" gradually displacing political and

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bureaucratic means of defining and discovering the public good? If so, is this a positive development?

Unfortunately, the authors offer no insights into these larger issues of the impact of economics upon the authority and legitimacy of modern governments. Nor do they examine in detail the policymaking process, revealing the precise blend of data-gathering, forecasting, analyzing, political bargaining, and litigation that has come to characterize it in all its incarnations. These omissions do not detract from the important contribution of these essays to a subject which has received too little scholarly attention in the past. Nevertheless, when such a broader frame of reference is absent, it is difficult to know how much significance to attach to the growing numbers of economic analysts in and around government, and to their ever more prodigious offerings. The book suggests a set of important questions about the nature of government, technical knowledge, scientific reasoning, and sources of legitimacy; it leaves to others the task of answering them.

ROBERT B. REICH
Harvard University

Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961 *by Burton I. Kaufman. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 279 pp. $25.00.*

The purposes of this book are to trace the historical evolution of United States international trade and foreign aid policies during the Eisenhower years, assess Eisenhower's leadership qualities, and evaluate the success of the particular trade and foreign aid programs undertaken. The primary sources used were Eisenhower's presidential and other papers and records available in the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. The book is organized chronologically into ten substantive chapters. These begin in 1953–54 when the Eisenhower administration first emphasized policies designed to expand trade and foster private investment in less developed countries (LDCs). There was a shift in policies thereafter that recognized the need for public lending and grants to LDCs. But it was difficult to convince Congress to appropriate large sums strictly for aid because of domestic budgetary pressures, the opposition of key congressional leaders, and especially the perceived threat of increased Soviet expansionism beginning in 1955–56.

Burton notes and documents Eisenhower's "virulent" anti-Communism and the resulting foreign policy emphasis on mutual security assistance. This meant that the bulk of U.S. foreign aid consisted of military transfers to particular LDCs that were considered especially vulnerable to Soviet initiatives and that economic aid was to be extended with security and Western ideological objectives in mind. There were important counterpressures at work, however, from within the Eisenhower administration itself, from liberal and internationally minded members of Congress, and from influential members of the academic and business communities. It is noteworthy in this connection that important steps were taken by the Eisenhower administration to establish the International Development Authority for the purpose of making "soft" loans under World

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Bank auspices and to create a Development Loan Fund with a similar function as the focal point of the U.S. bilateral aid program. In addition, special regional measures were introduced to deal with development and related needs in Latin America.

While Burton concludes that Eisenhower was, in fact, a cogent and active leaders in world affairs and in the design of U.S. foreign economic policy, he faults Eisenhower for his inability to get Congress to appropriate large sums for development assistance compared to what was spent on the Marshall Plan; for his preoccupation with Soviet expansionism and therefore his failure to consider the key links between internal social and political reform and economic growth in LDCs; and, more generally, for his failure to achieve a world order based upon security and stability. It seems to this reviewer that, in judging Eisenhower's performance, Burton is imposing standards that are perhaps too lofty and maybe inappropriate. It has become increasingly clear that the financial requirements of economic development are truly vast, in terms of their magnitude and time dimension, and especially that the domestic policies that the LDCs themselves follow may be crucial to the outcome. Thus, the LDCs with the best economic performance since the 1950s are those that have adopted liberal and export-oriented development strategies and have come to rely increasingly on borrowing from private financial markets and foreign direct investment. In this respect, trade *not* aid, which was the original premise of the Eisenhower administration, has been vindicated.

Burton devotes considerable space to Eisenhower's trade policies, which in retrospect either catered somewhat to protectionist interests in manufacturing or were an adjunct of domestic agricultural price supports. Even so, the basic thrust towards freer trade was maintained, and there was sufficient momentum to achieve significant liberalization in the Kennedy–Johnson administrations in the 1960s. The world economy has since been buffeted by two oil shocks in the 1970s, and disturbing signs of a retreat into increased protectionism in the United States and elsewhere are now evident. One hopes the major industrialized countries will not succumb to protectionism, for this would do irreparable damage not only to themselves but to the developing countries as well.

ROBERT M. STERN
University of Michigan

Political Tolerance and American Democracy *by John L. Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1982. 278 pp. $25.00.*

This is a major addition to a line of research initiated by Samuel Stouffer in *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (1955). The volume under review and the accompanying spate of journal articles by the same research team are causing some fundamental rethinking about the nature of political tolerance and the conditions that encourage or discourage it.

Political tolerance, according to Sullivan and associates, consists of the willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes. Over the years, dozens of studies

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have been undertaken that purport to describe how politically tolerant or intolerant Americans are and what makes them more or less so. What is the rationale for another such study? In measuring political tolerance, most researchers have focused on people's expressed willingness to extend civil liberties to members of certain leftist-oriented groups. This, the authors argue persuasively, simply will not do. If, for example, Jews prove to be more willing than others to accord leftists their rights, does this really mean that Jews are more tolerant, or are they simply less antipathetic to the left? The targets of intolerance may vary from person to person and from era to era, and unless one takes this into account when measuring political tolerance, one runs the risk of misstating any trends in tolerance that may be occurring and incorrectly specifying the factors that lead to greater tolerance.

Based on his conceptual-methodological critique of prior studies, Sullivan and his colleagues permitted respondents in their surveys to select their own target groups by indicating which of a large and diverse set of groups they liked least, the assumption being that the group that is liked least will be tolerated least. Analysis based on this "content-controlled" measure of tolerance suggests, *inter alia*, that the American public is much less tolerant than has commonly been assumed; that tolerance has increased since the 1950s by precious little, if at all; and that people tend to select target groups from whom they differ most (rightists pick on leftists, blacks on Klansmen, and so on). It further suggests that the best predictors of tolerance are perceived threats from target groups, self-esteem, and dogmatism and that level of education has very little impact on tolerance, in stark contrast to the findings of most prior studies.

When *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* is good, it is very, very good, but some surprisingly fundamental problems keep the volume from being consistently good. Most importantly, when Sullivan and associates attempt to determine whether tolerance has actually risen since the 1950s, they run headlong into a problem: they are comparing responses to one set of questions from the mid-1950s and a different set of questions from the late 1970s. They recognize this problem and attempt to take it into account, but in my view the question wording differences are insuperable. Nor do the authors pay the same careful attention to the rights accorded members of the target groups as they devote to the identities of the target groups themselves. Further, in measuring tolerance, one would surely want to consider the impact of different situational factors that are left undefined in the "content-controlled" items. For example, is the suspension of a group's rights deemed necessary to maintain public order or is it to be endorsed as a general practice? These and other lapses mean that this study is only a turning point, not the end point, in the quest for a better understanding of political tolerance in the United States. Despite its flaws, this is an important contribution that will play a central role in shaping future research on political tolerance.

LEE SIGELMAN
University of Kentucky

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America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth *by Alan Wolfe. New York, Pantheon Books, 1981. 293 pp. $16.50.*

Alan Wolfe's thesis is that American domestic and international politics after World War II consisted of a "centrist crusade for [economic] growth"(p. 90), which permitted American politicians to avoid making hard political choices between traditional conservatism's passion for free markets and isolationism, on the one hand, and liberalism's concern for social justice and equality, on the other. The government's "fixation on economic and imperial conquest . . . undermined . . . the capacity of either major party or dominant set of ideas to establish goals and an agenda for reaching them" (p. 230). This happened in the 1950s when the earlier blending of "conservatism and reform" disappeared and the idea emerged that expanding the economy would provide social justice "without tampering with profit and privilege" (p. 92). Five themes are discussed: "counter-Keynesianism; urban growth dynamics; overseas expansion; nationalistic internationalism; and aid to the Third World" (p. 203). In his discussion of these themes, Wolfe attempts to show that in place of political debate and decision there emerged a "pro-growth, centrist, nonideological program" (p. 180). In the international field, growth "could unite the center in the same way that public works projects, tax cuts, military ventures, and other features of the pro-growth coalition had already done" (p. 184).

Growth politics eventually produced a political stalemate, however, as well as economic and social problems, which were costly in four senses. First, "fiscal irresponsibility," or growing government spending created more inflation and balance of payments problems (p. 96). Second, "ideological eclecticism" involved the problem of finding consistent political justifications that could sustain the growth coalition when the economy finally ran out of steam (p. 96). Third, "planning difficulties" led the government to throw good money after bad to solve various social problems (p. 96). Fourth, "induced inequalities" consisted of the process whereby domestic and foreign policies were emptied of reform contents to make them acceptable to "conservatives, military, and businessmen" (p. 171).

The weaknesses of this book are obvious. There is little or no sociological or economic analysis underpinning Wolfe's political analysis. Explanations offered for both the sources and limits of economic growth are inadequate (for example, government spending and inflation, respectively). Little or no mention is made of changes in the international division of labor since the war, new capital movements, or the internationalization of production, all of which had profound effects on social class composition and the economy, hence on American politics. A related points is Wolfe's treatment of Keynesianism. He claims that Keynesian policies were never really tried; yet he speaks throughout of "macro-economic stimulation" and "tax cuts" and refers to texts which analyze "military Keynesianism." Keynesianism as the theory of socializing investment decisions has never been tried, but Wolfe is silent on this issue. Wolfe also ignores reform movements and their victories and defeats at local, county, and state government levels, where most "new social movement" and "populist" action takes place. Further, Wolfe's theory of "induced inequality" ignores capitalist inequality as being created by the production process itself; any attack on inequality must be an attack on capitalist control of

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production. In fact, Wolfe neglects the whole issue of commodity production, especially that the "politics of growth" meant the political imposition of work, that is, the domination of labor, and hence, it was a capitalist policy. Last but not least, Wolfe ignores previous work on "growth politics" in this country, especially Paul Baran's *Political Economy of Growth*, published over 25 years ago, which was one of the first postwar books to argue that the "politics of growth" was a nonideological "universal solvent."

JAMES O'CONNOR
University of California, Santa Cruz

Taking Care of the Law *by Griffin B. Bell with Ronald J. Ostrom. New York, William Morrow and Co., 1982. 254 pp. $13.50.*

Next to former presidents themselves, former cabinet members have increasingly been pursued by publishers in search of memoirs or have found it relatively easy to find a publisher for their recollections. Few of these retrospective volumes rise to the level of Dean Acheson's *Present at the Creation*; few are as revealing as Harold Ickes's *Secret Diaries*. All of them tend to stress the role of the autobiographical writer in past events. Griffin Bell, attorney general for a major part of the Carter administration, has produced a book that is both more and less than the conventional cabinet member's memoir.

Bell discusses a number of events in which he was involved as attorney general, from his confirmation hearing ("it's like being called before Judge Roy Bean in the law west of the Pecos," p. 65) to his designation, after he had returned to the private practice of law, to head the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("no sooner had I agreed to accept the post, then the invasion of my privacy began anew," p. 71). A number of the episodes he so relates offer information or insights not previously available.

The book, however, is neither a chronology of Griffin Bell as attorney general of the United States nor a history of the Department of Justice under his stewardship. It is, in the main, an exposition of Bell's views of the American governmental system's ills in our times.

Bell reveals himself as an old-style liberal and a staunch believer in the importance of the rule of law. What he has to say—about the bureaucracy, excessive regulation, the affinities of congressional subcommittees and the agencies they nominally control, and the proliferation of litigation—will not strike any well-read reader as novel. Yet Bell writes as colorfully as he speaks, and every point he makes is appropriately illustrated from his own experience as a member of the Carter administration.

Thus, while any reader of Richard Fenno's study of the cabinet is aware of the limited usefulness of formal cabinet meetings, Bell's description of them as "adult Show-and-Tell" (p. 45) is a phrase that deserves to make it into the textbooks. Similar trenchant language occurs on page after page and adds to the book's readability.

The chapters on intelligence activities and crime control are somewhat less colorful than the rest. Bell acknowledges that the intelligence chapters were reviewed by the pres-

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ent attorney general and his staff (p. 11), and it may be that this fact cramped Bell's style. These chapters do not carry the verve of the discussion of, for example, department–White House staff relationships in his first chapter ("What Went Wrong").

The final chapter ("Reforming Government") restates previous proposals made by Bell, such as the six-year presidential term. In light of the nine chapters that precede, they not only make sense but also mark Bell as a thoughtful and dedicated citizen of the republic.

FRANCIS H. HELLER
University of Kansas

The Speculator: Bernard M. Baruch in Washington, 1917–1965 *by Jordan A. Schwarz. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1981. 679 pp. $27.50.*

Bernard Baruch has been severely criticized by some academics. John K. Galbraith considered him "magnificently fraudulent," and Paul Samuelson wrote: "Barney Baruch was always, to insiders, a light-weight authority" (p. 576). Nevertheless, many important public figures from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower, as well as historians of twentieth-century America, thought highly of Baruch's abilities as an economic analyst of national and world affairs, especially in times of war, and have valued his political support, even though some have resented the public reputation he very skillfully built up for himself as a supreme oracle on public affairs.

In 1957 Margaret Coit had written with great verve and color the first full biography of Baruch based on his personal papers. She deserves more generous credit for her pioneer research and analysis than Schwarz gives her. Yet there is no doubt that his biography will be the definitive study of Baruch for a long time. The author has explored some 80 manuscript collections, 10 Columbia University oral histories, 22 unpublished doctoral theses, and almost all of the pertinent secondary authorities. The result is a highly competent, well-written biography that presents Baruch candidly, with all his virtues and faults given in full detail. Coit's book is fuller on Baruch's early life; Schwarz's fuller on Baruch's life from 1917 on. Schwarz has a greater command of economics and political science than Coit had and is more critical of Baruch's failings than Coit (often justly so). On occasion, however, he seems carping and even unjust to his subject, perhaps because he aligns himself with the debunking school of historians. As one example: Schwarz criticizes Baruch's record as a student at City College of New York (p. 13), but Coit informs us that Baruch was fifteenth in a class of 50 with an average grade of 83 for his entire college course. Moreover, Schwarz, though aware of various experts' judgments on critical economic issues, often does not get down to the bedrock of the competing economic theories involved.

Nevertheless, historians, economists, and political scientists will benefit from the many newly unearthed facts and insights that the author gives on Baruch's rise from his career as a Wall Street speculator to that of an important adviser to President Wilson, chairman of the War Industries Board, and participant in the Versailles Peace Conference. This

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period represented the height of Baruch's fame and accomplishments in public life. From the 1920s on, he succeeded, in part through his political influence with Southerners in Congress, in becoming one of many advisers to Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Lyndon Johnson, but never achieved the power, office, and personal satisfaction he had earlier derived from his personal relations with Wilson. For a self-made millionaire, he was more socially conscious than the great majority of the upper classes. Yet he never embraced the high hopes for major social reconstruction that the champions of the New Deal or the New Freedom cherished. His legacy was a profound concern for American national security, for adequate military preparation in time of peace, and for the desirability of avoiding inflation through the proper economic stabilization measures. He also saw as early as 1946 the need for international control of nuclear weapons and the wisdom of trying this to a program for general disarmament, embracing conventional weapons as well as atomic.

This is so good a book that it seems ungracious to voice regrets over certain omissions of topics the reviewer would like to have explored. Baruch's vision of economic civilization might have been strengthened by references to the work by Irving Fisher of Yale on the subject. Baruch's opposition to anti-trust and his advocacy of mergers and cartels might have been examined with more attention to the opposing views not only of Justice Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, but also those of Walton Hamilton, Thurman Arnold, and the University of Chicago school. Baruch's ambiguous position on Judaism and Zionism might have been clarified by reference to the work of Horace M. Kallen on cultural pluralism. Finally, Baruch's views of desirable economic policies during the New Deal might have been seen in greater depth and contrasted with an explicit evaluation of the views of J. M. Keynes himself as against his disciples.

Nevertheless, one's final judgment on this book is that it is an important and illuminating biography for which all scholars will be grateful.

SIDNEY RATNER
Rutgers University

U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle *by A. Doak Barnett. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 70 pp. $5.95.*

When Doak Barnett speaks, people listen—which adds up to one huge responsibility. Barnett is the single most respected American analyst of Chinese foreign policy. A generation of American statesmen concerned with China has read his books and has sought and respected his advice. A generation of Chinese statesmen has followed his work carefully, aware that his prescriptions will likely become American policy.

In this extended essay, Barnett functions as a mediator, telling American elites what the United States should do and why, and warning his Chinese audience of the limits of American flexibility. He does not hesitate to tell both sides what is good for them and how they must move from the positions with which they began negotiations in 1982. When he wrote in spring 1982, the carefully wrought Chinese-American relationship of

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the previous decade was seriously threatened by Reagan's inept management of the Taiwan issue and by increasing signs of Chinese inflexibility. Fortunately, both sides accepted Barnett's formula and reached an accord on 17 August 1982, staving off disaster until Reagan is beguiled again by the Taiwan bloc.

Barnett argues persuasively that the Chinese-American détente of the 1970s has had a favorable impact on American interests in East Asia and elsewhere, despite increased Soviet fears and activity in East Asia. American forces committed to the containment of China during the 1950s and 1960s were free for deployment to the Persian Gulf or anywhere else they might be needed, while Soviet forces otherwise available in Europe were marshalled along China's borders.

Important though it may be, the relationship between China and the United States is "fundamentally fragile" because of unresolved differences over Taiwan. Barnett quickly and deftly outlines the history of the problem beginning with the American decision to disengage and allow a communist takeover of the island—a decision reached in 1949 and reversed less than a year later as a result of the war in Korea. The American involvement deepened in the 1950s, in part because of Beijing's use of military pressure in 1954 and 1958. Since 1958, however, the People's Republic has stressed peaceful means of achieving reunification. In 1978, the crucial issue in the negotiation between the Carter administration and the Beijing authorities over "normalization" was the matter of arms sales to Taiwan. Agreement was never reached. Nonetheless, the Chinese agreed to establish formal diplomatic relations with the United States. Carter's staff offered a one-year moratorium on sales and it is likely that the Chinese were led to expect substantial progress on the issue.

Carter and his advisers underestimated the congressional reaction as displayed in the Taiwan Relations Act. They tried to reassure the Chinese by noting the discretionary power the president had in implementing the act. Then, not too many months later, Carter and his group were gone. In their places were people commited to "upgrading" relations with Taiwan. The Chinese watched with mounting apprehension as the struggle for Reagan's mind unfolded. Confidence in the American connection faded in Beijing.

Barnett notes that in the last months of 1981 and early in 1982 the People's Republic became increasingly critical of the United States and complained of American intervention in Chinese affairs, of American arrogance, and of America as a superpower like the Soviet Union, seeking hegemony. As Reagan wrestled with the decision as to whether to sell the FX fighter plane to Taipei, the Chinese prepared to downgrade relations with the United States, as they had with the Netherlands in a similar context. Offers by the United States to sell arms to the People's Republic were rejected as a bribe designed to facilitate Beijing's acceptance of the sale of arms to Taiwan. Those sales had to stop, and a date had to be set for termination. China would settle for no less.

By spring 1982, Alexander Haig and others had won the battle in the White House. Taipei did not get the planes it wanted. Conciliatory missions and messages issued forth from Washington to Beijing, but Chinese leaders would not budge—until August, when the Barnett formula prevailed. Beijing accepted American disavowal of any "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" plan and assurances that arms sales would never exceed current levels in quality or quantity and, in fact, would be reduced gradually. The Chinese

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are not satisfied, but the differences have been papered over once again. The Reagan administration avoided a serious crisis in the relationship but has not and probably cannot regain the level of mutual confidence it inherited.

As for arms sales or a more intensive military relationship with the People's Republic, Barnett is eminently sensible. As long as the Taiwan issue smolders, the political relationship between China and the United States will remain too tenuous to support a military relationship. The Chinese will not be bought off with arms. First Taiwan, and then . . .

WARREN I. COHEN
Michigan State University

Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation *by Mark R. Elliott. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1982. 287 pp. $17.95.*

Pawns of Yalta deals with one of the most painful episodes in Western policy in World War II—the often forcible repatriation of Soviet citizens who found themselves in American or British hands. This volume stands up as the most solid, scholarly, and balanced of several recent books on the subject and makes good use of a wide range of sources, from declassified government files to Soviet memoirs.

Well over five million Soviet citizens found themselves in the areas held by the Western allies at the end of the war. They included Soviet soldiers captured by the Germans, some refusing to collaborate, others willing to serve in German units or in nominally Russian formations; *Ostarbeiter*, men and women forcibly moved to work in the German economy; and civilians who had made their way westward from the USSR before the Nazi withdrawal, including both "innocents" as well as many who had in some form worked with the Germans, for example, journalists, policemen, or informants. Some had fought against the Western allies; most had not. Millions had died in German captivity. Of the survivors many—probably most—went back to the Soviet Union obediently, whatever their feelings. The problem was the remainder.

Elliott traces both formal and actual American policy, the characteristic confusion, the frustrating negotiations with Soviet authorities (including the sudden, almost mindless agreements), and the changing regulations as to what categories had to be sent back. Moscow wanted all Soviet citizens, pleading both law and solicitude. More important, Stalin had deemed surrender to the enemy tantamount to treason, and all returnees had to undergo an erratic process of "filtration," the results of which remain virtually unknown. Elliott gives estimates of some 300,000 executed, 2.5 million sent to prisons or forced labor camps, others exiled. These are but the roughest of guesses, and the figure of repatriates executed especially seems much too high.

Not surprisingly, many ex-prisoners did not want to go "home." In spite of numerous suicides and sabotage, the routine was to compell the recalcitrants, by force if necessary, to return to Soviet control. Over time, revulsion of U.S. commanders grew; in some instances the authorities in effect colluded with would-be returnees to let them escape.

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The book gives a good account of the reasons the United States agreed to the sweeping repatriation, with concern for American prisoners of war in Soviet hands a more important factor than had previously been recognized. Elliott's analysis probably gives excessive weight to "rational" factors; political naiveté, bureaucratic politics, and failure to think through the problem may deserve greater emphasis. In all fairness, he does stress enormous "Western ineptitude."

Perhaps the most difficult question is what realistic alternatives there were to the policy, which was half-heartedly pursued. The author suggests the United States should have returned by force only those "who were proven war criminals or who had joined Wehrmacht units of their own accord" (p. xx). How could the Americans have known? Many prisoners were never properly identified; former collaborators and others changed their names by the thousands; American interrogators often knew neither language nor political circumstances; and with such criteria the West would have been bamboozled by them as it had been by the Soviet authorities. But that only makes the story even more poignant than it seems at first glance.

ALEXANDER DALLIN
Stanford University

Keeping a Finger on the Public Pulse: Private Polling and Presidential Elections *by Bruce E. Altschuler. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 197 pp. $25.00.*

This book provides social scientists and political candidates and their staffs with new knowledge and fresh insights into the use and impact of private polls in recent presidential campaigns. Interviews with campaign participants, internal campaign memoranda, and published accounts of five recent campaigns are the primary data sources. Each of these campaigns is presented as a case study. The author takes full advantage of the opportunities that this approach presents for lacing interesting campaign stories with fascinating insights about personalities, tactics, and the constant surprises of the political life. Although the case studies are limited to the 1968 campaigns of Democrats Hubert Humphrey, Eugene McCarthy, and Robert Kennedy, George McGovern's campaign in 1972, and Jimmy Carter's race for the presidency in 1976, references to Republican contenders partially round out the picture.

Each case study is organized around a series of key decisions, such as the decision to enter the race initially and later to compete in specific primaries, decisions about issues to feature and target groups to reach, and decisions about choice of vice-president. In each case, Altschuler tries to ascertain what impact, if any, polls had on the decision and how the personality of the candidates and their political environment affected uses and interpretations of polls.

Evaluation of the usefulness and dysfunctional consequences of polls in each of the contests is viewed from three distinct and conflicting perspectives. From a rational voter perspective, for example, polling may be dysfunctional because it may induce candidates

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to avoid discussion of controversial issues and to attempt to manipulate voters. From the candidate's perspective, polling impact appears in a different light. Learning which issues to avoid and how best to woo the voters is distinctly beneficial. The campaign staff uses yet another rationale. Staff members may see expansion of their influence as a paramount goal. They may use their ability to control poll questions and poll interpretations as a way to gain power during the campaign. Ultimately, this may propel them into important White House positions. If so, conflicts of interests may arise if advisors retain an interest in their private polling firms.

Altschuler analyzes the ways in which private polls succeed or fail in achieving seven major tasks during presidential campaigns. These tasks include the use of trial heat polls to make the initial decision to run. Evidently, such polls are a weak basis for making decisions because public opinion is volatile in the early stages of the campaign. Polls also serve to determine which issues are important to the electorate and how voters evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various candidates. Poll findings help to plan the most advantageous use of issues and to improve the candidate's image. In the process, political leadership may be sacrificed to the goal of pleasing voters. Campaign strategies may be revised to change images, without changing the substance of behavior.

Polls also help in allocating time, money, and other campaign resources after pollsters have identified the key groups to whom the campaign for money and votes should be pitched, as well as the key contests which should be entered. The 1980 Reagan campaign is an example of the success to be reaped from sophisticated analyses of the interests of diverse voting groups. Polls also provide follow-up tests to determine the effectiveness of campaigns. Polls may even become tactical instruments that are released openly or leaked anonymously to affect news coverage to raise or lower expectations, to weaken opponents and raise the morale of supporters.

Altschuler's systematic analysis demonstrates convincingly that private polls have become a vital factor in presidential campaigns and affect the quality of the democratic process. As such, they amply deserve continuing scholarly attention. This volume provides an excellent pattern for future inquiries.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

The Modern American Vice Presidency: The Transformation of a Political Institution *by Joel K. Goldstein. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982. 409 pp. Cloth $28.00; paper, $6.95.*

This book provides a comprehensive and balanced description of the workings of the vice-presidency. Its author, a Harvard Law School graduate, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, where a version of this work was submitted for the doctorate. The existing literature on the office has been almost as mediocre as the position itself; just as Goldstein argues that the vice-presidency has now become a more significant and exciting job for its incumbents, so, too, it can be said that with this book, the study of the vice-presidency has become a more interesting exercise for the reader.

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It is more interesting because Goldstein has done several useful things. For vice-presidents and their staffs, he has written a handbook: how to get to the office, what to do once you have it, how to get along with the president and the presidential staff, how to secure a second term, what to do if you have to take over, and how to run for the presidency from your office (or as a retired vice-president). Mondale please take note. Also Bush.

For professional reformers, Goldstein has provided a useful analysis of the limits of reform. He skillfully dissects various proposals, finds little merit in most, and suggests that the various problems, when not overstated, divide into two categories: those for which no reform could provide a remedy and those which could only be remedied by creating new defects. He believes that the solutions to the malfunctioning of the office remain elusive—a statement one could make about the presidency as well.

Best of all, for political scientists interested in party and electoral systems, Goldstein has placed the transformation of the office squarely within the context of the empirical literature of electoral and party politics. His argument that the move away from classic conventions to media-centered and candidate-centered primary and election campaigns has changed the qualifications for the office is presented convincingly with a wealth of data and anecdotal evidence. From the favorites of party bosses, vice-presidential candidates have been transformed into the personal choice of presidential nominees. They are no longer put on the ticket to balance it, geographically or ideologically, but rather become a centrist complement to the presidential nominee. As a result, they no longer stand outside the executive branch or the presidential circle but become part of the inner circle and are given more responsible assignments than ever before.

Goldstein documents the way in which the vice-presidential office has expanded its responsibilities and staffing. He offers several different patterns of behavior, concluding that the Mondale vice-presidency was the most successful. His tendency to list powers, functions, conditions, roles, duties, and difficulties is useful rather than irritating, mainly because of the good sense he makes in each argument.

Goldstein has also collected and included all the great quotes about the vice-presidency, as well as a number of useful tables and a bibliography that one hopes will not stimulate much more work in this vein, as it has been mined thoroughly and most interestingly by the author.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College, Columbia University

Implementing Public Policy *edited by Dennis J. Palumbo and Marvin A. Harder. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1981. 168 pp. $19.95.*

This book is a collection of papers originally prepared for a Policy Studies Organization symposium on evaluation. Hence, the papers focus largely on (a) the relationship between implementation research and program evaluation and (b) specific programs. The range of subjects includes water quality standards, local education programs, employment and training, and child welfare. Each of the 12 essays is quite short—10 to 15 pages—so the

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level of detail in exposition and bibliography is relatively low. The editors' objectives are modest: to "look at the kinds of changes that are likely to occur during implementation, the conditions that lead to these changes, and how implementation can be improved through evaluation" (p. xii).

The central theme of the book—changes in structure and objectives during implementation—is one that has interested and vexed students of evaluation for a long time. The normative model implicit in evaluation research holds that program elements should be held constant over time in order to assure that outcomes can be measured against objectives. The behavioral reality is that elements, objectives, and outcomes are in a constant state of flux from the moment the implementation process begins. The rationale behind implementation or process evaluation is that one should be able to study the process of flux systematically and deliver useful information about it to policymakers and administrators. The critical question, of course, is what policymakers and administrators are to make of this information once they have it. The answer given by the authors in this book is the same as that given by other students of implementation—"It depends." Some argue that flux is simply evidence of adaptation to practical constraints; some argue that it is evidence of subversion; some argue both. This book provides lots of examples of the way this problem presents itself in specific programs, but not much guidance about how to distinguish adjustment from failure.

Students of evaluation and public policy will find useful essays in this collection on adjustment of programs to shifting objectives, on the "drift" of program elements and objectives, on the craft of "patching up" evaluations that have been made obsolete by changes in program, and on the use of evaluations to intervene in implementation. In some places the jargon becomes impenetrable, and the distinctions drawn to score analytic points seem of limited practical value. Overall, however, the authors are seriously engaged in trying to articulate useful analysis of implementation.

The fundamental problem with implementation analysis, a problem which is not confined to the essays in this book, is the lack of a strong normative structure on which to base reasoned recommendations. The editors are frank about this shortcoming and about the limited value of case studies in constructing a normative structure. In the absence of such a structure, though, the arguments in the book appear to the casual reader to be based on taste rather than on hard analysis. Some authors are partial to mutual adaptation as a normative framework, others are partial to a more hierarchical, decision-based framework. Yet there still seems to be no way to adjudicate these preferences with clear, logical arguments from first principles to conclusions. That will be the task for a future collection.

RICHARD F. ELMORE
University of Washington

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Interest Groups in the United States *by Graham K. Wilson. New York, Oxford University Press, 1981. 161 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper $9.95.*

This book focuses on the representation and operation of farm, labor, business, public interest, and single issue pressure groups; it concludes that such groups are becoming better organized, more active, and more effective in U.S. politics. As a synthesis of behavioral data, and one which essentially falls within the confines of traditional pluralist theory, this is a relatively solid study. If, however, one is looking for a contribution to the theoretical debate surrounding the concepts of "interest" and "interest representation," that will not be found here.

Structuring his book in much the way V. O. Key did in the pressure groups segment of his classic *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, Wilson provides a clear, concise, and relatively thorough synthesis of available historical and contemporary information on a variety of such groups. The groups range from the AFL-CIO and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) to Common Cause and the National Rifle Association (NRA). His descriptions of their origins and evolutions are useful, but his conclusions about the general "characteristics" of the various subcategories are even more interesting. His observations about larger tactical trends and their relationship to recent societal and systemic changes are also engaging. Lastly, his attempt to add some international perspective to all these subjects is greatly appreciated.

On the theoretical level, however, the book is a disappointment. This dimension is simply too shallow and unoriginal, ultimately detracting from the overall merits of the study as a whole.

The author begins by clearly laying out some of the critical theoretical issues that have emerged in response to studies of "interest groups" and interest group "power"—in particular the arguments over "objective interests" and structural constraints. Yet from there, he proceeds simplistically to dichotomize the latter two positions and to add nothing to their criticisms. For example, he rejects the notion of "objective interests" (or what he terms the thrust of the "false consciousness school") with a rehash of very traditional pluralist arguments. He does not seem to grasp the complexity of the structuralist critique, including its convergence with the concepts of "dominant ideology" and "consciousness." He uses business opposition to Franklin D. Roosevelt as a counterexample to the structuralist position and then proceeds to blur the ideological basis of empirical assumptions and definitions in general, at least in part to rationalize the significance of his own study. The latter is actually quite unnecessary, for few would quarrel with his point that narrowly focused pluralist empiricism has its place. It would have been more appropriate to have changed the title to "Pressure Groups in the United States," avoid the shallow theoretical pretentiousness, and refrain from overgeneralizations concerning group "effectiveness," judgments concerning the latter being far too deeply imbedded in ideology to have been amply addressed without a clearer recognition of that fact.

An interesting direction Wilson might have taken, once the empirical groundwork had been laid, would have been a return to the concept of "class consciousness." What does the growth of activity among economically elite and non-elite groups tell us about that concept? For example, could it be that the expansion of information, leisure time, and standard of living are freeing people to see and challenge long existing structures of

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wealth and power (structures he does admit exist)? Or could the resurgence of business strength noted by the author reflect a crisis in capitalism which has at least temporarily increased business power as its investments are so badly needed amidst what may well be permanent "stagflation"? Wilson does toy with the transition from "potential" to "actualized" interest aggregation; but again, the failure to address more directly the ideological questions necessary for such a discussion severely limits his theoretical contribution here.

MARCUS D. POHLMANN
The College of Wooster

Women and Public Policies *by Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982. 198 pp. Cloth, $18.50; paper, $6.95.*

Gelb and Palley's study is an important contribution to public policy, political participation, and women and politics literature. Its significance is stated by Janet Boles on the jacket: "The first attempt to deal with several women's policies in a systematic manner within a common framework." The framework is drawn from well-known scholarship, such as Mancur Olson's and E. E. Schattschneider's. The case studies of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, abortion policy, and pregnancy disability insurance are informative and interesting. The authors, highly respected policy analysts, have provided a valuable resource, an incentive to further research, and a readable textbook.

Stressing pluralist rules-of-the-game, Gelb and Palley support five hypotheses based on the critical nature in meeting policy-related objectives of proposals that appear to engender wide-ranging consensus; proposals that do not provoke values cleavages; access and a mobilization of informed bias; compromise; and acceptance of incrementalism. The authors find that *role equity* rather than *role change* characterizes the case studies—a predictable finding about the effects of process democracy. This finding was anticipated by sociologist Jessie Bernard, although the authors emphasize instead the work of sociologist Maren Lockwood Carden, who built upon Bernard's work.

Gelb and Palley report on dimensions, about which we know little, of pluralist activity around women's rights. Chapter 3, "The Group Actors: Resources and Strategies," represents this strength. The tables on professional salaries paid by women's rights organizations, budgets and funding sources, Ford administration grants, and cross-membership of directorates—with accompanying analyses—are worth the book's price. Similarly useful is discussion of membership in women's rights organizations as a resource that, among other things, increases "accountability, credibility and funding capacity" (p. 51). The sub-section on litigation valuably supplements Karen O'Connor's *Women's Rights Organizations' Use of the Courts* (1980). Materials on monitoring encourage more impact studies than are currently available.

Future studies might fruitfully avoid the few pitfalls of this volume. There is a level-of-analysis problem: all feminists are not found in women's rights organizations—a finding

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of historian Gerda Lerner. Unfortunately, after making this point (on p. 4), the authors discuss selected organizations as if they were the feminist movement. This assumption gives to the efforts of nonorganizational and even organizational feminists an undue conservative emphasis. The authors emphasize the selected organizations' ("feminists' ") noninvolvement in protest activities. But, for organizations such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the Committee on Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse (CARASA), protest activity is common.

Overlooked in choosing policy issues is one important component of legitimacy, support, and coalition-building for women's rights: determining *which* women are affected. Abortion, used widely by white middle-class women, is a difficult policy arena, but no more so than sterilization abuse, affecting many women on welfare and/or of color. The authors comment on the paucity of support for pro-abortion politics by black organizations, yet Black, Hispanic, and Native-American organizations struggling against sterilization abuse have received little support from women's rights organizations. The authors discuss lack of support for Title IX by black male former activist administrators in Health, Education, and Welfare's (HEW) Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Another problem for those negotiating with OCR was the co-optation and/or opposition of certain white administrators—male and female. Further, male and female negotiators from black organizations pressured OCR on Title IX, not to mention affirmative action.

On balance, this study does a fine job with what it sets out to do. Its few flaws lie mainly in the conventional analytic framework chosen. Those flaws did not begin with the authors, and the authors have subtly demonstrated pluralism's problems by repairing some of its omissions.

SARAH SLAVIN
State University of New York at Buffalo

Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism *by Bell Hooks. Boston, Mass., South End Press, 1981. 205 pp. $7.00.*

Until recently, the study of black women has been sorely neglected. Although brief references to black women have begun to appear in the literature concerning blacks and women, few book-length examinations of black women exist. This book discusses the impact of sexism on the social status of black American women. Bell Hooks contends that sexism by black and white men and racism by white women have resulted in the continued devaluation of black womanhood. She argues that "no other group in America has so had their identity socialized out of existence as have black women" (p. 7).

Beginning with slavery, Hooks traces the black women's experience in racist/sexist America in five chapters leading up to the present day. She provides an excellent commentary and analysis of the continued distorted and degraded image of black women in society.

Throughout the volume, Hooks seeks to provide an understanding of black women's activities within, and their perceptions of, the feminist movement both past and present.

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The discussion of racism and feminism is the most valuable chapter in the book. Hooks's critique of black women and feminism is marred, however, by sweeping and undocumented generalizations. For example, she makes the claim that sex roles in slave communities "mirrored those of patriarchal white America" and further states "slave women resolutely believed that it was natural that they be subservient to men" (p. 44). This latter statement not only contradicts recent studies of slave communities but also the testimonies of slaves themselves. While Hooks repeatedly condemns black women for failing to develop a "feminist consciousness" (pp. 48–49), she later contradicts this point of view by asserting that nineteenth-century black women "were more aware of sexist oppression than any other female group in American society" (p. 161).

Hooks's lack of a consistent argument concerning the role of black men in the oppression of black women is also a glaring weakness of the book. She notes that, historically, black men never viewed themselves as protectors and providers of black women. According to Hooks, black men have always been primarily interested in self and stood idly by as black women were raped during slavery (p. 35). Nevertheless, when black men by the end of the nineteenth century assert themselves and seek to defend and financially support the women of their race, Hooks labels this behavior as patriarchal and sexist (p. 91).

The above observations dismiss the study as a serious scholarly examination of black women and feminism. The frequent personalized comments and subjectivity by Hooks make this book primarily an autobiographical and speculative one. Despite these flaws, this work raises questions concerning black women and feminism that are worthy of further exploration. Hooks is to be commended for providing the stimulus.

LINDA M. PERKINS
The Mary Ingraham Bunting Institute, Radcliffe College

Out To Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States *by Alice Kessler-Harris. New York, Oxford University Press, 1982. 400 pp. $19.95.*

This history of American wage-earning women is enjoyable reading. It traces the lives of women workers in the United States from the early colonial period to the present, as seen through the eyes of someone writing who is now aged about 40, that is, from a generation of women reared in the 1950s and coming to maturity in the late 1960s. In this history, women emerge as people and not as so much grist for the feminist–academic mill. Kessler-Harris also excels in not lumping all women together but in distinguishing among them by class, race, and ethnicity.

The chief virtue of this book is its attempt to explore the conscious determinants of American women's behavior. Kessler-Harris does as much as possible to get us into the mind sets of the thousands of women who pass through the pages of her history. We read the poetry and books of women workers themselves and feel their onerous work loads and their frustrations over their pay and status. We listen to the speeches and pronouncements of the Establishment on the ideology of the Home and Women's Work, an ideology that condemns or condones women's work as the demand for women's labor

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fluctuates. We hear the cries of male trade union leaders, bourgeois reformers, politicians, and so forth, that taken together lead us to understand the structures of ideas that have influenced how women workers have felt about themselves and how others have felt about them. Thus, the major theme of this book—the "tension" between the family and wage work—is analyzed primarily in terms of the tenacity of cultural frameworks. The material underpinnings of these frameworks are not explored at all, although in an aside in a note of acknowledgement (which, curiously, serves as the book's finale), Kessler-Harris tells us that she agrees with the economic explanations of women's second-class status proffered by segmented labor market theorists.

The book is divided into three parts, each with three or four chapters. Part I is entitled "Forming the Female Wage Labor Force: Colonial America to the Civil War." Kessler-Harris argues here that women's choice (or lack thereof) between farming or factory work and women's access (or lack thereof) to skilled jobs were governed by European traditions and expectations. In this section, as in the others, Kessler-Harris's mode of argument is not to line up two or more opposing theories and then to go after one or the other. Instead, she gives examples and illustrations in support of her reading of how things happened. For example, in Part I she gives anecdote after anecdote to show that even free women could find opportunities for independence only rarely. Given the reality in colonial America of an abundance of land and a shortage of labor, that women emerged both as landless and low paid underscores the power of ideology in sustaining sexism.

Part II is entitled "The Idea of Home and Mother at Work: The Civil War to WWI." In the period from the Civil War to the depression of 1873, women engaged in widespread protest and organized extensively in trade unions and production cooperatives. Nevertheless, the percentage of married women in the labor force was still small, and working women were continually degraded both financially and socially by the saintliness attributed by the dream machine of the ruling class to Home and Hearth. Moreover, in their struggle for air, working women had few allies: The trade unions tended to try to banish women workers to small corners of the labor market or back into the home, and middle class reformers (as, for example, the Women's Trade Union League) accepted without question the continuing necessity for poor women to earn wages but in the end acquiesced to trade union conceptions of woman's place.

Part III of the book ("Transforming the Notion of Work for Women: World War I to the Present") takes us to the point where working for wages is becoming the norm for women, and women are no longer accepting that their only or even primary orientation need be the home. This realization, according to Kessler-Harris, is the Radical Consequence of Incremental Change—which is the title of the last chapter of her book.

Unfortunately, the important history of working women in the United States could have been better told. There are no explicit theories in the whole of Kessler-Harris's work. In her final note, she acknowledges that she has been influenced by the new set of constructs developed by the women's movement, although she admits that these remain invisible in her study (p. 320). Too bad! She doesn't organize her material to confront any of the major theoretical debates in the field, which might have given her story some intellectual coherence and sharpness. Instead, we are given some rather obvious general statements in each chapter and then some marshaling evidence to go along. Even her

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main message—that of the omnipotence of culture and consciousness—is implicit, and, as mentioned above, there is no systematic discussion of why and how ideology has been what it's been; neither the economics nor politics which sustain it are investigated.

All the same, the book is a good start and a good buy.

ALICE H. AMSDEN
Barnard College, Columbia University

European Women on the Left: Socialism, Feminism, and the Problems Faced by Political Women, 1880 to the Present *edited by Jane Slaughter and Robert Kern. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 245 pp. $27.50.*

Women and American Socialism, 1870–1920 *by Mari Jo Buhle. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1981. 344 pp. $21.95.*

The record of socialists on the woman question is not especially heartening to students of women's emancipation, nor does it consistently reflect an interest in the question of where in the socialist utopia women's distinctive functions and meaning might lie. If the evidence of two recent studies, one on European women and socialism and the other on American women and socialism, is any indication, there has long been a gap between the perceptions not only of men and women but of different cohorts of women themselves on the relative importance of political and economic goals, on the one hand, and of social and sexual goals, on the other. While both of these works repeatedly document the gap, it is Mari Jo Buhle's long-awaited book on both native and immigrant American socialist women that determinedly seeks an explanation of it.

Slaughter and Kern's *European Women on the Left*, equipped with a brief introductory overview, is a valuable anthology of essays about leading female radicals. We witness the doomed efforts of Germany's Clara Zetkin to maintain a strong women's organizational arm of the Social Democratic Party; the Spanish anarchist Federica Montseny's heroic calls for individual self-realization as the essential route to the creation of a healthy social organism; the struggles of the Italian communist Teresa Noce to maintain contact with her children while living a fugitive life as radical organizer; the Ukrainian Angelica Balabanoff, having surrendered her rights to the family estate, editing *Il Traditore* in New York City in the early 1940s while labeling both her former socialist co-worker Mussolini together with Stalin as opponents of social justice. The perception of women's agenda—at times compatible with socialist ideals, at other times not—is traced by Slaughter and Kern within the span of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century history. They distinguish between the older women socialists for whom "personal liberation was not a conscious motive to become political" (p. 8) and a later generation, spurred by the " 'de-radicalization' of traditional parties, which has helped to foster pluralism in contemporary leftist politics" (p. 9) to seek feminist aims outside of a rigidly Marxist framework. In focusing our attention on the vicissitudes of their subjects, the contributors unearth a full century of contact and conflict between feminism and an evolving socialism. Their

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heroines range from those whose incipient feminism thrust them into the mainstream of socialist endeavor to those whose feminism in the end required a parting of the ways with their radical male confrères.

Slaughter and Kern's study, though collective biography, is concerned more with events and issues than with the refinements of personality and historical context. By contrast *Women and American Socialism*, a tour de force of research and reconstruction, is nothing less than a grand synthesis. It must surely be accorded a prominent place in the recent historiography of American radicalism, along with the recognition it deserves as a stellar contribution to the women's studies canon of the past dozen years. Buhle plunges masterfully into the rich interstices of perhaps the most dynamic era of American growth. Radical ideas of and about American women, funneled at intervals into such indigenous movements as populism, nationalism, and temperance, are studied in close association with the more conventional protests of the immigrant German-American socialists and their Jewish counterparts in the garment trades of New York. The vagaries of socialist party ideology were a product of both discontent and inertia, mixed constituencies, internal pressures, rapid industrial changes, and, at times, the dictates of foreign policy. Nevertheless, ideas counted: the utopian texts that incorporated the new views of women, like Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* and Ignatius Donnelly's *The Golden Bottle*, are probed as energetically as are the resolutions and platforms of parties.

Buhle also analyzes the careers of neglected individuals, like Josephine Conger, a prominent socialist editor of the first decade of the twentieth century who combined in her intellectual outlook Protestant rectitude, a benevolent mysticism, and the characteristic Victorian faith in the moral superiority of the female sex. Such women were bridges into the newly activated pre-World War I suffrage movement, which in turn gave way to the cause of sexual emancipation in the late 1910s and 1920s. Buhle depicts with equal skill the influence of organizations, for example, locating the ways in which the garment unions united the traditions of the trade unions, the socialists, and the women reformers and "inspired a militant sisterhood bound to working-class sentiment" (p. 208). Indeed, her insistent testimony to the complex interaction of ideas, individuals, and organizations convinces us of her claim that "the deepest truth in the history of the Socialist women's movement was the constancy of change and the unceasing necessity of adaptation" (p. 170).

It is on the question of woman sufrage that the socialists were finally required to engage in open self-examination. While they selectively and at times haphazardly aided the suffrage cause, their failure to have achieved a theoretical consensus on the woman question surfaced in the years just before World War I. It was their acknowledgment of this that soon after spelled the end of a coherent organizational life for socialist women.

ANNETTE K. BAXTER
Barnard College, Columbia University

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Norman Street: Poverty and Politics in an Urban Neighborhood *by Ida Susser. New York, Oxford University Press, 1982. 230 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $6.95.*

This study adds to the growing body of literature that focuses on the urban neighborhood. Ida Susser moved into the area—the Williamsburg–Greenpoint section of Brooklyn (New York City)—in order to absorb the dimensions of everyday life in an urban, industrial, predominantly white, working-class community. She continued her participatory observation for two years as she probed her suspicion that "many of the characteristics that have been attributed to blacks in community studies might also be found in white working-class areas suffering similar economic setbacks and constraints" (pp. vii–viii).

As "an ethnography of an American urban neighborhood," the author claims that "this book develops a new approach in that it analyzes the daily life of working-class people within the constraints of a particular historical period" (p. viii). This new approach yields a detailed picture of many of the dimensions of urban life from the "bottom up" and is an intimate portrait of the daily existence and conditions as seen from the perspectives of these urban dwellers. Susser departs from the sociological tradition of community studies in her emphasis on life-styles, values, and activities at the neighborhood level "as they change in response to political and economic conditions within a clearly delineated national and local political context" (p. ix).

The onset of New York's fiscal crisis in 1975 marked the beginning of the author's undertaking. The cutbacks in programs and services, of course, took their toll heavily in the neighborhood in which she was immersed. After presenting some of the history of Greenpoint–Williamsburg as a "changing neighborhood," Susser explores the interrelated problems of unemployment and welfare dependency (Chs. 4 and 5), and landlord–tenant relations (Ch. 6). These chapters present a poignant portrait of some of the urban malaise. The bases for local political action and the networks upon which such movement can be built are explored by examining the dynamics of block association formation (Chs. 7–9). A special case of effective local organizing is described (Ch. 10). In the face of increasing fire risks and the rise in arson, New York City, as part of its austerity program, proposed to close up Engine Co. 212 in the northern section of Williamsburg–Greenpoint. By occupying the firehouse over a period of one and a half years, utilizing media coverage and union support and working effectively with elected officials, the residents were able to win back the guarantee of continuation of this essential municipal service.

The richness of detail in Susser's study cannot compensate for the limitations of an individual ethnographic approach. Susser herself acknowledges that "as one fieldworker among a population of nearly two hundred thousand," she was "unable to work with large numbers of residents." She chose instead to follow a few events as they occurred in order to present a complete picture of the people involved and the processes leading to particular episodes" (p. 15). Her account is, in turn, a very readable and useful study, rich in detail, and offers an illumination of the current urban experience which more sophisticated methodologies would, of necessity, not capture. Her conclusions about working-class urbanites as anything but passive challenge the usual notion of the apathetic American working class. As she sees it, broader economic interests and political

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coalitions strengthened the forces of repression, thereby limiting the capacity of very local level urban efforts—even when barriers of race and ethnicity can be overcome—to develop into more broadly based movements. The implications of her conclusions are worth pondering while we grope, in an unfocused fashion, for the articulation of a national urban policy.

EDWARD T. ROGOWSKY
Brooklyn College

The New Subversives: Anti-Americanism of the Religious Right *by Daniel C. Maguire. New York, Continuum Publishing Co., 1982. 153 pp. $9.95.*

In this short and timely book, liberal ethicist Daniel C. Maguire offers one perspective on the contemporary religious right. The result is a forceful but troubling study. For while Maguire's analysis of the Christian conservative movement is in many respects learned and thoughtful, the argument is so angry and antagonistic that his insights are often lost amid the polemics.

Advising that the influence of the religious right should not be overestimated, Maguire begins by considering its weaknesses. He finds the movement to be contradictory and at times incoherent, a curious combination of conservative rhetoric and radical programs. Its philosophy is simultaneously libertarian and authoritarian. In religion it is separatist; in politics, activist and coercive. These contradictions, he observes, create a fragile coalition, containing the seeds of its own dissolution.

Warning that such loosely connected groups have nevertheless historically exercised disproportionate political power, Maguire goes on to review the movement's strengths. The book describes the appeal of absolute authority and unambiguous simplicity in a complicated modern world. It surveys the lure of tribal symbols and the Christian conservative identification of religious piety with nationalistic and militaristic patriotism. In a brief review of the history of fundamentalism, the book cites the drawing power of fear and hatred, especially fear of modernity and hatred of its representatives, the so-called secular humanists. Finally, in the most closely reasoned section of the book, Maguire admits that some of the power of the religious right is the product of honest moral worries about the changing status of the family, the school, and the local community at a time of genuine social problems.

Nevertheless, Maguire's view of the movement is overwhelmingly negative. The major part of the book is given to explaining how these contemporary conservatives misread the Bible, misinterpret Christian history, and misuse religious morality to pursue a repressive political platform. Maguire lists at length the dangers they pose to women, blacks, the poor, and homosexuals, as well as to Jews and Catholics. Noting the rise of counter-organizations such as Americans for Common Sense and People for the American Way, he closes with a call for a liberal response to the conservative threat.

Unfortunately, this book provides little for liberals to build on. Relying on Richard Hofstadter, Maguire insists on describing the religious right as an example of "paranoid"

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politics. At its best, he finds it "absurd," "funny," and "ridiculous." At its worst, it is racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic. Assuming the idea of "pseudoconservatism" and holding that the Christian rightists are in fact populist radicals disguised as traditionalist conservatives, he pictures their politics as extremist and ultimately totalitarian. The partisans of the religious right, he contends, are "born again fascists" (p. 1); their philosophy is "ultimately fascistic in its spirit" (p. 45); their views on abortion and the family are "Nazi, not American" (p. 123). Finally, while relying on the pluralist principle of tolerance and making clear that Christian conservatives have every right to express their opinions, Maguire dismisses them from the realm of legitimate discourse, portraying their views as "extremist," "subversive," and "anti-American." Theirs, he states flatly, is "not the American way" (p. 66).

For partisan opponents of the religious right, this book is a call to combat. For serious students, it is a disappointing polemic. For contemporary liberals, it should stand as a troubling example of a fearful and defensive liberal response to a challenging conservative movement.

MICHAEL LIENESCH
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Compromised Compliance: Implementation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act *by Howard Ball, Dale Krane and Thomas P. Lauth. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 300 pp. $27.50.*

The gist of the book's argument might be summarized in five points. First, the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) embodies legal principles that go beyond traditional American conceptions of the boundaries of federalism and the appropriate roles for the national government. Under the VRA, federal officials assisted in voting registration drives in the South, and the Civil Rights Division (CRD) of the U.S. Department of Justice became involved in determining whether or not changes in voting laws proposed by Southern constituencies were legal. The latter activity is referred to as "preclearance" because under the VRA, Southern constituencies are obligated to present changes in voting legislation for approval before the changes are enacted.

Second, political processes affect how the VRA, and especially the preclearance requirements, are implemented. Rules of procedure and the level of resources available to the CRD are set by Congress—a political body. More importantly, potential resistance or defiance—political acts—are considered by the CRD as costs in their calculation of the optimal strategy for enforcing the law and attaining the principles of the VRA.

Third, for fear of aggravating the level of resistance and possibly causing a reevaluation of federalist principles, the CRD evolved procedures for enforcement that rest heavily on informal exchange between the principal actors—negotiation and compromise. The book provides source materials that enrich our understanding of the implementation process such as organization charts used by the Justice Department and CRD, copies of the legislation, and copies of other written materials.

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Fourth, the level of justice achieved by the CRD is lower than it would be if the VRA were interpreted in a stricter way and if there were fewer compromises in enforcement. On the other hand, the level of justice in the South is higher now than it would be without the VRA. Our appreciation of this argument is somewhat reduced by the failure of the book to document empirically the dependent variables—the number of minorities registered to vote, the degree of dilution of minority vote, and, most importantly, the effectiveness of the CRD in changing (or failing to change) these factors. The book's argument rests on an estimate of the percent of jurisdictions that have never applied for preclearance. This, however, is not a valid standard for evaluating implementation of the VRA. Jurisdictions that do not change the law are not required to apply for preclearance. The high percent that have never applied (estimated to be 24 percent) reflects a limitation in the scope of the VRA and not on the effectiveness of implementation of the VRA by the CRD. The effectiveness of implementation, and not the scope of the law, is supposed to be the topic of the book.

Finally, the fault for the underattainment of justice under the VRA lies in the fact that we live in a political system that is based on compromise and values the maintenance of public order—sometimes to the point of overlooking failures in attaining the full measure of justice for particular groups or individuals. To drive this point home, the book relies on statements by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights describing the persistence of barriers to the full attainment of racial equality. The force of this argument, however, is limited by the failure of the book to measure the amount of injustice that still exists—the degree of non-registration, the degree of vote dilution, and so on.

In sum, the book is a valuable source for narrative accounts and public documents that relate to an important phase in the legal and social history of American racial politics.

D. GARTH TAYLOR
University of Chicago

Jobs for Disadvantaged Workers: The Economics of Employment Subsidies
edited by Robert H. Haveman and John L. Palmer. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 336 pp. Cloth, $28.95; paper, $11.95.

This volume, the twentieth in the Brookings Studies in Social Economics series, focuses on the government's use of tax incentives to encourage private sector firms to create new jobs and to hire the structurally unemployed. The book is a collection of nine papers, with discussants' comments, presented at a Brookings Institution conference in April 1980. The editors have grouped the papers under three headings: Theoretical Analysis, Empirical Evidence, and Program Design and Evaluation. In addition, the editors provide a fairly lengthy and detailed introduction and summary.

In the context of all current government employment programs, the subject of the collection is quite narrow. At the time of the conference there was reason to believe that the then new Reagan administration would emphasize tax incentives. Instead, the administration has signed a new Job Training Partnership Act, replacing the Comprehensive Em-

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ployment and Training Act (CETA), but continuing its emphasis on job training for the economically disadvantaged unemployed. The tax incentives studied here, therefore, remain only one very small component of current employment policy.

The papers in all sections of the book are most successful as economic theory. The authors apply a variety of economic models to analyze the effects of tax incentives for particular groups and for the economy as a whole. They show the ways in which economic effects, especially the unemployment-inflation trade-off, should be defined and measured, and they provide careful definitions of potential target groups. With their results, the authors clarify the economic conditions under which tax incentives can provide jobs for the structurally unemployed without at the same time promoting inflation.

The papers are much less successful in drawing conclusions or in making policy recommendations. Though they generally favor the use of tax incentives, all of the authors conclude that the success of the incentives depends on the state of the economy when they are introduced and the nature of the unemployment they are meant to combat. The conclusions are stated formulaically: if A and B economic conditions prevail, a given tax incentive can create C jobs for a group unemployed for D reason. Even if such conclusions were universally accepted, the diagnoses of a given economic condition and of a given group's unemployment are still crucial and, in these areas, experts in society as well as in this volume disagree. This weakness is compounded because the authors present almost no empirical evidence about the number of jobs or new hires actually brought about by existing tax incentive programs. Scattered throughout the volume, for example, are comments on the well-documented reluctance of firms to use tax incentives to hire the disadvantaged, but no author pauses to analyze this phenomenon. The major exceptions to the weakness in policy evaluations and recommendations are in a paper by George J. Carcagno and Walter S. Corson, that recommends the most efficient way to administer tax incentive programs, and to a lesser extent, in a paper in which Robert I. Lerman argues that worker wage subsidies promote more employment than employer subsidies.

The narrow focus of the volume and the lack of empirical evidence means that the authors cannot compare the effectiveness of tax incentives with that of other employment programs, in particular, with job training. This, too, limits the usefulness of the volume in a time of scarce resources when choices among programs must be made.

This volume makes a real, though limited, contribution to the literature on employment programs. The authors clarify the economic issues involved in tax incentives, set forth the standards for evaluating the policy, and specify the conditions under which the incentives should achieve their objectives. For all of these reasons, the study will be a useful guide in the crucial research that still remains to be done.

EILEEN SULLIVAN
New York City Department of Employment

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The Politics of Urban Personnel Policy: Reformers, Politicians and Bureaucrats *by Wilbur C. Rich. Port Washington, N.Y., Kennikat Press, 1982. 178 pp. $18.50.*

In this volume, Wilbur Rich joins the handful of scholars who have studied the politics of public personnel administration. His book constitutes an ambitious attempt to provide historical perspective on the "deadly serious struggle for power and influence" in New York City's personnel arena (p. 151).

Rich devotes particular attention to four groups that have shaped this city's personnel policies. The genteel reformers consisted of nineteenth-century liberal Republicans and reform Democrats who sought to cleanse the city of corrupting influences through personnel reform. Academic reformers, primarily management consultants, academics, and researchers, followed. This group sought to improve the personnel system by introducing "scientific" principles of management via management training and other means. Fiscal managers—accountants, investment specialists, and lawyers—surged to the fore during the city's fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s. While the actions of this group have reverberated through the personnel system, Rich argues that the fiscal managers are distinguished from prior reform groups by their lack of "a coherent policy toward the civil service" (p. 5). Aside from these three reform elements, Rich considers another pivotal actor—the unions. While a focus on these four groups drives Rich's analysis, he also devotes a chapter to explaining the ways in which groups, politicis, and negotiations affect such personnel functions as labor planning and selection and the handling of grievances. Although Rich doubts that the city's work practices can be "effectively reformed" (p. 161), a final chapter recommends certain ameliorations.

Rich's volume at times reveals considerable insight, especially in the two chapters on the genteel and academic reformers. In dealing with the genteel reformers, for instance, Rich perceptively sorts out three connotations of the term "merit"—merit as a struggle among individuals in a form of social Darwinism, as a moral imperative for purifying local government, and as the opposite of patronage. Some of Rich's other observations, such as his argument about the insularity and low level of professionalism in New York City's bureaucracy, also prove intriguing.

If the volume at times gratifies, however, it also frustrates. Perhaps in part because of its ambitious scope, the analysis often seem superficial. Observations appear that whet the reader's appetite but then get dropped before they can satiate. For instance, Rich bemoans the demise of party influence in personnel policy (pp. 156–57), but other than briefly citing E. E. Schattschneider and Supreme Court Justice Powell, he never develops this potentially fruitful line of inquiry. If parties become stronger, precisely how might that benefit personnel practices and the overall functioning of city politics?

The normative posture adopted by the book also proves confusing at many points. While early in the volume Rich asserts that he will not "offer any normative judgments about the groups competing in the public personnel arena" (p. 14), these judgments subsequently surface. He suggests, for instance, that New Yorkers should welcome the arrival of the new fiscal managers (p. 122) and considers the city's response to union demands as all too often "a dubious policy of borrowing from Peter to pay Paul" (p. 97).

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He also notes that union intervention in many aspects of personnel rule making "has been most unfortunate because it has eroded the authority of civil service managers" (p. 159). Prescriptions for improving personnel practices also emerge (such as more in-service training in performance appraisal). Rich's normative assessments may all be well grounded, but it is almost impossible to tell because the volume never really clarifies its value assumptions about personnel practices or politics more generally. In recent times, social scientists have grown increasingly alert to the ways in which polices fostering certain values often undermine the achievement of other desirable ends. A greater specification of normative criteria would help the volume deal more satisfactorily with the trade-offs that lie at the heart of personnel politics.

While Rich's volume fails to satisfy completely, he deserves credit for reminding us of the importance of personnel politics, for raising significant questions about the new fiscal managers, and for shedding light on the behavior of the genteel and academic reformers. These intellectual dividends make the book worthy of consideration by specialists in urban politics and personnel policy.

FRANK J. THOMPSON
University of Georgia

Ethnicity and Public Policy *edited by Winston A. Van Horne and Thomas V. Tonnesen. Milwaukee, University of Wisconsin System, 1982. 133 pp. Cloth, $12.00; paper, $5.95.*

This is the first of an annual series based on the Green Bay Colloquium sponsored by the University of Wisconsin American Ethnic Studies Coordinating Committee and Urban Corridor Consortium. The volume is a heterogeneous collection of seven essays ranged around the topic of ethnicity and public policy. Editor Winston Van Horne posed the general question: "In a multiracial and multiethnic society . . . what precisely *is, can,* and *ought to be* the role of public policy in the actualization of the common good?" (p. v.).

The first three articles examine disagreements over the meaning and significance of racial and ethnic identity. Ronald Takaki emphasizes historical discrimination between racial and ethnic groups; he challenges Nathan Glazer's analysis that discrimination on the basis of race is comparable to that based on ethnicity and argues that Asians, Africans, and Native Americans suffered more than European ethnics. Whether Takaki's or Glazer's analysis prevails commits the government to policies of affirmative action or to equal opportunity. Glazer concedes Takaki's emphasis on the historical significance of race, but diminishes its contemporary importance since present government policies not only outlaw discrimination but establish broad policies of racial preference.

In the third essay, Ira S. Lowry considers the definitional and theoretical problems involved when government attempts to count its population by nationality or race. Lowry's essay incorporates some of the difficulties he attributes to the U.S. Census Bureau (p. 43, 45) while presenting a history of enumeration practices and suggesting that contemporary methods reflect political lobbying rather than sociologically accurate identification. He

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concludes with recommendations for rigorous definition of ethnic or racial status and alternatives to the present method of self-definition.

The next four articles focus on ethnicity and specific policy areas. Roy Simon Bryce-Laporte illustrates how race and ethnicity have manifested themselves in American immigration policy; from 1924 through 1965, European entrants contributed 49.5 percent of those admitted to the United States (p. 69). The 1965 Immigration Act shifted the balance from European to Asian and Latin American populations. Bryce-Laporte then points to the domestic problems posed for local governments by the changing character of immigration, and notes the contrast between the myth of open acceptance and inequality of opportunities.

Adalberto Aguirre, Jr., attempts to develop a theoretical analysis of the bureaucratic manipulation of groups that do not speak English. His essay is strongest when he focuses on descriptions of linguistic difficulties in bureaucratic interaction, and weakest when he argues that bureaucracies bestow their social services on groups that have the least political potential. While it is clear what he is getting at, any bureaucracy that consistently used such a strategy would quickly find itself weak and isolated from representatives of better organized groups.

Carl L. Tahkoper's examination of resource development on Native American land is a straightforward analysis of policy outcomes at differing institutional levels. In the past, Supreme Court decisions on Native American tribes were rarely enforced. At present, tribal councils are neither represented on regional commissions created to plan for interstate energy development, nor do they receive much of the substantial planning funds available. This is a critical issue since important amounts of uranium, coal, and other natural resources are found on tribal lands.

Finally, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., shows that black participation has increased in the military, especially in the noncommissioned ranks of the army, from 11.8 percent in 1964 to 32.2 percent in 1979 (p. 123); secondly, black enlistees have been increasingly better educated, both over time and relative to whites. Moskos concludes that the changing racial composition of the army is less problematic than that the character of all branches of the military is increasingly lower income; he proposes a two-track system to attract volunteers from all social classes.

The essays constitute a good addition to the literature on ethnicity. Interested scholars should look forward to the second in the series.

DIANNE M. PINDERHUGHES
Dartmouth College

The Ideology of Administration: American and Soviet Cases *by Michael E. Urban. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1982. 174 pp. Cloth, $33.50; paper, $9.95.*

As any student of comparative administrative law knows, industrialization breeds regulation, and government by regulation leads inevitably to the formation of a special caste of

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administrators who, because of their acquired expertise, belief systems, and identifiable rituals, quickly become contemptuous of the general checks placed on their power by (among other things) the requirements of due process of law. The members of this new governing class view administration as a social vehicle whose destination is the good life and whose cause is social justice. They firmly believe that they are blessed with the gift of intuition and are capable of divining the interests of all the people.

Urban's book empirically corroborates the trite propositions that the administration of a welfare state, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, becomes so complex that issues of power and privilege are soon turned into issues to be resolved by technical experts and that despite their fundamental differences in other areas, the problems of administering Soviet communism are quite similar to those of administering American capitalism. This is so because both societies are modern industrial societies as well as administrative states.

The author argues, and this is hardly a new thesis, that the tendency in the modern world is towards bureaucracy and that if one discards meaningless dichotomies—such as those between capitalist and socialist, Western and Eastern, totalitarian and democratic (pp. xii, xiii)—one will quickly find that the United States and the USSR converge in many aspects of one ideology, the ideology of administration. In his two-part analysis, the author discusses the general ideology of administration and the special ideologies of administration in the two societies under consideration. The pleasure in reading the book derives from the author's ability to recognize the sameness while savoring the differences between the American ideology of democratic bureaucracy—a category which the author rightfully finds to be a contradiction in terms (p. 89)—and the Soviet analogue of democratic centralism.

The Soviet government may be quick to condemn the exploitative nature of the American system, but at the same time, admiration for capitalist management techniques in general remains a prominent feature of the current Soviet outlook on public administration. Under the prevailing American and Soviet ideologies of administration, the administrators are seen as a governing class whose claim to legitimacy is based on the belief that they alone possess the competence or expertise required to govern efficiently. Both systems, as the author points out, are dominated by the "cult of expertise" (p. 92).

The thrust of the author's contribution to our general knowledge of comparative Soviet and American administrative ideologies is concentrated in Chapters 6 and 7, "Ideologies of Democratic Bureaucracy in the United States" and "Administrative Communism in the Soviet Union," respectively. The theme in both chapters is extremely well conceived and the underlying propositions are admirably well argued. Unfortunately, however, nothing in these or other chapters of the book rises to the level of an original thesis. Another major defect of the book is that the concluding chapter lacks a conclusion. One would hope that this is not the author's last word on the subject.

CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE
Tulane University

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Britain Against Itself: The Political Contradictions of Collectivism *by Samuel H. Beer. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1982. 231 pp. $18.95.*

The perception of the performance and the prospects of the British political system has shifted dramatically in the last 20 years. The celebration of the British political process as a model of successful public choice in the 1950s was followed by political fragmentation and renewed ideological polarization against a background of relative economic decline and the failure of government attempts to reverse it. Many argued in the 1970s that Britain had become ungovernable, its government overloaded and bankrupt, the formulation and implementation of policy seriously distorted by the adversary style of the two-party system and by the excessive expectations of the electorate—ideas that would have amazed earlier generations of observers. Beer concedes that neither he nor anyone else predicted what was to come, but he argues that this does not invalidate the theoretical analysis that he developed in his earlier work. On the contrary, he believes that it can be extended to encompass the new developments.

His central argument is that the collapse of the 1950s consensus has been brought about by the contradictions of the collectivist system itself. It encouraged a centrifugal group politics. The competition between groups for state benefits and pay produced inflation and the loss of control over public expenditure. As the pursuit of sectional advantage increased, so class loyalties and attachments began to wane, hitherto one of the most important foundations of the consensus. Electoral opinion became far more volatile and unpredictable, partisan loyalties weakened, and party membership declined. Beer argues that the explanation for these trends is a change in political culture—the sudden emergence of a new populism, which shows itself in the collapse of deference and the weakening of the old civic culture. Collectivism has lost the forces that sustained it and the ideologies that legitimated it. Beer sees the neo-Liberalism of the Thatcherite Conservatives, the neo-socialism of the left in the Labour party, and the neo-radicalism of the Liberals and the Social Democrats as expressions of this new populism.

This approach brings insights but also has pitfalls. The main difficulty is that Beer can offer no explanation for the change in political culture from deference to populism. He dismisses the idea that the breakdown in consensus can be explained by the relationship between government management of the economy and electoral support, but his discussion of this crucial issue is cursory. He tends to treat the new populism as a single idea, and every new political manifestation is reduced to it. The Militant Tendency, Powellism, the Liberal protest vote, the Social Democratic Party, and the growing insubordination of members of Parliament are all treated in this way. What this approach fails to capture is that the populisms of left and right often has very different roots. The populism of the right, for example, has to be grasped in relation to popular responses to issues such as Britain's decline from world power, immigration, inflation, and the increasing burden of direct taxation. Beer's overarching concept of political culture leads him at times into exaggeration (the impact, for example, of the counter-culture and the Beatles) and into error (as in his account of the New Left). He also fails to recognise that Thatcher's so-called U-turns are only tactical; they do not signal any change in the neo-Liberal strategy. Further, he overestimates the extent to which the neo-Liberal goal requires "wide and lasting

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consent." Its policies are aimed at making that unnecessary by reducing state responsibilities for the economy and welfare and therefore the need to mobilize consent. In Britain's present economic and political situation, Thatcher may be running closer to the grain than he supposes.

ANDREW GAMBLE
University of Sheffield, England

The Other European Community: Integration and Co-operation in Nordic Europe *by Barry Turner with Gunilla Nordquist. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 307 pp. $25.00.*

This is not really a study of integration and cooperation within the Nordic community. The main thrust of the well-written book is instead a broad, comparative overview of social, economic, cultural, and political trends in the five Nordic countries. The relations among these nations are given only secondary consideration while the main focus is on significant domestic features.

Following a description of the geographical and historical elements of the region, the author quickly moves on to a survey of industrial, social, and political changes during the first half of this century. He compares and contrasts the developments in each country and is able to draw out some significant trends in a limited space. A longer chapter traces the political history of the postwar era. The many attempts at Nordic economic cooperation and at finding satisfactory relations within the European community are surveyed at some length in chapter four.

Political developments of the 1970s are also discussed in a separate chapter. The author shows his talent as a perceptive political observer with an eye for the essential elements of domestic political games. The common themes of rising populism and the necessity of dealing with economic recession are nicely brought forward in the five national surveys. Although Sweden gets a disproportionate share of the analysis throughout the book, it is commendable that all five Nordic countries are consistently included in this history of recent social and political developments.

The various attempts at fostering greater industrial cooperation between Norway and Sweden during the last ten years are also discussed. An informative account of the unsuccessful Volvo deal of 1978 and its implications for continued economic cooperation in the region is offered. On this topic, the author contributes some new knowledge to the English language literature on Nordic relations. The chapter also covers Nordic experiences with industrial democracy, which should be of broad interest among students of Scandinavia.

The final chapter of the book develops the theme of cultural democracy. The author argues that these Scandinavian countries have proceeded through political to economic democracy and are now well under way toward attempting cultural democracy. Cultural and educational policies are discussed with a view to the ways in which these governments have tried to strengthen this element of modern democracy. The main focus is on the

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domestic scenes, but the record of Nordic cultural cooperation is also touched upon briefly.

This book is of limited value to the advanced student of the Nordic region. Without references and seemingly based on already published materials, it presents little that is new to the informed reader. The conventional view of events and forces shaping them is given on most of the topics covered. The primary contribution of the work is the broad and comparative overview of significant contemporary features of the five Nordic societies. The author is sensitive to common trends and national contrasts, and he writes in an accessible style without footnotes or academic jargon. One finishes the volume with the impression that Turner has managed to fit a reasonably rich analysis of complex domestic developments into a fairly tight package. The book has potential as an introduction for readers not already familiar with the Nordic community of states.

BENGT SUNDELIUS
Bradley University

Years of Wrath, Days of Glory: Memoirs from the Irgun *by Yitshaq Ben-Ami. New York, Robert Speller and Sons, 1982. 601 pp. $15.00.*

Jewish history has followed a pattern of internecine war during times of external threat. In 597 B.C., the first Hebrew commonwealth fell when Nebuchadnezzar's Judean appointee was murdered by a rival Jewish descendant of the House of David. Almost six centuries later, Jewish Galileans and Judeans massacred each other in the upper city of Jerusalem as the Romans laid seige to the lower city. And in our century, following the near genocide of world Jewry, Jew battled Jew on the beaches of Tel-Aviv even amidst the birth throes of the state of Israel.

Conventional history has tended to blame this third civil conflict on the Irgun "revisionists," a militant offshoot of the Socialist-Zionist Haganah, the Jewish Defensive Underground. Yitshaq Ben-Ami's provocative memoir offers a different version of the genesis of the Jewish state. As a member of the Irgun for 16 of the 17 years of its existence, Ben-Ami served as the head of Jerusalem's Betar youth movement, as a key coordinator of the frustrating attempt to evacuate European Jewry before World War II, and as chief fund-raiser for the Irgun in America. He also witnessed the demise of the Irgun when David Ben-Gurion ordered the sinking of the Irgun arms transport ship, the *Atalena.*

The Irgun was formed in 1931 by disgruntled members of the Haganah seeking a more militant defense of the European and Palestinian Jewish populations. The Zionist establishment was still committed to a nonviolent, noninterventionist political solution to the problems of world Jewry. As a right-wing military group in the 1930s, based on the integralist nationalism of Vladimir Jabotinsky, the appellation "fascist" stuck easily and quickly to the Irgun. The revisionist struggle became the struggle between those who saw the danger of fascism from within and those who saw a nascent military Zionism as the Jewish answer to world fascism.

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Ben-Ami offers the perspective of the initiated. He has an insider's version of the "Black Day" of Irgun bombings of British installations, the role—or lack of a role—of the Haganah and the Zionist establishment in saving European Jewry, the "massacre" at Deir Yassin, the bombing of the King David Hotel, and the agonizing final days of the Irgun from the deck of the *Atalena*.

Under Menachem Begin's leadership, the Irgun increased its guerrilla tactics, and infuriated Ben-Gurion as it complicated Labor's efforts to play the game of diplomacy by international rules. Ben-Ami suggests that the Irgun's success and power severely threatened Ben-Gurion's "hegemony." Though criticized for constantly violating international immigration laws, the revisionists saved thousands of Jews from annihilation in Europe. Though denounced for smuggling arms, it was largely those arms that defended the fledgling state in 1948. Though internationally condemned for hanging British officers, the act ended the British executions of Hebrew soldiers.

Ben-Ami's impassioned apologia for the revisionists is needed to bring balance to accounts of the early years of the establishment of Israel, most of which have been written by Labor historians. His personalized style and intimate participation give some authority to this views, and he offers valuable insights on the early years of Begin, Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann, and Stephen Wise.

The recent successes of Begin and the Likud coalition have allowed revisionist historians out of the closet. Were they freedom fighters, terrorists, or both? Does Israel exist because of the Irgun or in spite of it? Perhaps the truths of revolution are the truths of *realpolitik*, and those who shed the blood of military victory must trust their laurels to the largess of those inaugurated by political victory. The winners may write the history books, but it is often the losers who wrote the history.

PAUL S. WOLPE
Yale University

Who Voted For Hitler? *by Richard F. Hamilton. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982. 664 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $16.50.*

The standard answer to the question of the title of this volume, almost from the moment Hitler came to power, has been "the lower-middle class." Members of this class, it was said, were particularly susceptible to Nazi appeals. Perched precariously on the social ladder, anxious about their livelihood and status, they lived in dread of either being "pushed down" or "falling into" the proletariat. As their hopes collapsed during the economic crisis, they turned to the party that promised relief and provided Hitler with the mass support and the string of electoral victories that made him a constitutionally legitimate contender for the chancellorship, and ultimately chancellor. Over the decades, this thesis, expressed in scholarly treatises, college texts, and classrooms, became undisputed fact.

Richard Hamilton, who teaches sociology at McGill, challenges the conventional wisdom. Working with rural and urban voting records for 1928–32 (and particularly for the Reichstag elections of July 1932, when the Nazis took 37.3 percent of the vote), he

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finds little evidence of that vaunted lower-middle-class support. In the countryside, where small farmers and shopkeepers are said to have flocked to the Nazi rolls, voting seems to have been determined not by class but by confessional affiliation. In Catholic areas, the Nazis did poorly; in Protestant areas, they did well; in both, the vote cut across class lines. In the cities, where one would suppose the political orientation of lower-middle-class districts could readily be ascertained, it turns out that the lower-middle class lived, not by itself, but generally mixed in with the working class. The only truly homogeneous districts were those at the extremes of the economic spectrum, the very rich and the very poor. Here Hamilton found the deepest support for the Nazi party, in the upper- and upper-middle-class districts, not in the mixed districts. In July 1932, for example, in wealthy districts of Berlin, the Nazi vote ranged from 18.5 to 47.2 percent above the city average, figures not matched by any of the mixed districts, which ranged from 2.8 percent below to 13.2 percent above the average. Berlin was no exception. In 14 of Germany's largest cities, Hamilton's analysis shows, the Nazi vote came disproportionately from the "best districts," not from those with lower-middle-class populations.

How can one explain these voting patterns? Hamilton argues, first, that the Nazis became acceptable because much of the bourgeois press and many local elite figures endorsed them and, second, that they gained important grassroots support from an army of political activitists who carried the party's message to the voters. Then, as the depression deepened and the traditional parties refused to take measures against the crisis, the Nazis took on the appearance of a plausible alternative, at the right place at the right time. Hamilton explores these issues in depth, and he offers much detail on the role of the parties and the character of the electoral struggle. But by and large he is on familiar ground here, indebted to the works of William Sheridan Allen, Jeremy Noakes, and others.

The book's originality and significance lie in the analysis of the popular vote. Hamilton's research is thorough, his reasoning clear and persuasive. His conclusions oblige us to revise our assumptions and interpretations. In his last chapter, he notes that the traditional explanation emerged because research techniques were inadequate and because researchers were often influenced by ideological considerations. That the traditional explanation should have persisted over five decades is an unflattering comment on the independence of social scientists.

CHRISTOPH M. KIMMICH
Brooklyn College

The Third World in Soviet Military Thought *by Mark N. Katz. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 188 pp. $18.50.*

Studies of Soviet military policy have recently proliferated nearly as quickly as the missiles in Moscow's arsenal. Hence the author need not only master the subject, but also overcome readers' natural skepticism about the possibility of producing new information or insights. Mark Katz seems undaunted by previous analyses of either Soviet Third World policy or Soviet military thought, and we should be grateful for such academic

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fearlessness. This slim book easily stands tall on book shelves as a reference on either Soviet foreign policy or Soviet military thought. Katz argues persuasively that there have been excellent studies of Soviet military thought on nuclear war, war in Europe, or case studies of Soviet involvement in the Third World. But no one has yet tackled the question of what the Soviet military thinks about conflict in the Third World (p. 9).

While at the Brookings Institution, Katz took on the task of producing a policy-relevant study. The result is an excellent, if less than definitive, analysis of Soviet military thought, mostly in the Brezhnev era (since 1964). Katz focuses on six major dimensions of Soviet military thought: the relationship of local wars to world war; the nature of war in the Third World; the relationship of peaceful coexistence to local wars; the Soviet view of indigeneous forces; the Soviet view of the American view of Third World conflict; and the actual role of the Soviet Union in Third World conflict. (p. 10). His conclusions are diverse—indeed, so diverse that some of the tight analytical focus is sometimes lost. Nevertheless, the overall impression is of a solid scholarly study. Katz sees the Soviet military as having gone from optimism about the chances for Third World revolution to pessimism about the complexities to be overcome. He trenchantly argues that like the United States, the Soviet superpower has had to come to terms with the realities of Third World conflict that are not subject to great power machinations. Unlike Washington, Moscow retains more zealous desires to overcome these local forces, despite the rising costs. Katz suggests that there are real opportunities for the United States to take advantage of this Soviet folly. He argues that when a Soviet-backed regime is weak, then rebels (as in Afghanistan) should be supported. When a local regime is quarelling with Moscow (as in Sadat's Egypt), the United States should support the local regime's independent instincts. This is sensible policy, if somewhat simplistically stated.

Katz has obviously managed to walk the tightrope between the simplicities of hawks and doves in debates on Soviet strategy. For this reason alone, his study of Soviet Third World policy deserves careful reading. Inevitably, however, problems do emerge that some might find disturbing. Apart from the epilogue—a nine-page dash through policy implications for the West—one other problem stands out. Especially in a study of Soviet military thought, it is crucial to develop a complex grasp of party-army relations. Katz obviously eschews simple totalitarian models of decision-making and is aware of the perils of simple interest-group approaches, but alas, he often stumbles on the latter hurdle. A more comprehensive analysis would have brought out the splits within both the party and the army, as well as the points where cross-cutting cleavages appear. This plea for greater sophistication might well have been met in a longer study. Katz's basically sensible center ground analysis of the broader problem of Soviet policy gives every indication that he would have done an excellent job.

GERALD SEGAL
University of Leicester, England

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Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War *by William Taubman. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1982. 291 pp. $18.95.*

For all the volumes that have been written on the origins of the Cold War, we have relatively few good analyses of Stalin's foreign policy during that critical period in East-West relations. William Taubman attempts to fill that void in what is an admittedly interpretative historical analysis of Soviet-American relations from 1941 to 1953. The author stresses ideology and political culture in attempting to reconstruct Stalin's motives and intentions. In the absence of diplomatic and personal archives and with only a handful of eyewitness accounts by former associates of Stalin, however, the author is forced to presume too much. Throughout the book we are repeatedly told what Stalin "thought," "assumed," or "guessed." These presumptions are seldom documented by references.

Documentary and methodological limitations aside, the book nevertheless provides a lucid, sometimes glib, discussion of Stalin's intricate dealings with the West. The author avoids the easy temptation to assess blame for the Cold War to any one actor. The deteriorating state of relations resulted from the interaction of many complex factors: Truman's increasing intransigence; the overselling of the Truman Doctrine; the Marshall Plan; National Security Council Directive 68 (NSC-68); Stalin's belligerence on German reunification and Berlin; his persistent attempts at manipulating American policymakers; and above all, the mutual perception by U.S. and Soviet leaders of the hostile intentions and lack of good faith on the part of the other side. At fault were both the naiveté of American politicians and the xenophobia of the Soviets.

A particularly enlightening aspect of Taubman's analysis is his extensive discussion of Soviet negotiating behavior. He departs from the usual preoccupation with the specific substantive issues of the numerous diplomatic meetings during this period to examine Stalin's negotiating style and tactics. Taubman sees clear parallels to recent Soviet negotiating tactics at the SALT and other negotiations and summit meetings.

Unlike many accounts of the Cold War, this work devotes considerable attention to the cleavages that existed within the Western alliance, especially French and British opposition to American proposals for the reunification of Germany. It is unclear, however, to what extent Stalin was aware of and able to exploit such differences.

Implicit in Taubman's discussion is the assumption that Soviet-American relations in the 1980s bear a striking resemblence to those of the 1940s and 1950s. In the opening pages, the author draws a comparison between the Truman Doctrine and President Carter's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's proposals to seek reciprocity in American relations with the USSR and Ambassador W. Averell Harriman's suggestion of linking political concessions to the receipt of American credits are portrayed as forerunners of Henry Kissinger's policy of détente.

In the concluding chapter, the author asks the question that has been presumed throughout the book, namely, whether the patterns of Soviet foreign policy behavior as observed in the 1940s still apply today. The author builds a convincing case for continuity in Soviet foreign policy. Yet he does not give adequate recognition to the ramifications of the burgeoning military might of the Soviet Union, the experience of détente, the dramatic changes in the Third World and the global economy, the erosion of both the

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East and West blocs, and the improved ties between the United States and China. While the continuities in Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy are appealingly presented, the author's final assessment that "Stalin's American policy lives" overstates the case. Nevertheless, Taubman provides the scholar and student of Soviet affairs and U.S. foreign policy with a provocative and engaging analysis of Stalin's foreign policy and the origins of the Cold War.

GORDON B. SMITH
University of South Carolina

South Africa: The Prospects of Peaceful Change *by Theodor Hanf, Heribert Weiland, and Gerda Vierdag. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1981. 492 pp. $35.00.*

This book is an English translation of the volume entitled *Südafrika, friedlicher Wandel?* that was published in Germany in June 1978. There is a brief preface to the English edition in which the authors explain that they felt no need to update the text to take account of the changes that have occurred in southern Africa during the three-year period between the publication of the two editions. They do include a postscript, however, written by Lawrence Schlemmer, incorporating more recent survey findings.

The aim of the book is to assess the prospects for peaceful change towards a more democratic and socially just system of government in South Africa. While recognizing that the chances of such an outcome are remote, the authors explore the possibilities of some form of consociationalism and consider its viability in relation to the findings of surveys conducted among the elites and the masses of both whites and urban blacks.

The book consists of five major sections. Part One outlines the theoretical problems of resolving conflicts in plural societies and their relationship to the present South African political system. Two further sections are based on the survey findings that represent the original and highly valuable core of the study. There are extensive quotations from the respondents that allow readers to draw their own conclusions about the authors' interpretation of the data. Part Four relates these findings to the prospects of establishing a consociational democracy, and the final section speculates about the future chances of such an outcome given that it is a theoretically conceivable option.

It is hard to do justice to the complexity of the argument in the space of a short review, but it is clear that the authors are torn between their desire to see a peaceful settlement of South Africa's racial problems and their detached recognition of the improbability of this outcome. They bend over backwards to read hopeful signs into the survey findings but are left, in the last analysis, with a white political elite unable and unwilling to share any power with urban Africans. This is the fundamental issue in South African society and one that is unlikely to be resolved without an enormous escalation of conflict.

Part of the problem lies in the authors' tendency to view a peaceful solution as the only alternative to full-scale racial warfare. It might be more helpful to consider war and peace as simply poles on a continuum of increasing pressure and violence, which in turn affect

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the bargaining process between the various groups in a plural society. As the authors demonstrate, it is quite clear that the National Party "does not intend to devolve or share an iota of real power at this stage" (p. 443). The recent split in the National Party resulting in the formation of Dr. Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party (CP), a development thought highly unlikely by Hanf and his colleagues in 1978 (p. 414), has produced a combined "ultra right" vote (CP and Herstigte Nasionale Party) in by-elections at Germiston and Parys equal to that of the government. The National Party leadership seems unlikely to make real concessions unless forced to do so by increased black pressure, but by the time it may be ready to yield, it seems doubtful whether the black leadership will be able to accept a settlement short of unitary democracy. This is the South African dilemma. Without an escalation of violence, Gatsha Buthelezi and other "moderate" leaders will be unable to exact meaningful political advantage from the white elite; after a violent struggle, he could well face the same fate as Bishop Abel Muzorewa in Zimbabwe.

Despite these reservations about their interpretation, there can be no doubt that Hanf and his associates have produced a remarkably important work which no serious student of South African politics can afford to ignore.

JOHN STONE
University of London, Goldsmiths' College

Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century *by Leo Kuper. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1982. 255 pp. $15.00.*

This book makes compelling reading. The charge of "genocide" is much used in moral and political rhetoric in the contemporary world, often in such a way as to cheapen its meaning by attachment to a particular ideological bias or political program. Yet at the same time, the reality of mass extermination of persons for racial, ethnic, religious, or other reasons has repeatedly thrust itself forward for judgment and reaction. What has been needed for some time is a serious and credible effort to separate demagoguery and double standards of judgment from the assessment of whether genocide is actually being practiced in a given situation. Kuper's book performs this task. While not dispassionate (on the contrary, Kuper is outspokenly on the side of the victims), he is objective. While not hesitating to extend condemnation where indicated, he is fair. The book, however, is not only about defining and identifying genocide where it exists and clearing away overblown verbiage where genocide is not present, it is also, and perhaps more importantly, a scathing critique of international instruments regarding the identification and punishment of genocide as a crime. For example, Kuper scores the United Nations as condoning genocide in practice, while opposing it mightily in theory, and produces overwhelmingly damaging evidence to support his charge. The historical ineffectiveness of the United Nations in policing the internal activities of its member states is common knowledge approaching scandal; yet the service rendered by Kuper is to lay the causes and effects before his readers, raising the question whether something may not be done to reverse this state of affairs.

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The structure of this book is essentially tripartite, with the early chapters (1-5) on theoretical issues: the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention; various theories of genocide offered by parties to the contemporary debate ("perspectives on" genocide rather than "theories of"); the connections between social structure and genocide; and the nature of warrants for genocide. The central portion of the book (Chs. 6-8) treats in considerable detail two of the most flagrant examples of genocide from the twentieth century—the Turkish massacre of Armenians and the Nazi campaign against Jews—and treats as well several "related atrocities," as Kuper somewhat bitingly terms them: the purges under Stalin in the Soviet Union; the massacres of Communists in Indonesia in 1965; and the atrocities perpetrated on the population of Cambodia by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea beginning in 1977. The final chapters (9 and 10) apply Kuper's critique in more general ways, arguing that the fundamental problem with the U.N. role in condoning genocidal behavior is the importance of national sovereignty in the current international order. Kuper then turns to the question of how constraints internal to societies may blunt or choke off genocidal tendencies that in other societies would lead to mass slaughter.

All the parts of Kuper's treatment are useful. His frank willingness to call a spade a spade permeates his entire treatment; no one is ever in doubt as to his sources or his personal stance, and his judgments carry the ring of truth. The book contains much useful historical material, including especially the material relating to U.N. debates on the framing of the Genocide Convention and subsequent debates regarding the definition and ensuring of human rights. Similarly, the analysis of the massacres of the Armenians and the Jews, though focused on events already well-documented in history, possesses the virtues of tight argument, compelling examples, and vivid language. More important, perhaps, as an effort to establish a history to be remembered is his depiction of less well-known cases like those of Burundi, Uganda, East Pakistan (before it became the independent Bangladesh), the Sudan, and Nigeria during its civil war. Kuper blames the United Nations for tacitly accepting cases like this and thus implicitly encouraging other states to do what they might with minorities in their populations. His criticism of the United Nations is devastating—though it would take a great optimist to expect any change to follow soon.

Kuper is less than convincing in his effort to assign causes for the evils he documents, however. The villain behind U.N. inaction is national sovereignty; Kuper devotes an entire chapter to making this case. Nevertheless, what might be the alternative, and might any alternative not be worse yet, at least in any future anyone could reliably forecast? How would we get wherever Kuper would have us go without upheaval and suffering in the meantime? These questions are not addressed. Kuper suggests that the ideal of self-determination of peoples is a built-in restraint on national sovereignty in the United Nations, but notes further that it always takes second place to sovereignty when issues like genocide arise. Should this be taken to imply that the resolution ought to be the other way round? Does not the idea of self-determination of peoples (lacking a workable definition of "peoples") also need limiting in some way? Further, in searching for the causes of genocidal conflict, Kuper identifies plural societies as the fundamental structural cause. Yet there are plural societies all over the globe, and genocide is not endemic to more than

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a minority of them. On the face of it, plurality seems an obvious precondition: there must be an oppressor group and an oppressed one. This is so obvious, however, that it leads nowhere, unless the goal is to fragment societies down to small, integral, tribal communities. This would not eliminate genocide, but would only mean that it would be practiced *across* boundaries instead of *within* them.

These may be churlish comments. The solution is far from anyone's grasp, and Kuper has at least tried to suggest answers to the problem. Yet the fundamental value of his book is in his analysis of the scope of the problem of genocide in the contemporary world and its connection to the policies of nations and their international behavior.

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON
Rutgers University

Modernization and the Working Class: The Politics of Legitimacy *by Carlos H. Waisman. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982. 244 pp. $27.00.*

Modern social science is Marxist in many senses, one of which is in the sheer volume of attention it gives to the political position and activity of the working class in capitalist societies. Yet modern social science is not thoroughly Marxist. For Marx, the problem was the way the working class would surpass capitalism. For modern social science, the problem is the manner in which the working class can be incorporated into the capitalist political system.

Waisman begins by identifying two dimensions of incorporation: whether the working class is an autonomous political actor and whether it accepts "basic" capitalist social relations. Next, he conceptualizes collective political action. His argument here seems to be that rational-choice concepts are appropriate for describing "elite" actions, whereas working-class actions are described best by collective-behavior concepts. Thus, elites have specific goals and good information about goal achievement; elite actions can be categorized as inclusion of the working class, exclusion, and co-optation. In contrast, working classes have diffuse goals and poor information about goal achievement; working-class actions can be categorized only as acceptance or rejection, in thought or in action, of the status quo.

Waisman offers unsurprising hypotheses about the interdependencies of elite and working-class actions. For example, elite inclusion creates working-class acceptance, and working-class acceptance discourages elite exclusion. Case studies of Disraeli's Britain, Bismarck's Germany, and Peron's Argentina are used to illustrate the interdependencies.

The case studies are followed by a brief elaboration of the hypothesis that the timing of a society's industrialization affects the incorporation of its working class. Timing is taken to be a symptom of two deeper dimensions: whether a pre-capitalist sector co-exists with the capitalist sector and whether foreigners control significant economic resources. The existence of both a pre-capitalist sector and foreign control tend to discourage full incorporation of the working class as an independent actor which accepts the status quo. Here,

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Waisman comes close to a world-systems explanation of the global distribution of liberal democracy.

There follows a shift in the unit of analysis, from the whole society to the individual worker. The major question is, does the economic position of a worker – for example, occupation, living standard, employment status—affect his or her acceptance of the status quo? Waisman summarizes the answers to this question in the writings of Marx, Bakunin, and Marcuse, but then, instead of offering a systematic theory of his own, proceeds directly to research findings about the Argentine working class. The findings are much too complicated to be described here, but most are consistent with established views. For example, prolonged employment experience in the urban–industrial milieu tends to be associated with acceptance of the status quo, but unemployment tends to be associated with rejection.

The book ends with a brief return to whole societies. Waisman says that his Argentine research helps to explain working class acceptance of the status quo as industrialization proceeds. The logic is that industrialization deposits a progressively larger proportion of the workers in positions that generate acceptance.

Some readers will appreciate Waisman's predilection for abstract conceptualization, whereas others may find the jargon clumsy, vague, and wasteful. Some will be interested in the data on Argentine workers; others will find in these data little to jolt established views. Some readers will be comforted by the implicit adherence to modern social science's pessimistic ideology; still others, unconvinced that liberal democracy is the best we can do, will prefer works that combine competent analysis with the old Marxist optimism.

JAN SMITH
Ohio Wesleyan University

The New Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine Pollution and the Exploration of Antarctica *edited by Johnathan I. Charney. Totowa, N.J., Allanheld, Osmun and Co., 1982. 343 pp. $39.50.*

The emerging ability of countries to exploit commercially such common spaces as the oceans and outer space has led to a resurgence of nationalism toward the use of these spaces. The new Law of the Sea Convention sanctions massive extensions of national sovereignty by coastal states, extensions which are unique in this century. The American Society of International Law formed a multi-disciplinary study group to address two problems in which nationalism either is or will be an important factor: ocean poilution from land-based sources and the exploitation of minerals in Antarctica. This book, which is a product of the study group, is a first-rate collection of articles on these two subjects.

Part I focuses on land-based sources of marine pollution. It opens with an excellent overview of ocean-based pollution and of efforts to reconcile the competing goals of efficient transport and preservation of the marine environment. The subsequent three chapters analyze the several dimensions – the scientific, the political and economic, and the

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legal—of the problem of land-based sources of ocean pollution. Together these chapters provide a cogent and insightful analysis of the issues.

Part II addresses resource exploitation in Antarctica. The first four chapters look to the development of mineral resources in the area and, in the mode of the previous part, address several disciplinary dimensions of the problem. The chapters explore the potential mineral resources in the area and the environmental risks associated with developing the resources, the economics of exploiting them, the legal constraints on doing so, and the alternative strategies for a regime governing mineral exploitation in the area. The concluding chapter addresses the new regime for exploitation of living marine resources in Antarctica. It provides an extensive analysis of the negotiating history of the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctica Marine Living Resources and identifies potential problems in its implementation. The appendices contain the texts of the two Antarctica Conventions and other documents relating to the exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica that are otherwise not readily available.

All of the chapters are informative, thoughtful, carefully researched, and well written. They reflect the careful review to which they were subjected by their peers and provide essential reading for anyone interested in these areas.

There is, however, something missing from the book: a conceptual piece linking the various chapters of the book together. The title of the book indicates that there is a new nationalism which affects our use of common spaces, and the editor alludes to this development in his introduction, but the thesis is not systematically developed and tested. An article which develops this theme would be a useful contribution and could draw upon the wealth of material that is contained in this excellent volume.

EDITH BROWN WEISS
Georgetown University Law Center

Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism: Mozambique and Tanzania *by James H. Mittelman. New York, Academic Press, 1981. 277 pp. $27.50.*

This slender, well-written book explores the transition to socialism by analyzing the configuration of class forces surrounding two events in two states of East Africa. The events chosen for analysis are the seizure of state power in Mozambique by Frelimo in 1974–75, and the nationalization of the banks in Tanzania in 1967–69. Mittelman's thesis is that the seizure of state power in Mozambique represented a progressive step toward socialism and therefore constitutes a "transitional conjuncture," whereas the nationalization of the banks in Tanzania was not genuinely "transitional," but only seemingly so. Mittelman proposes to analyze the class struggle in two instances by employing the notion of *conjuncture*, which he defines as "the precise state of class struggle at a particular time" (p. 4). By focusing on these snapshots of the class struggle in two countries, he attempts to explain why one conjuncture could potentially lead to socialism while the other could not. Mittelman's theoretical claims are at once both modest and important.

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Mittelman argues that the bank nationalizations in Tanzania were not truly transitional because the state apparatus that gained control of the financial institutions was captured not by the workers and peasants but by a fraction of the petty bourgeoisie, and that bank policies pursued after the nationalizations actually facilitated the penetration of international capital. In Mozambique, however, Frelimo's victory represented a victory for the worker–peasant alliance which sought to destroy the colonial state, not to inherit it, and to introduce profound changes in the relations of production. The seizure of state power in Mozambique, therefore, constituted a transitional conjuncture.

Mittelman is guarded in projections for outcomes of the transitional phase, arguing that his two case studies are only "windows" (p. 7), and events may yet reverse the gains or losses of any given conjuncture (p. 238). As Mittelman argues, the outcome of the process of struggle and change is not determined. Furthermore, the two situations are not, strictly speaking, comparable. Achieving independence is not the same as nationalizing banks.

The difficulty of historical comparison of two countries in different situations is exacerbated by the author's condensed treatment of historical factors. His most detailed and well-researched chapters focus on the events immediately surrounding the conjunctures he studies. Yet there are important elements of his argument presented in the conclusion that have not been discussed in the text. For example, in his conclusion Mittelman explains the non-transitional nature of Tanzania's conjuncture in terms of the non-violent, accommodationist nature of the independence movement. He does not, however, explore the debate regarding the class nature of the Tanzanian state, supplying only a bibliography in a footnote. Rather, he relies on Shivji's work, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, to provide the analysis of the Tanzanian class structure. Although Mittelman does not accept Shivji's argument uncritically (see pp. 142–45), the notion of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, based on contentious assumptions, is used throughout Mittelman's analysis. Mittelman acknowledges the weaknesses of Shivji's approach (p. 145), but he does not subsequently qualify the concept of bureaucratic bourgeoisie in his own analysis.

Mittelman effectively whets the reader's appetite for a larger, more detailed study of class forces in each country, but this does not detract from the considerable accomplishment the book represents. It is an important contribution to our understanding not only of Tanzania and Mozambique, but of socialism in Africa as well.

JAMES PLETCHER
Washington, D.C.

Inside the Iranian Revolution *by John D. Stempel. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1981. 336 pp. $17.50.*

The Iranian revolution, aside from being fascinating in its own right, offers a major opportunity for the student of revolution in the modern world. Here is a chance to test many current theories on such things as long- and short-range causation, factors affecting governmental capacity to resist revolution, and the relative significance of such variables

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as personality, class, ethnicity, religion, ideology, and outside intervention. The book under review is a good starting point for a non-specialist in search of an overview of the events preceding and immediately following the fall of the Shah. The author, who served in the U.S. embassy in Tehran from July 1975 to June 1979, rising to the position of acting chief of the political section, relies to a substantial degree on his observations during his tenure at the embassy, interviews he conducted with Iranians, as well as published materials. He presents a solid *tour d'horizon* of the revolution's development: a short history of the Iranian monarchy and political system; a discussion of the social and economic changes in Iran after the oil price increases of the early 1970s; a detailed account of the political events leading up to the fall of the Shah (April 1977–January 1979); a somewhat less satisfying discussion of the events from January 1979 to January 1981; and an interesting account of the U.S. diplomatic role.

The title of the book is a bit misleading. While Stempel clearly had a good set of contacts and access to much inside information, he was, as a practical matter, an outside observer. As such, he has an important perspective to offer. It is nonetheless different from one we might expect from a participant in the revolution. The strength of the book lies in its account of the years from 1977 to 1979. Here the reader will find a well-written and detailed presentation to ponder. The book is less satisfying in other respects, however. Two major problems stand out. First, while one can appreciate the necessity of protecting one's vulnerable sources and the caution which results from having had access to classified materials, more citation and substantiation for some of the assertions made are in order. Statements such as "most Iranians expected the Shah to direct Azhari to restore order" (p. 135) or "the overwhelming majority of villagers in rural towns near Tehran believed the Shah would return to the throne" (p. 310) need substantiation. These statements, and others like them (see the reference to "the public," p. 118) are not covered by the blanket statement in note 2, Ch. 5, p. 328.

The second problem has to do with what is, perhaps, the central thesis of the book, namely, that the Shah's demise was essentially his own fault. Stempel believes that the Shah could have saved himself if he had been willing to use ruthless repression against his radical opposition while at the same time opening up the political system to the moderates. The Shah, in Stempel's view, suffered a failure of nerve which Stempel attributes variously to the Shah's illness, his humanity, and/or his myopia. He also faults the Shah for lacking a coherent strategy or plan, a sense of where he wanted to take the country.

This is a very complex matter, and Stempel's tendency to present his argument without qualification tends to oversimplify the issue (see, for example, pp. 278–79). Aside from the problem of hindsight versus foresight (see the quote from Harold Saunders on p. 286), there are at least two major theoretical issues. First, how can anyone be certain what the results of greater repression would have been? Stempel assumes it would have dealt with threats from the radical religious and secular opposition. It is possible to speculate that such repression would only have enraged them further. One needs a theory here as to how repression works. Second, how "inevitable" was the revolution seen in terms of the relationship between long- and short-term causes? Stempel presumably sees long-term causes as more important since he analyses them early in the book. Unfortunately, he

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makes no attempt to relate these in his analysis toward the end. As these brief comments suggest, I believe the book would have been strengthened had the author drawn on the rich theoretical literature (much of it of recent vintage) dealing with the question of the ways incumbent regimes lose or maintain the capability to withstand revolutionary challenge.

LEWIS BROWNSTEIN
State University of New York at New Paltz

U.S.-Mexican Energy Relationships *edited by Jerry R. Ladman, Deborah J. Baldwin, and Elihu Bergman. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1981. 238 pp. $23.95.*

This book is the edited proceedings of a conference held in December 1979 at Arizona State University, sponsored by Americans for Energy Independence (Washington, D.C.) and ASU's Center for Latin American Studies. Papers have been grouped into four sections, each followed by comments and a discussion summary.

As the editors' introduction observes, several major themes emerge from the collection. First, although energy is increasingly important in the United States-Mexican relationship, it is unlikely to become the dominant ingredient. Second, Mexican energy will not totally solve U.S. energy problems, nor will it quickly resolve longstanding issues of Mexican national development. Mexico still must wrestle with poor agriculture, grave unemployment and underemployment, a growing gap between rich and poor, a massive out-migration of citizens, a need to boost non-oil exports, inefficient industry, and governmental corruption. Energy wealth can help fund public programs, but it also tends to encourage imports and foreign borrowing.

The lead essay by Edward J. Williams highlights the "ambiguity and fragility" of U.S.-Mexican energy relations, which unfold in a context of historical antagonisms and are additionally complicated both by domestic politics and by the linkages between energy and other intractable issues (p. 14). Mexico's official oil production policy has shifted "from conservationistic to expansionistic and back again" (p. 14), and U.S. diplomacy has floundered in cases like the gas purchase deal and the Ixtoc-I blowout.

Part II of the collection, "The Mexican Perspective," begins with Bernardo F. Grossling's essay stressing (as do several others) the difficulty of estimating Mexico's total recoverable petroleum reserves; he calculates that the Reforma-Campeche Province alone could range from 100 to 700 billion barrels or more (p. 43). Isidro Sepúlveda traces the evolution of the Mexican National Petroleum Company (PEMEX) and its change in emphasis from social and import-substitution-industrialization goals to economic efficiency and export-orientation. René Villarreal argues that Mexico has a better chance to become a "high-level industrial power" by the year 2000 than most other new oil-exporting countries because Mexico has four decades of industrial experience and political stability, but he urges policymakers to ensure that petroleum wealth will improve the lot of the masses

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(p. 85). Laura Randall examines various explanations for Mexico's inflation from 1976–79 and the role of oil in this connection.

The most interesting essay in Part III, "The U.S. Perspective," by Clark W. Reynolds, compares the transformation of the U.S. Southwest from the 1940s to 1980 with Mexico's development plans. According to Clark, success for Mexico "will require the kind of sustained big push . . . that it took a war to induce in the U.S. Southwest" (p. 159).

In Part IV, separate essays by Mario Ojeda and Olga Pellicer de Brody advance contrasting assessments of the international bargaining power inherent in Mexico's energy resources. Ojeda sees Mexico's influence already increased in certain situations, while Pellicer de Brody regards the United States as essentially unmoved on major issues like immigration. Obviously, we have here an example of glass half-full or half-empty reasoning. Mexican energy is undoubtedly a bargaining chip, but it is insufficient in itself to guarantee Mexican victories on all issues where other important considerations come into play. Moreover, it is debatable how free Mexico may be to withhold energy from those countries that remain intransigent.

This book appeared before the 1982 world oil glut and Mexico's subsequent balance-of-payments crisis, devaluation of the peso, and nationalization of the banks. Although none of the contributors were able to foresee these events, their writings do shed considerable light on the background of the present turmoil.

YALE H. FERGUSON
Rutgers University-Newark

The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention *by Richard H. Immerman. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982. 291 pp. $24.50.*

This study provides us with a precise description of the role that U.S. policymakers played in overthrowing the democratically elected Jacob Arbenz Guzmán government. It is a book that provides deep insights into U.S. policy in Central America. The centerpiece of the study begins with a detailed account of the diplomatic and political efforts undertaken by the Truman administration to undermine the Arbenz government. Washington had decided that the Guatemalan president's moderate agrarian reform was communist-inspired, thus paving the way for a political confrontation. The most information section of the study focuses on the comprehensive effort at covert operation launched by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers, John and Allen. The strategy combined a massive international propaganda campaign and economic pressure with the arming of a right-wing military clique.

The strategy involved high-level secret planning to overthrow the Arbenz government, combined with public relations statements aimed at persuading the U.S. public that the impulse for change was a purely local "popular" affair. The process of destabilization involved efforts at the regional level to secure Latin American support, as well as a concerted campaign to arouse congressional approval. The successful execution of the opera-

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tion was exclusively the result of U.S.-controlled operations: the air raids, the radio broadcasts, and even the selection of the coup leader were in the hands of U.S. operatives. The study concludes by pointing to the different effects that the coup had on U.S. policymakers and Cuban revolutionaries almost a decade later. Washington's Guatemalan success led them to attempt to replicate it in Cuba in 1961; the failure of Arbenz, however, provided lessons for the revolutionaries. The result was the Bay of Pigs debacle.

This excellent study highlights the superficiality of much of political science writing, which assumes that public statements of policy substantially reflect the actions of policymakers. The corollary has been the tendency to dismiss scholarly efforts to identify covert activities as "conspiratorial theories." The study also demonstrates the pervasive linkages between imperial intervention and corporate interests through their common opposition to structural reforms adversely affecting U.S. business. The discussion also clearly demonstrates the degree of coordination and consensus among policymakers (State, Defense, and CIA) in fashioning the destabilization effort. Differences were largely tactical. The "imperial" policymaking apparatus appears more cohesive and self-conscious than the "bureaucratic politics" analysts have led their followers to believe.

At the historical level, the study presents a convincing picture of President Eisenhower as a calculating and obtrusive interventionist, unlike the benign portrait that has been generally presented. Moreover, recently released documents analyzed in the volume suggest that his interventionist posture was less the product of his being subject to the nefarious influence of John Foster Dulles and more the result of personal conviction. He was a true believer in the right of the United States to assert its supremacy in this hemisphere.

Finally, the study contributes to a better understanding of the roots of the popular guerrilla movement and of the type of savage state repression taking place in Guatemala today. The military regime that emerged from the U.S.-sponsored coup restored all the land and privileges to U.S. corporations and denied any and all forms of democratic expression. Since 1954, over 30,000 Guatemalans (mostly dispossessed Indians) have been slaughtered by successive military regimes that Washington dubbed the saviors of democracy.

JAMES PETRAS
State University of New York at Binghamton

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

Africa South of the Sahara, 1982–83 *prepared by Europa Publications. London, Europa Publications, 1982. 1,399 pp. $120.00.*

The Almanac of American Politics, 1982 *prepared by Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa. Washington, D.C., Barone and Co., 1982. 1,258 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $16.95.*

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The Book of the States, 1982–83, vol. 24 *edited by Jack L. Gardner and L. Edward Purcell. Lexington, Ky., Council of State Governments, 1982. 734 pp. $35.00.*

Border and Territorial Disputes *edited by Alan J. Day. Essex, Longman Group, 1982. 406 pp. $75.00.*

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook, 1982, 2 vols. *compiled by Gale Research Co. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1982. 1,454 pp. $62.00.*

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook, 1982, Supplement *compiled by Gale Research Co. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1982. 386 pp. $35.00.*

The European Economic Community: A Guide to Sources of Information *compiled by Gay Scott. Edinburgh, Capital Planning Information, 1982. 72 pp. $20.00.*

Eurostat Index: A Detailed Keyword Subject Index to the Statistical Series Published by the Statistical Office of the European Community *compiled by Anne Ramsey. Edinburgh, Capital Planning Information, 1982. 152 pp. $35.00.*

Guide to Congress, 3d ed. *edited by Michael D. Wormser. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982. 1,185 pp. $90.00.*

Index to International Public Opinion, 1980–1981 *edited by Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 584 pp. $75.00.*

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The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 40: 1916–1917 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982. 598 pp. $30.00.*

USSR in Maps *prepared by J.C. Dewdney. New York, Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982. 117 pp. $29.50.*

V.I. Lenin: An Annotated Bibliography of English-Language Sources to 1980 *compiled by David R. Egan, Melinda A. Egan, and Julie Anne Genthner. Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow Press, 1982. 482 pp. $32.50.*

Worldwide Government Directory, with Inter-Governmental Organizations, 1983 *prepared by Lambert Publications. Washington, D.C., Lambert Publications, 1982. 972 pp. $355.00.*

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

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
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

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

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